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Abstract
This work analyses working hours, childcare support, wage inequality and windfall gains.
In Chapter I, I test whether family-support policies play a role in explaining variation in working 
hours across countries. I analyse childcare subsidies and family cash benefits and I distinguish 
between people with children and people without children. Childcare subsidies should increase 
working hours in the economy and these effects should differ between parents and nonparents. I 
test this using household data for a set of European countries and the US. Empirical analysis, 
however, does not support the family-policy explanation. The effects of the policies on working 
hours are weak and insignificant. Furthermore, I do not find evidence for the expected differences 
between parents and nonparents. I conclude that family policies are not helpful in explaining the 
variation in working hours across countries.
In Chapter II, I argue that rising inequality in offered wages lowers average working hours. If the 
labour supply is concave in wages, the aggregate effect of the decrease in working hours of low- 
paid workers is greater than the increase in working hours of high-paid workers. Furthermore, due 
to low market opportunities, some of the low-paid workers may leave the labour force and 
become inactive. Using the CPS-MORG data for prime-age men I find evidence in support of this 
explanation. After controlling for the average wage, wage inequality has a negative effect on the 
labour supply.
In Chapter III, I investigate whether workers adjust hours of work in response to windfall gains 
using data from the European Household Panel. The results suggest that unexpected variation in 
income has a small negative effect on working hours. Furthermore, the empirical findings show 
that the impact of windfall gains is more important for young and old individuals, is most 
negative for married individuals with young children, but can be positive for single individuals at 
the age of 40.
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General Introduction
This work comprises of three papers of which the main topic is working hours. It is important to 
study working hours for several reasons. In many settings working hours represent an argument 
in the utility function of individuals, hence they directly affect welfare. Working hours are also a 
direct demonstration of the labour supply, and in this way they are central to the workings of the 
labour market and the whole economy. In this work I analyse working hours in relation to 
childcare support, wage inequality and windfall gains.
In Chapter I, I test whether family-support policies play a role in explaining variation in working 
hours across countries. There are large differences across countries in the actual hours worked per 
person. According to OECD data, working hours per person are on average about 40% higher in 
the US than in Belgium, Germany or France. Even within Europe itself, differences are 
substantial; an average person in the UK or Scandinavia works almost 30% more than the average 
person in continental Europe. There is large body of research that has tried to explain this 
variation. Prescott (2004) argues that such a big US-EU gap in working hours can be explained 
almost completely by the higher taxes prevalent in Europe. However, while the tax story is 
plausible when comparing the US with European countries, it cannot accommodate the variation 
in hours within Europe. More specifically, it fails to explain the fact that in Scandinavia, despite 
facing higher taxes, people on average work more than in continental Europe.
In response to this Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007) propose an extension of the simple tax 
story. They argue that it is not only important how big the tax burden is, but also how the 
government uses its tax proceeds. If taxes are used to support disabled people who cannot work, 
for example, this would increase the differences in hours worked. On the other hand, if  taxes are 
used to subsidise day care for children of parents who work, this would dampen the effect of 
taxes on work-hours differences. They expand the model to allow for the service sector that 
produces childcare and other home care services. By means of calibration and simulation they 
show that accounting for stylised differences in public policies, including the public provision for 
household services (i.e. childcare), they can much better fit the data on working hours across 
countries.
The purpose of Chapter I is to identify the role of family policies in explaining working-hours 
variation across countries. Prescott (2004), Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007) focus on 
simulations of calibrated macroeconomic models with a representative agent. However, there is 
an underlying logic behind the aggregate effects that they consider. For example, higher childcare
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subsidies increase aggregate working hours. But the reason for this is that with higher childcare 
support parents are stimulated to work more, therefore they are the ones for which we should 
observe large increases in working hours. In my approach I thus take one step back; I ask who 
and how is affected by the family policies, and whether evidence of this can be found in the data 
rather than by means of simulation and calibration.
First, I focus on comparisons of two groups, people with children (parents) and people without 
children (nonparents). Intuitively, family policies should have most of their effects concentrated 
on the recipients: people with (young) children. Second, I focus my attention on two types of 
policies: provision of childcare services by the government (childcare subsidies) and direct cash 
transfers to families (cash benefits). I develop a simple labour supply model with taxes, childcare 
subsidies and family cash transfers and with two types of households: parents and nonparents. 
The two types differ in their utility towards childcare and in their budget constraints due to 
differences in policy receipts. I show that, holding taxes fixed, one would expect a positive effect 
of childcare subsidies and a negative effect of cash benefits on aggregate hours worked in the 
market. Furthermore, effects of each policy on working hours of parents should be stronger than 
effects on working hours of nonparents. Another interesting prediction from the model concerns 
the effects of family policies on the time spent in childcare at home. Childcare subsidies are 
expected to decrease aggregate childcare at home, while family cash benefits should increase it; 
the effects are again expected to be stronger for parents.
If the family-policy explanation of working-hours variation across countries is correct, then the 
above listed predictions should show up empirically. I obtain data on family support policies 
across countries from the OECD Social Expenditure database. In order to distinguish between 
people with children and people without children I use individual level data from the European 
Household Panel (ECHP) and the US CPS, available for the years 1998 - 2001. Due to the short 
time period of the available data and the low variation in policy variables over time, I mostly 
exploit cross-country variation in my analysis.
The results, however do not support the idea that family support policies can help explain 
differences in working hours across countries. In the preferred specifications with working hours 
as a dependent variable, the estimated effects for the parents are statistically insignificant and 
close to zero. Whereas in countries with higher childcare subsidies participation in the labour 
force is higher, working hours conditional on working are lower, bringing the aggregate effect of 
policies to zero. In regressions with time spent in childcare at home on the left hand side, the 
effects o f policy variables contradict the theory. An analysis performed on the sample of people
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older than 55 years, for which family policy should not matter much, gives rise to evidence that in 
countries with more generous family policies, time spent in childcare of older people is shorter. 
One possible explanation for this is that public childcare support actually substitutes for the 
childcare by older people, rather than for the time spent in childcare of the prime-age group. As a 
majority of older people do not participate in the labour market, family support thus cannot have 
a strong impact on working horns.
There could be important cultural differences across countries that my analysis does not capture. 
Therefore I include into the analysis also two measures of “culture”: average number of adults in 
the household and the incidence of part-time work in the country. After including these controls, 
the aggregate effects of childcare subsidies on working hours become positive and significant; 
however the effects on parents are still weaker than the effects on nonparents. Furthermore, the 
results from the analysis on the time in childcare spent at home still contradict the theory.
In Chapter II, I argue that rising inequality in offered wages lowers average working hours. In my 
work I conceptually follow the “conventional” labour supply literature such as Juhn, Murphy and 
Topel (1991), Juhn (1992) and Welch (1997). In this type of setting an individual’s labour supply 
simply traces the wage that an individual (potentially) earns in the labour market. Assuming a 
positive effect of wages on working hours, if the offered wage of a worker rises, the labour 
supply of a worker will rise. On the other hand, if the offered wage falls, the worker will decrease 
her work effort or may drop out of the labour force altogether. If in addition the labour supply 
function is stable over time, then movements in a worker’s wage will closely determine 
movements in his or her labour supply over time.
According to such a view of the labour market, it is obvious that changes in the wage inequality 
should have a direct impact on labour supply. I argue that a mean preserving spread in the wage 
distribution causes average working hours in the economy to fall. The reasoning behind this is 
quite simple. Suppose that the labour supply function is concave in offered wages. When 
variation in wages increases, keeping the mean wage constant, high-paid workers are getting paid 
more whereas low-paid workers are getting paid less. Due to the concavity of the labour supply, 
effects on the labour supply at the bottom of the wage distribution will be stronger than at the top 
of the wage distribution. Therefore, while high-paid workers increase the number of hours 
supplied to the market by little, low-paid workers decrease their hours supplied to the market 
relatively more. Moreover, for some workers wages are reduced below their reservation wage and 
they decide to drop out of the labour force and work zero hours. In practice, active workers 
usually work a certain amount of hours that is not close to zero. Hence, a decision to leave the
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labour force usually represents a discreet jump and reduces working hours substantially. By this 
argument, therefore, higher variation in wages causes working hours in the economy to fall.
For the results of Chapter III rely heavily on the concavity of the labour supply function. In fact, 
the concavity of the labour supply is something that has been around in the literature, at least 
implicitly, for some time. Much of the established labour-supply literature assumes a concave 
labour supply, as reported also in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). In some cases, the concavity of 
labour supply was reported also explicitly: Juhn et al. (1991) and Juhn and Murphy (1997) find 
that with rising wages labour supply elasticity falls. Furthermore, in the empirical section of 
Chapter II, I find support for the concavity of labour supply with my data.
I report empirical evidence in support of the claim that greater wage inequality decreases average 
hours of work in the economy. I do this using the NBER extracts of the CPS Annual Earnings 
File (also known as the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups) for prime-age men for the period 
1979-2008.1 find evidence that after controlling for the average wage, wage inequality has indeed 
a negative and significant effect on the labour supply. This result is robust to various 
specifications. According to my results, the increase in wage inequality equivalent to the increase 
in the US over the 1979-2008 period would cause an approximately 3% decrease in average hours 
worked in the economy. In the same period average working hours in the economy fell by about 
8%. From this it follows that rising inequality can potentially explain 30-40% of the decrease in 
working hours over time.
The findings of Chapter II are important for several reasons. The chapter deals with two central 
themes in labour economics -  labour supply and inequality. To my best knowledge this is the first 
paper that explicitly relates the conventional static view of labour supply, where labour supply is 
determined by a worker’s own offered wage, with the wage inequality. The results are also 
interesting from the point of view of public policies that affect wage inequality.
In Chapter III, my co-author and I investigate whether workers adjust hours of work in response 
to unanticipated windfall gains. According to the life-cycle model, a relaxation or tightening of 
the consumer’s intertemporal budget constraint can lead both to changes in consumption and to 
changes in labour supply. Windfall gains represent an unanticipated increase in non-eamed 
income and, by reducing an agent’s marginal utility of wealth, they therefore reduce her incentive 
to work.
We analyze the linkages between windfall gains and working hours using data from the European 
Community Household Panel from 1994 to 2001. We show that an unanticipated rise in wealth
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reduces working hours in accordance with the life-cycle model, although the effect is, in general, 
small. The impact of windfall gains is stronger at the external margin, that is, individuals adjust 
their labour supply primarily by entering or dropping out of the labour force, rather than by 
reducing their work hours conditional on working.
We also examine whether “size matters” with respect to the effects of windfalls on working 
hours. We assess how households respond to small, medium or large windfall gains. We find that 
the effects become stronger as the size of the windfalls increases. In particular, men receiving a 
large windfall on average reduce labour supply by 1.3 hours per week, a 3.4% reduction in 
working hours.
Finally, analysing the effects of windfall in relation to various personal characteristics, we find 
that: (i) at younger and older ages, the effect of windfall gains on labour supply is the most 
negative; (ii) for married people and people with young children the windfall gain leads to a 
stronger decrease in working hours and (iii) for single individuals at the age of around 40 the 
effect can be positive. A potential explanation for the latter empirical finding is in the effect of 
windfall gains on reducing liquidity constraints in capital markets. By doing so windfall gains 
may encourage people to become self-employed and increase their working hours, as suggested 
by Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) and Taylor (2001) and also confirmed in our data.
Chapter III contributes to the literature in following ways. This is the first paper that analyses the 
effects of windfall gains on working hours using European data with more than one country 
included. Henley (2004) was the first paper done on European data, but it analyzes the effects of 
capital gains on labour supply using data for Britain only. Furthermore, because we include 15 
countries in our analysis, the sample of people for which we observe windfall gains is large, 
offering a further empirical advantage to our approach. With the panel data set we additionally 
observe a rich set of personal characteristics of individuals. This gives us an opportunity to better 
understand the ways that participation and working-hours decisions vary across different types of 
individuals.
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Chapter I
Can Family-Support Policies Help Explain Differences in 
Working Hours across Countries?
Urban Sila
Abstract: It has been suggested in the literature that taxes and subsidies play an important 
role in explaining the differences in aggregate working hours across countries. In this chapter, 
using individual level data for a set of European countries and the US, I test whether public 
programmes for family support play a role in explaining this variation. Extending a simple 
macroeconomic model, I analyse two types of policies: childcare subsidies and family cash 
benefits. I distinguish between people with children and people without children. Childcare 
subsidies should increase working hours in the economy and these effects should differ 
between people with children and people without children. Public support to families is also 
expected to decrease the amount of time people spend in childcare at home. The empirical 
analysis, however, does not support the family-policy explanation. The effects of the policies 
on working hours are weak and insignificant. In regressions with time spent caring for 
children as a dependent variable, the estimates of the effects contradict the predictions of the 
theory. Furthermore, I do not find evidence for the expected differences in effects between 
parents and nonparents. I conclude that family policies are not helpful in explaining the 
variation in working hours across countries.
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1 Introduction
There are large differences across countries in the actual hours worked per person. According 
to OECD data, working hours per person are on average about 40% higher in the US than in 
Belgium, Germany or France. Even within Europe itself, differences are substantial; an 
average person in the UK or Scandinavia works almost 30% more than the average person in 
continental Europe. There is large body of research that has tried to explain this variation. One 
branch of the literature explains the “hours divide” with differences in tax rates. Prescott 
(2004) relies on calibration techniques and argues that such a big US-EU gap in working 
hours can be explained almost completely by the higher taxes prevalent in Europe. Olovsson 
(2004) similarly finds that much of the gap between the US and Sweden can be explained by 
differences in tax rates. Estimates in Davis and Henrekson (2004) provide evidence that taxes 
significantly reduce the hours worked. However, while the tax story is plausible when 
comparing the US with European countries, it cannot accommodate the variation in hours 
within Europe. More specifically, it fails to explain the fact that in Scandinavia, despite facing 
higher taxes, people on average work more than in continental Europe.
In response to this, Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007) propose an extension of the simple tax 
story. They argue that it is not only important how big the tax burden is, but also how the 
government uses its tax proceeds. While in the model of Prescott (2004) all taxes are returned 
into the economy as a lump sum subsidy, in reality policies are more complicated in ways that 
are important for the working-hours variation. If taxes are used to support disabled people 
who cannot work, for example, this would increase the differences in hours worked. On the 
other hand, if taxes are used to subsidise day care for children of parents who work, this 
would dampen the effect of taxes on work-hours differences. This extension can thus be used 
to better explain the variation in working hours with respect to Scandinavia, where high taxes 
coincide with generous system of public provision of family services1. Ragan (2005) and 
Rogerson (2007) expand the model to allow for a service sector that produces childcare and 
other home care services. By means of calibration and simulation, they show that accounting 
for stylised differences in public policies, including the public provision for household 
services (i.e. childcare), they can much better fit the data on working hours across countries .
1 Rosen (1996) discusses Swedish case.
2 A similar story is offered in Ngai and Pissarides (2008). They examine the implications o f  tax and subsidy 
policies for employment in three stylized worlds o f  welfare: a world with low taxation and low  regulation o f  
market work (i.e. the UK and the U S), a world with higher taxation and regulation (i.e. France and Italy), and a
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The purpose of this chapter is to identify the role of family policies in explaining working- 
hours variation across countries. In this way, I am contributing to the macroeconomic 
literature. Prescott (2004), Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007) focus on simulations of 
calibrated macroeconomic models with a representative agent, but such aggregate effects are 
hard to identify empirically with the limited available data. However, there is an underlying 
logic behind the aggregate effects that they consider. For example, more generous childcare 
policies increase aggregate working hours. But the reason for this is that with higher childcare 
support parents are stimulated to work more, therefore they are the ones for whom we should 
observe large increases in working hours. As such differences may be easier to capture 
empirically, I step away from the simplest macroeconomic model with a representative agent. 
At the same time, however, it is important to remember that throughout the chapter I address a 
macroeconomic question and that my interest lies in explaining the variation in aggregate 
working hours.
First, I focus on comparisons of two groups, people with children {parents) and people 
without children {nonparents). Intuitively, family policies should have most of their effects 
concentrated on the recipients: people with (young) children. Second, I focus my attention on 
two types of policies: provision of childcare services by the government {childcare subsidies) 
and direct cash transfers to families {cash benefits). I develop a simple general equilibrium 
model that focuses on labour supply and includes taxes, childcare subsidies and family cash 
transfers as well as two types of households: parents and nonparents. The two types differ in 
their utility towards childcare and in their budget constraints due to differences in policy 
receipts. I show that, holding taxes fixed, one would expect a positive effect of childcare 
subsidies and a negative effect of cash benefits on aggregate hours worked in the market. 
Furthermore, the effects of each policy on the working hours of parents should be stronger 
than the effects on the working hours o f nonparents. Another interesting prediction from the 
model concerns the effects of family policies on the time spent in childcare at home. 
Childcare subsidies are expected to decrease aggregate childcare at home, while family cash 
benefits should increase it; the effects are again expected to be stronger for parents.
world with high taxation and regulation, but also with high public support o f  market services connected with 
childcare (i.e. Sweden). They claim that taxes and subsidies have different effects on market activity in different 
sectors o f  the economy, depending on how close a substitute the product o f  a particular sector is to home 
production. They argue that in this way they can explain quite well the differences in employment rates in 
different sectors between the three worlds o f  welfare.
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If the family-policy explanation of working-hours variation across countries put forward by 
Prescott (2004), Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007) is correct, then the above listed 
predictions should show up empirically. I obtain data on family support policies across 
countries from the OECD Social Expenditure database. In order to distinguish between people 
with children and people without children I use individual level data from the European 
Household Panel (ECHP) and the US CPS, available for the years 1998 - 2001. Due to the 
short time period of available data and the low variation in policy variables over time, I 
mostly exploit cross-country variation in my analysis.
The results do not support the idea that family support policies can help explain differences in 
working hours across countries. In preferred specifications with working hours as the 
dependent variable, the estimated effects for the parents are statistically insignificant and 
close to zero. Whereas in countries with higher childcare subsidies participation in the labour 
force is higher, working hours conditional on working are lower, bringing the aggregate effect 
of policies to zero. In regressions with time spent in childcare at home on the left hand side, 
the effects of policy variables contradict the theory. An analysis performed on the sample o f 
people older than 55 years, for which family policy should not matter much, gives rise to 
evidence that in countries with stronger family policies, older people spend more time in 
childcare. One possible explanation for this is that public childcare support actually substitutes 
for the childcare by older people, rather than for the time spent in childcare of the prime-age 
group. As the majority of older people do not participate in the labour market, family support 
thus cannot have a strong impact on working hours.
There could be important cultural differences across countries that my analysis does not 
capture. I therefore also include two measures of “culture” in the analysis: the average number 
of adults in the household and the incidence of part-time work in the country. After 
controlling for these variables, the aggregate effects of childcare subsidies on working hours 
become positive and significant; however, the effects on parents are still weaker than the 
effects on nonparents. Furthermore, the results from the analysis on the time in childcare 
spent at home still contradict the theory.
Before turning to the paper, it should be mentioned that the story of taxes and family-policy is 
not the only story that has been put forward as an explanation of cross-country differences in 
working hours; on the contrary, the literature is quite large. Faggio & Nickell (2007) have a 
good statistical survey of the differences in working time across countries and they review 
and discuss various explanations. Alesina et al. (2005) rely on the Blanchard & Wolfers
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(2003) explanation that different institutional settings result in different reactions to adverse 
shocks; i.e. in Europe unionisation and labour market regulation increased sharply after the 
shocks of the 1970s and 1980s. The shocks resulted in the so called “work-sharing” policies, 
which can be used to explain the low hours worked in Europe. Bell & Freeman (1994, 2001), 
Freeman & Schettkat (2001a) and Schettkat (2003) relate working-hours variation to earnings 
inequality, where earnings inequality increases work effort due to higher incentives. Bowles 
& Park (2005) also focus on inequality, but claim that the positive relationship stems from the 
fact that social comparisons work upwards and hence the poor want to imitate the rich in their 
consumption. Freeman & Schettkat (2001b, 2005) explain the differences between the US and 
Europe by the marketisation hypothesis, stating that households in Europe produce more 
goods at home than the US.
Another branch of literature finds explanations for differences in working hours across 
countries and over time in factors such as differences in technologies, growth rates and 
structural transformation (Rogerson (2008, 2006), Pissarides (2007)). Related literature 
focuses on explaining the trends in the US data (McGrattan & Rogerson (2004), Greenwood 
& Vandenbroucke (2005), Aguiar & Hurst (2006), Francis & Ramey (2006), Ngai & 
Pissarides (2007)). Attanasio et al. (2008) try to explain changes in female labour force 
participation in the US within the framework of a life-cycle model. They argue that female 
participation has increased for recent cohorts due to reduced cost of childcare and rising 
wages.
Finally, there is also an extensive literature seeking to assess the microeconomic impacts of 
family-support policies (free/subsidized childcare) on the labour market outcomes of families, 
mainly mothers with pre-school children. However, empirical estimates of the effects of these 
policies on the labour supply of mothers have a wide range, from large to insignificant. For 
some examples of this literature refer to Baker et al. (2008), Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008), 
Gelbach (2002), Blau (2000) or Anderson & Levine (1999).
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2 I introduce a simple theoretical model 
and discuss its implications. Section 3 and Section 4 show the variation in working hours and 
the variation in public family policies across countries, respectively. In Section 5 I undertake 
an empirical analysis of the effects of family policies on working hours, distinguishing 
between people with children and people without children. In Section 6 I analyze the effects 
of family policies on the time spent in childcare at home. In Section 7 I add into the analysis 
two country-level measures of culture and Section 8 concludes.
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2 Simple theoretical discussion
2.1 Basic set-up
In the theoretical section I elaborate on the underlying channels through which family policies 
affect aggregate working hours in a simple macroeconomic model with a representative agent. 
I recognize that public policies treat groups of households differently, therefore their 
contribution to changes in working hours are expected to differ as well. The model built here 
is not a general model and the results are specific to the assumptions made here, but the 
exercise is interesting and empirically relevant.
I introduce a simple model with two types of households and with a government policy that 
supports families. Consider a static economy with two types of households: parents (P) and 
nonparents (N). They are both assumed to have a log-utility function over the consumption of 
a market good (cm), a household good (c**) and leisure (/). The market good refers to a 
composite good bought in the market and the household good represents the amount of 
childcare. Utility functions and budget constraints are as follows.
Parents maximise:
alncp +/3\ncp + { \ - a - p ) \ n l p (1)
subject to
c” =( \ -T)hp +T + s (2)
cp ~ H p + g  (3)
l p = \ - h p - H p (4)
Nonparents maximise:
a l nc "  + y \n chN + { \ - a - y ) \ n l N (5)
subject to
c” = ( l - t ) h N+T  (6)
4 = H n (7)
lN = \ - h N- H N (8)
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Where
P>Y-  (9)
r  represents tax wedge3, T is a lump sum subsidy, s represents cash transfers from the 
government to parents and g  is public provision of childcare, h represents time worked in the 
market, and H  is time spent in childcare at home, a  and/?are utility parameters on 
consumption and childcare, respectively. All parameters and variables are assumed to be 
nonnegative and also 0 < a  < 1, 0 < /? < 1 and 0 < y  < 1.
As seen from expressions (1) - (9) parents and nonparents differ in certain important aspects. 
One such difference is in the public policy parameters. Parents receive a cash-transfer s from 
the government (equations (2) and (6)) capturing child allowances and other direct transfers to
L
parents that exist in many countries. Time constraints (3) and (7) on c assume that parents 
also receive a childcare subsidy g  from the government. This is assumed to be a perfect 
substitute for home provision of childcare and is provided to the households directly, in kind. 
There is no doubt that this is a simplistic way of entering government support of childcare 
programmes into the model; it assumes that government simply gives each parental household 
a certain “amount” g  of childcare. In this model, households have no cost of childcare other 
than the opportunity cost of time, i.e. they don’t need to pay for childcare provided in the 
market (external day care). For alternative specifications, look for example at Ragan (2005) 
and Rogerson (2007). In their models, childcare can be produced either at home or in the 
market, with these two inputs being strong substitutes for each other. When the government 
subsidizes childcare provided in the market, its relative price goes down, and as a 
consequence individuals spend less time in childcare at home and more time at work and in 
leisure. In my specification, on the other hand, I assume that there is no market for childcare. 
Yet the main mechanism is very similar; with the government subsidy g, the government 
takes care of the children instead of the parents, hence they are able to work more and enjoy 
more leisure. While my model is simpler with regards to the specification of the government 
policies, it is more involved in that it introduces two types of households: parents and
3 Following Nickell (2004) the tax wedge r incorporates three types o f  taxes: payroll tax th  direct taxes on 
income t2 and indirect taxes on consumption t3. This follow s from defining the budget constraint for the market
good a s(l + f3)c m — hencer = 1 -  —— —— . Although I focus only on the labour supply I
(I 3^ )
incorporate the payroll tax t t in order to capture potentially important effects o f  this tax on the demand for 
labour.
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nonparents. In aggregate, the main results of the model presented here and of the models in 
Rogerson (2007) and Ragan (2005) go in the same direction4.
Another important difference between nonparents and parents is in their preferences. 
Condition (9) states that parents derive higher utility from consuming c \  which is based on a 
plausible assumption that parents need to spend more time to care for the children. On the 
other hand, I assume that the utility coefficient a  on cm is the same for both types of 
households. This is done for two reasons. First, complicating the model by allowing different 
utility coefficients on market consumption would not add much to answering the questions of 
interest in this chapter. Second, it is not clear empirically whether parents work more or less 
than nonparents; in some countries they work more while in other countries they work less5. 
From the assumptions made here it therefore follows that differences in working time between 
parents and nonparents exist solely due to differences in the treatment of the two groups at the 
hands of public policy rather than due to differences in preferences.
Households maximise utility with respect to hours of work h and hours in childcare at home 
H, subject to budget and time constraints. See Appendix for first order conditions. Assuming 
an interior solution, the supply of labour is as follows,
( l- a ) (T  + s) mhp =a(\  + g ) - y A 7 , (10)
(1 - r)
f (1-aO T
h N = a — z — r *  ( 1 1 )(1 -r)
Assume that everybody works: h > 0; this is sensible if we imagine parents and nonparents as 
households, rather than individuals.
Now I turn to the public sector. The government is assumed to have a balanced budget. 
Denote the percentage of parental households as S. The government budget constraint can be 
written as:
T(ShP + ( l - S ) h N) = T + S(g + s).  (12)
4 1 outline an alternative set up with the market for childcare at the end o f  the Appendix.
5 Data on this w ill be presented later in the paper; see Table 10. Couples normally decide to have children in 
their prime working age and for this reason they tend to work more than other groups. But even if  one compares 
parents and nonparents o f  the same age, while it is true that women with young children on average work less, 
most men with children in fact work more.
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The left hand side of (12) represents government tax revenues and the right hand side is 
government expenditure on a lump sum subsidy and family policies. The lump sum subsidy T 
will be treated as endogenous, and by combining (10), (11) and (12) can be written as:
From the expression (13) above it is clear that the more government spends on family support 
policies, given the tax rate, the less remains for the lump sum subsidy. If  the government 
spends a larger share of its expenditures on family services it not only supports young parents
assumed to be perfectly elastic. Therefore, expressions (14) and (15) are the building blocks 
of the discussion about how hours of work (labour supply) react to changes in policy 
parameters. It is also useful to look at the expression for aggregate working hours:
h = 8hp + Q - 8 ) h „ = ? ^ \  + g 5 .  (16)
(1 - ( X T )
From (14) - (16) it is clear what determines the working hours of households in this model: 
preferences, taxes, childcare subsidies, cash transfers and the share of people with children in 
population. Assume that preferences and the population structure remain constant6. It can be
6 In this paper I w ill for most part assume that the share o f  parents in population is exogenous. However, it is 
easy to argue that it is not exogenous. A s suggested for example by Ermisch (1989) and McDonald (2000), one
r =  -Q  r^ - - g S { \ - T ) - s S .
( l-c r r )
(13)
to go to work, but further increases the incentives for work, indirectly, by spending less on 
the lump sum subsidy.
2.2 Effects of family policy on working hours
By combining equation (13) with equations (10) and (11) we can get the labour supplies in 
reduced form.
Labour supply of parents:
K = a^ X ^ +g(ar + £(l-a0)-s(1 - a x ) (1 - x ) (14)
Labour supply of nonparents:
(15)
In this model only the supply side of the labour market matters and demand for labour is
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easily shown that the aggregate labour supply (16) and the labour supply of parents (14) 
decrease with the tax rate. The same goes for the labour supply of nonparents (15) under 
plausible conditions7. The underlying argument behind this result is that higher taxes reduce 
the marginal benefit from working so that households reduce their hours supplied to the 
market.
Labour supply is increasing in the amount of the childcare subsidy g  in all three expressions 
(14) - (16), keeping the tax rate constant. It is also straightforward to see from (14) and (15) 
that the effect o f the childcare subsidy is stronger for parents. The labour supply of parents 
increases because a higher childcare subsidy g  results in more spare time that can be supplied 
to the market. Another channel through which the childcare subsidy g  affects working hours is 
through its effect on the lump sum subsidy T. This is also the mechanism through which the 
childcare subsidy affects the labour supply of nonparents (15). The government budget 
constraint (13) dictates that the more money the government spends on childcare subsidies, 
the less of it is spent on the lump sum subsidy T, which in turn reduces the non-eamed income 
of households and encourages them to work.
Cash benefits to families s have a negative effect on the labour supply of parents (14), but a 
positive effect on the labour supply of nonparents (15). The reason for this discrepancy is that, 
while cash benefits mcrease the non-eamed income of parents, they decrease the non-eamed 
income of nonparents by lowering the lump sum subsidy T. The latter effect influences both 
types of households but the direct effect of cash benefits dominates for parents. At the 
aggregate level (equation (16)) cash benefits don’t have any effect on the labour supply; the 
direct effects on the labour supply of parents are exactly offset by the indirect effects on the 
labour supply of both groups through the effect on the lump sum subsidy. Effectively, family 
cash benefit is just a redistribution of a subsidy from one group to another, which in aggregate 
has no effect on working hours.
can easily argue that family support increases fertility, and indeed in some countries these measures may have 
been introduced with this exact objective in mind. Cohen et al. (2007) for example report evidence that the 
introduction o f  child subsidies in Israel increased the fertility o f  married women with two or more children. In 
this paper I w ill not take a stand on the direction o f  causality, hence I w ill simply report associations between a 
crude measure o f  fertility and other variables o f  interest. I will also implicitly assume that the share o f  parents in 
population is constant over time and across countries. It is indeed slow-m oving over time, so the first part does 
not necessarily generate a huge problem, but it is definitely not constant across countries. However, due to 
endogeneity problems I w ill leave it out o f  my empirical analysis. The lack o f  an appropriate instrument leads 
me to leave this issue for future research.
7 Appendix shows this analytically.
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Another interesting way in which we can look at these results is to compare the working hours 
of parents and nonparents. The expression for the difference is:
h p - h N = a g - s ^  a \  (17)
(1 - r )
From equation (17) it can be nicely seen that increasing the childcare subsidy while holding 
the tax rate constant increases the working hours of parents relative to the working hours of 
nonparents, and vice versa for the family cash benefits. The tax wedge reduces the work of 
parents relative to nonparents. Although this is a simple model, it can be intuitively 
generalised to real economies. In countries with different family policies, this should be 
reflected when comparing the hours worked for parents and nonparents. Suppose we add a 
stochastic component to the above equation (17). In practice, if childcare subsidies g  vary 
across countries more than cash benefits s and more than taxes r, and if in addition s and g  are 
not too strongly correlated, then g  dominates expression (17). This implies that in the data one 
would expect to see a positive relationship between childcare subsidies and the difference in 
hours worked between parents and nonparents. In countries with high taxes and high childcare 
subsidies, nonparents are discouraged from working due to high taxes, while parents are 
encouraged to work more due to generous childcare subsidies. Hence, according to the model, 
in such countries, parents should work a lot when compared to nonparents.
Let me summarize this section. According to the model outlined in this chapter, we would 
expect the effect of childcare subsidies on aggregate working hours 1) to be positive in 
general, 2) to be positive for both parents and nonparents, but 3) stronger for parents. There 
should be 4) no aggregate effects of family cash benefits on working hours, 5) a negative 
effect for parents, and 6) a positive effect for nonparents.
2.3 Effects of family policy on childcare at home
Here I consider the effects of family policies on another use of time -  childcare at home. I 
assume that households without children also spend some time in childcare at home, 
depending on the parameter y . In this way I capture the fact that nonparents also look after 
children; i.e. they spend some time looking after grandchildren, nephews and nieces8. In fact,
8 In the year 2000 in Europe, for example, individuals with children o f  age 0-15 in the household on average 
spent 21.6 hours per week looking after children, while individuals with no children o f  age 0-15 in the household 
spent 1.4 hours per week. The calculation is based on the European Household Panel data for individuals o f  16 
years o f  age or more.
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the time in childcare at home of parents and nonparents could also be correlated. If parents go 
to work while members of a nonparent household (i.e. grandparents) look after the children, 
time spent by parents at home in childcare is substituted for time spent by nonparents in 
childcare. However, this kind of substitution is not introduced in my model, in the same way
relieves both types of households from childcare. But the effect on nonparents in this model
relationship between the time spent in childcare o f parents and nonparents.
As before we can find reduced form childcare “supply” for parents, nonparents and in 
aggregate.
Time spent in childcare at home for parents:
the results for labour supply. With the rise in the tax rate, each of the three uses o f time 
considered here increases9, as the tax rate reduces the opportunity cost of non-work. The 
childcare subsidy g  reduces childcare in all the three expressions (18) - (20). The cash benefits 
to families s increase the childcare for parents (18) and in the aggregate (20), because by 
increasing the non-eamed income of parents they discourage them from working in the 
market. The cash benefits s, on the other hand, have a negative impact on the childcare of 
nonparents (19), via their effect on the lump sum subsidy T. These effects are naturally 
stronger for parents than for nonparents.
To summarize, there is 1) a negative effect of childcare subsidies on aggregate time spent in 
childcare at home, 2) the effect is negative for both parents and nonparents, but 3) stronger for
9 The childcare o f  nonparents decreases with taxes under plausible conditions. See Appendix.
that it is not a part of the representative agent model: the increase in childcare subsidies
comes solely through the effect of the lump sum subsidy T  rather than through any direct
(18)
Time spent in childcare at home for nonparents:
(1 -  a t )  (1 -  t)
(19)
Aggregate time in childcare at home:
H _ a p  + y{ \—8) 
( 1—  a t )
{ P - r )5{ \ - 5 )  
(1 - r )
(20)
The results for the time spent in childcare at home basically go in the opposite direction from
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parents. There should be 4) a positive aggregate effect of family cash benefits on childcare 
time, 5) the effect should be positive for parents, and 6) negative for nonparents.
3 Working hours across countries
I am interested in explaining the variation of working hours across countries, so it is natural to 
start the empirical investigation by examining these differences at an aggregate level. First I 
turn to the OECD data on total working hours for the population aged 15-64. My main 
analysis is not done with the OECD data, but this is the most common source used to report 
cross-country differences in working hours, which is why I report it here. In Table 1 I show 
hours worked per person per week in the year 2000, which I further illustrate in Figure 1. 
Countries with the highest hours of work are the US (27.1), Canada (24.4) and the UK (24.1). 
Scandinavian countries are mostly in the top half, Sweden (23.6), Denmark (23.0) and Finland
(22.7); only Norway (21.0) is in the lower half. Countries with the lowest hours worked are 
Belgium (18.2), Germany (18.7) and France (18.8). Differences across countries are quite 
large; the difference between the US at the top and Belgium at the bottom is nearly 9 hours 
per week.
Statistically, differences in working hours can be decomposed into differences in the 
employment rates and differences in the length of the working week for employed persons10. 
The length of the working week takes into account the average hours worked in a week by an 
employed person as well as vacations, public holidays and absences from work (columns (2) 
and (3) of the Table 1). The employment rates (column (3)) vary from 0.55 in Italy to 0.79 in 
Norway, a very large difference. Countries such as Italy (0.55), Greece (0.57) and Spain 
(0.58) have very low employment rates. This is in large part due to the low participation of 
women in the labour force. The Scandinavian countries, Norway (0.79), Denmark (0.77) and 
Sweden (0.76), the US (0.76) and UK (0.73), on the other hand, have high employment rates. 
There are also big differences in hours worked per week by employed persons (column (2)). 
Interestingly, hours worked per week for employed workers are highest in Greece (40.0), Italy
(35.7), the US (35.4) and Spain (34.9). For the three southern European countries this is a 
consequence of the fact that due to the low participation of women and older workers, 
employed persons are mostly prime-aged males. Hence the statistic on hours worked is based 
on a sample where most of the subjects work full-time, whereas in other countries this statistic 
is reduced by including many part-time employed women and older workers. Countries with
10 For a more thorough analysis, see Faggio & Nickell (2007).
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lowest hours worked by employed persons are the Netherlands (26.3), Norway (26.6) and 
Germany (28.2). The difference between the top and the bottom is large: almost 14 hours per 
week. In the remainder of the chapter I will mainly focus on the overall hours worked per 
person, although in some instances I will also distinguish between the employment decision 
and hours of work decision.
Table 1: Working hours per week per person 15-64 (year 2000)
(U  =  (2)*(3) (2) (3)
H ours per 
w eek per
H ours per  
w eek E m ploym ent
C ountry person (em ployed) rate
Austria 21.58 31.38 0.69
Belgium 18.22 29.71 0.61
Canada 24.43 33.97 0.72
Denmark 23.01 29.88 0.77
Finland 22.68 33.64 0.67
France 18.82 30.62 0.61
Germany 18.70 28.23 0.66
Greece 22.96 40.00 0.57
Ireland 21.36 32.46 0.66
Italy 19.52 35.67 0.55
Luxembourg 19.87 31.52 0.63
Netherlands 19.11 26.31 0.73
Norway 21.01 26.54 0.79
Portugal 23.64 32.52 0.73
Spain 20.18 34.91 0.58
Sweden 23.62 31.24 0.76
United Kingdom 24.11 32.85 0.73
United States 27.06 35.40 0.76
Data sources: OECD data on total working hours. Data are for the population 15-64 years o f  age. Working hours 
per w eek per person (1) is the product o f  the employment rate (3) and the weekly hours worked by employed  
persons (2). W eekly hours worked by the employed take into account the length o f  the working week as w ell as 
holidays and other days o f f  work.
I now turn to the micro level data obtained from the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP). I combine this with the US March Current Population Survey (CPS) from the 
IPUMS CPS (King et al. (2004)). Data is available at the individual level for people older 
than 15 years of age at time of survey. To measure working hours I use the variable pe005: 
Total number of hours worked per week (in main + additional jobs). This variable is based on 
the following two survey questions: “How many hours per week do you work in your main 
job, including paid overtime if any?” and “About how many hours per week did you work in 
your additional job or business? Please give an average figure for the last 4 working weeks.” 
As this variable is only reported for employed individuals, for the rest of the population I 
assume that they work 0 hours. From the US CPS data I use the variable UHRSWORK: Usual 
hours worked per week (last year). This variable reports the number of hours per week that
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respondents usually worked if they worked during the previous calendar year. Individuals 
were asked this question if they reported working at a job or business at any time during the 
previous year or if they acknowledged doing "any temporary, part-time, or seasonal work 
even for a few days" during the previous year. These two combined variables capture the 
“usual” amount o f hours worked per week for an individual. In this sense they capture 
whether someone participates in the labour force and how much this person usually works. 
They do not, however, incorporate the number o f holidays, vacations and days off work1 ’.
Figure 1: Working hours per week per person for individuals aged 15-64 (year 2000)
27.1
Data sources: OECD data on total working hours. For more details see Table 1.
In Figure 2 1 show average working hours per week for individuals aged 16-64 from this data. 
I choose the age restriction 16-64 in order to be comparable with the OECD data on total 
working hours reported in Table 1. Working hours on average appear higher than in the 
OECD data, the reason being that days off work are not counted. The ranking o f countries 
differs from Table 1, but the correlation between the ranks from the OECD data and the micro 
data is 0.69. The countries with the biggest differences in ranks from one data set to another
11 It is important to note that respondents report their usual hours o f work even if they are temporarily absent 
from work due to vacation, sickness or injury, maternity leave, bad weather, a lay-off or a labour dispute. Hence, 
mothers who are on maternity leave report positive hours o f work. This is a caveat o f the data which 
unfortunately cannot be overcome.
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are Greece (7 places lower), Belgium, Germany (both 6 places lower) and Spain (5 places 
higher)12.
4 Family support policies across countries
4.1 Cash benefits and childcare subsidies
I this section I present data on family support policies. OECD Social Expenditure Data 
(SOCX) provides data on public expenditure on various programmes: old age, survivors, 
incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labour market programmes, unemployment, 
housing and other social policy areas. In what follows I focus on public expenditure under the 
family programme. More details about the OECD SOCX can be found in OECD (2007) and 
in the OECD Family Database.
In Table 2 I show family expenditures as a percent of GDP across countries for the year 2000. 
Public spending on family benefits can be divided into three groups. First, child related cash 
transfers to families with children, column (1). These include items such as child allowances, 
public income support during parental leave, income support for sole parent families and 
public childcare support through payments to parents. The second group in column (2) is 
public spending on services for families with children. These comprise of direct financing and 
subsidising of providers of childcare and early education facilities, public assistance for young 
people and residential facilities and public spending on family services (centre-based services 
and home help for families in need). The third group shown in column (3) is public support 
fo r  families provided through the tax system, such as tax exemptions, child tax allowances and 
child tax credits.
For the purposes of the analysis and to be consistent with the model presented in Section 2 I 
group these expenditures into two groups: cash benefits and childcare subsidies, shown on 
the right hand side of Table 2. Cash benefits capture those transfers from the government that 
directly increase the non-eamed income of households with children. To obtain a measure of 
cash benefits I combine cash transfers (1) with tax support to families (3). Because tax breaks 
result in the reduction of the amount households have to pay in taxes to the government, they 
can be understood as a cash transfer to families. This is an important point because looking
121 don’t explore the reasons behind such differences, but I conjecture that they cannot be fully explained by the 
differences in holidays, vacations and days o f f  work. There must be some important differences in data 
methodology.
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only at the cash transfers in column (1) could overstate the actual variation across countries in 
family cash benefits. In the US, for example, direct cash transfers to families are very low, but 
the tax system provides certain benefits to families. On the other hand, in Scandinavian 
countries there is an extensive support to families via cash transfers, but tax reliefs are 
relatively low.
Figure 2: Working hours per week per person for individuals aged 16-64 from the micro
data (year 2000)
31.9
c
Data Sources: European data is from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). As a measure of 
working hours I use the variable pe005: Total number of hours worked per week (in main + additional jobs). 
This variable is based on the following two survey questions: “How many hours per week do you work in your 
main job, including paid overtime if any?” and “About how many hours per week did you work in your 
additional job or business? Please give an average figure for the last 4 working weeks.” It is only reported for 
individuals active in the labour market, hence for the rest 1 assume that they work 0 hours. The US data is from 
the US March Current Population Survey (CPS) from IPUMS CPS (King et al. (2004)). For the US 1 use the 
variable UHRSWORK: Usual hours worked per week (last year). It reports the number o f hours per week that 
respondents usually worked if they worked during the previous calendar year. Individuals were asked this 
question if  they reported working at a job or business at any time during the previous year or if they 
acknowledged doing "any temporary, part-time, or seasonal work even for a few days" during the previous year. 
The data is for the year 2000 (wave 7 o f the ECHP).
33
Table 2: Public family spending, % GDP (year 2000)
0 ) (2) (3) =  ( l )  +  (3) (2)
Tax Cash C hildcare
country Cash Services breaks benefits subsidies
Austria 2.37 0.56 0.02 2 3 9 0.34
Belgium 1.76 0.83 0.55 2.31 0.59
Canada 0.77 0.20 0.08 0.85 0.20
Denmark 1.49 2.19 0.00 1.49 2.05
Finland 1.70 1.35 0.00 1.70 1.19
France 1.47 1.54 0.77 2.24 1.19
Germany 1.16 0.78 1.01 2.16 0.40
Greece 0.74 0.39 0.00 0.74 0.15
Ireland 1.64 0.19 0.07 1.71 0.00
Italy 0.54 0.61 0.00 0.54 0.55
Luxembourg 2.74 0.48 0.00 2.74 0.47
Netherlands 0.72 0.73 0.44 1.17 0.73
Norway 1.87 1.93 0.12 1.99 1.43
Portugal 0.65 0.43 0.17 0.83 0.31
Spain 0.30 0.56 0.06 0.36 0.40
Sweden 1.52 1.74 0.00 1.52 1.30
United Kingdom 1.87 0.71 0.31 2.18 0.56
United States 0.11 0.63 0.83 0.94 0.38
A verage 1 3 0 0.88 0.25 1 3 5 0.68
C oefficient o f  variation 0.56 0.67 1 3 2 0.47 0.79
Data sources: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003) and OECD Family Database (PF1). 
Columns (l)-(3 ) are as reported in the data sources; columns on the right hand side are as shown. Cash transfers 
to families (1) include items such as child allowances, public income support during parental leave, income 
support for sole parent families and public childcare support through payments to parents. Services (2) comprise 
o f  direct financing and subsidising o f  providers o f  childcare and early education facilities, public assistance for 
young people and residential facilities, public spending on family services (centre based services and home help 
for families in need). Tax breaks (3) represent tax exemptions, child tax allowances and child tax credits. 
Childcare subsidies exclude those services that do not support childcare; such items include for example
assistance for pupils and youths, youth centres, family accommodation benefits, transport subsidies, holidays for
schoolchildren, school meals etc.
However, it is not always clear that tax breaks fall into the category of cash benefits. In some 
countries tax deductions can only be claimed based on the family’s expenses for external 
childcare. In such cases these should perhaps be treated as childcare benefits. With available 
data it is not possible to make such a distinction. Nevertheless, as argued in Immervoll & 
Barber (2005), page 17, support through the tax system blurs the perceived link between 
childcare expenses and support payments. Whereas parents need to pay for childcare today, 
they get reimbursed through the tax system only after the end of the tax year. Therefore the 
perceived link between expenses and benefits is weakened and tax benefit when received by 
the family may be seen as a windfall rather than a consequence of their childcare choices. The
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data on tax breaks for families is only available for the year 2003, so I assume that the ratio of
1
tax breaks over cash transfers remains constant over time in a given country .
Childcare subsidies capture transfers from the government that provide services to parents and 
effectively act as a substitute for parental childcare. Childcare subsidies include public 
spending on pre-primary education, data on which is available only from the year 1998 for 
most countries. Data on childcare subsidies before the year 1998 are thus not comparable 
across countries. Another issue with the reported measure of public support for services to 
families (column (2) of Table 2) is that it includes items such as assistance for pupils and 
youths, youth centres, family accommodation benefits, transport subsidies, holidays for 
schoolchildren and school meals. These do not represent a substitute for the childcare of 
parents. As much as the information in the OECD SOCX dataset allows, I exclude these items 
from the measure of childcare benefits. I consider the new measure of childcare subsidies as a 
more appropriate one and use it in the analysis that follows. My results are similar regardless 
of which of the two measures I choose. Note also that the correlation coefficient between the 
two measures is 0.97.
Let me now turn to the information contained in Table 2. From the last two columns we can 
see that the variation in childcare subsidies is considerably higher than the variation in cash 
benefits. Figure 3 and Figure 4 further illustrate the variation in public child support across 
countries. Childcare subsidies (Figure 3) tend to be especially high in the Scandinavian 
countries: Denmark (2.05%), Norway (1.43%), Sweden (1.30%) and Finland (1.19%)14. The 
share of childcare subsidies in GDP is also very high in France (1.19%). Countries with the 
lowest share of childcare subsidies in the GDP are Ireland (0.00%), Greece (0.15%) and 
Canada (0.20%). In Figure 4 I show family cash benefits, which are the highest in 
Luxembourg (2.74%), Austria (2.39%) and Belgium (2.31%), and the lowest in Spain 
(0.36%), Italy (0.54%) and Greece (0.74%).
I now turn my attention to the relationship of the two family support policies with each other. 
Figure 5 plots a scatter diagram of cash benefits and childcare subsidies. There is a weak 
positive correlation (0.21), not significantly different from zero. Countries can be divided 
roughly in three groups according to the combination of childcare subsidies and cash benefits. 
The first group consists of countries with high childcare subsidies and a medium to high level 
of cash benefits. This group comprises of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway,
13 Time variation in these measures is in general low  hence the error thus committed should not be too large.
14 This empirical observation was the basis o f  discussion in the papers by Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007).
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Sweden, and Finland) and France. The second group consists o f countries with low childcare 
subsidies but relatively high cash benefits: Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria, UK, Germany and 
Ireland. And lastly, the third group consists o f countries with low subsidies and low cash 
benefits: Spain, Italy, Greece, US, Portugal, Canada and the Netherlands.
Figure 3: Childcare subsidies, % in GDP (year 2000)
0 5 9 %  0 .56% 0 .55%
0 .40 % 0 .40% 0 .38%,
Data sources: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003) and OECD Family Database (PF1).
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Figure 4: Family cash benefits, % in GDP (year 2000)
2 .18% 2 .16%
1 .71% 1.70%
Data sources: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003) and OECD Family Database (PF1).
Another important policy variable in the model presented above is the tax rate. In Figure 6 
and Figure 7 I therefore show scatter plots o f family support policies against the tax wedge. 
The average tax wedge is calculated as explained in the footnote 3, based on the CEP-OECD 
data on labour institutions described in William Nickell (2006). As Greece is not included in 
the CEP-OECD data, 1 calculated the tax wedge directly from the OECD data as explained in 
Nickell (2006). Figure 6 reveals a strong positive relationship between taxes and childcare 
subsidies across countries; the correlation coefficient is 0.66 and statistically significant. The 
Scandinavian countries and France stand out as having both high tax rates and high childcare 
subsidies. The US and UK have low tax rates and medium levels o f childcare subsidies. On 
the other hand, Figure 7 shows that there is no significantly positive correlation between taxes 
and family cash benefits. In terms of cash benefits, the Scandinavian countries do not stand 
out. Together these two figures suggest a potential for family policies to dampen the effect o f 
taxes on working hours.
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Figure 5: Childcare subsidies and family cash benefits, % in GDP (year 2000)
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Data sources: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003) and OECD Family Database (PF1). There 
is a positive correlation (0.21), not significantly different from zero.
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Figure 6: Childcare subsidies (% in GDP) and tax wedge (year 2000)
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Data sources: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003) and OECD Family Database (PF1). Taxes 
are obtained from the CEP-OECD dataset, described in William Nickell (2006). There is a statistically 
significant positive correlation (0.66).
4.2 Children in formal care
In this section I look at the percentage o f children enrolled in external childcare and relate it to 
family policies. I do this in order to see whether family policies have the effects that one 
would intuitively expect and also to get a sense o f the degree to which the empirical measures 
used in this chapter are informative. Childcare subsidies, for example, directly affect both the 
demand for external childcare (by subsidising the fees households pay for external care) and 
the supply o f external childcare (via the public provision o f childcare-centres or subsidies to 
childcare providers). Thus childcare subsidies are expected to have a strong impact on the 
proportion o f children enrolled in some type o f external care.
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Figure 7: Family cash benefits (% in GDP) and tax wedge (year 2000)
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Daa sources: OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003) and OECD Family Database (PF1). Taxes 
areobtained from the CEP-OECD dataset, described in William Nickell (2006). There is a positive correlation 
(0.16), not significantly different from zero.
In Table 3 I present data on the use o f external childcare, and in Figure 8 I plot the 
rehtionship between external childcare and childcare subsidies across countries. The first two 
cobmns in Table 3 show the enrolment rates o f children under six in childcare and early 
edication services. The data is obtained from the OECD Family Database. Enrolment rates 
for those aged 0-2 years primarily refer to formal childcare arrangements such as group care 
in childcare centres, registered childminders based in their own homes and care provided by a 
caier at home who is not a family member. Enrolment rates for those aged 3-5 years refer to 
these enrolled in formal pre-school services, and, in some countries, 4 and 5 years old in 
prinary schools. Where children are enrolled in more than one part-time programme, the 
issie o f  double counting arises. This leads to overestimated enrolment rates. As a result, 
reported enrolment in some countries can exceed 100% and the data needs to be interpreted 
wib caution.
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Table 3: Use of formal childcare
O EC D  Fam ily D atabase ECH P
Enrolm ent rates o f  
children under six  in 
childcare and early  
education services 
(2003/04)
% o f households 
having their kid  
looked after on a  
regular basis 
(2000)
C ountry 0 - 2  years 3 - 5 years 0-11 years
Austria 6.6 74.0 33.0
Belgium 33.6 99.6 43.7
Canada 19 na na
Denmark 61.7 89.7 77.4
Finland 35 46.1 46.6
France 28 101.9 42.7
Germany 9 80.3 38.1
Greece 7 46.8 21.0
Ireland 15 68.2 19.2
Italy 6.3 100.3 33.8
Luxembourg 14 72.3 55.0
Netherlands 29.5 70.2 29.3
Norway 43.7 85.1 na
Portugal 23.5 77.9 45.7
Spain 20.7 98.6 20.0
Sweden 39.5 86.6 66.4
United Kingdom 25.8 80.5 34.9
United States 35.5 62.0 na
Correlation with  
childcare subsidies 0.83* 0.28 0.81*
Data sources: OECD Family Database (PF11). Canada and Germany (2001); France (2002); Greece, 
Luxembourg and Norway (2003); Denmark and the United States (2005). Enrolment rates for those aged 0-2 
years primarily refer to formal childcare arrangements such as group care in childcare centres, registered 
childminders based in their own homes and care provided by a carer at home who is not a family member. 
Enrolment rates for those aged 3-5 years refer to those enrolled in formal pre-school services, and in some 
countries 4 and 5 years old in primary schools. Where children are enrolled in more than one part-time 
programme, the issue o f  double counting arises. This leads to overestimated enrolment rates (enrolment in some 
countries >  100%).
ECHP (European Community Household Panel), year 2000. Calculations based on the survey question at the 
level o f  household: “Are any o f  the children (0-11) in this household looked-after on a regular basis by someone 
other than their parent or guardian, whether at hom e or outside such as at a creche or kindergarten?” Based on all 
households with at least one child aged 0-11.
* denotes significantly different from zero at 5%.
Differences in enrolment rates across countries are large. For 0-2 year-olds, enrolment rates 
range from 6.3% in Italy to 61.7% in Denmark. Variation in the enrolment of 3-5 year-olds is 
much lower, mainly due to the fact that most children of this age are in some form of pre­
school service. The lowest enrolment is in Finland (46.1%) and the highest in France 
(101.9%). The data, however, does not account for other important differences in childcare 
patterns. For example, the number of hours children typically spend in formal care varies 
across countries. According to Immervoll & Barber (2005), in some cases, having such 
information would further amplify the observed variation across countries. There are other
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issues with the comparability o f the data across countries (see OECD Family Database 
(PF11)). Enrolment rates suffer from underreporting in countries where childcare and early 
education is to a large extent provided by the local government (Canada, Ireland and the US); 
there are also important differences in parental leave arrangements across countries (these can 
be considered as family cash benefits), which influence the extent to which children are cared 
for by external institutions. Countries also differ in the availability o f informal care by other 
family members (i.e. grandparents).
Figure 8: Use of formal childcare and childcare subsidies (% in GDP)
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Data sources: OECD Family Database, ECHP (European Community Household Panel) and OECD Social 
Expenditure database (SOCX 1980-2003). For more details see notes under Table 3.
In the last column o f Table 3 I report the % o f households with at least one child aged 0-11 
that have their children looked after on a regular basis. Data is based on the ECHP survey 
question: “Are any o f the children (0-11) in this household looked after on a regular basis by 
someone other than their parent or guardian, whether at home or outside such as at a creche or 
kindergarten?” Variation is again very large, ranging from 19.2% o f households in Ireland to 
78.2% o f households in Denmark. It is not clear, however, whether the question refers to 
formal or informal child care; answers most probably take into account both types of 
childcare.
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Figure 8 shows a scatter plot of formal childcare use versus childcare subsidies. I use two 
different measures of formal childcare use: enrolment of 0-2 year olds based on the OECD 
data and the % of households with children cared for based on the ECHP. There is a clear 
positive correlation between childcare subsidies and use of external childcare (see also bottom 
of Table 3). Note, however that the use of childcare for children of age 3-5 years is not 
significantly correlated with childcare subsidies. Since in many countries most of the 3-5 
year-olds are enrolled in some form of external care, it is possible that a high share of the 
observed variation for this group is due to measurement error. On the other hand, parents of 
older children in general participate in the labour force more than parents of young children. 
Hence, intuitively, what should matter for the explanation of the hours worked across 
countries with respect to public family policies are the employment and work decisions of 
parents with very small children.
Table 4: Relationship between the use of formal childcare and family policy variables
(year 2000)
D ependent variable: % aged 0-2 in care %  aged 3-5 in care
%  households with  
kids looked after*
(1) (2) (3)
Childcare subsidies - % GDP 23.647 8.748 23.657
(4.022)*** (8.251) (3.268)***
Family cash benefits - % GDP -2.261 0.430 3.877
(2.996) (6.175) (2.502)
Constant 12.628 71.956 17.139
(5.288)** (11.406)*** (5.508)***
Observations 18 17 59
R-squared 0.70 0.08 0.75
Standard errors in parentheses, +pooled OLS: period 1998-2001, standard errors clustered by country, 
with 15 clusters. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
So far the analysis of the use of external childcare across countries has been descriptive. 
Therefore, in Table 4 I report results from regressing each of the three measures of the use of 
formal childcare on the childcare benefits and the cash benefits. Coefficients in the regression 
with the % of 3-5 years old in formal care (column (2)) are not significant. However, the 
results from regressions with the % of 0-2 year olds in formal care (column (1)) and the % of 
households with children looked after (column (3)) show that the childcare subsidies have a 
strong positive effect on the use of formal childcare. The effects of family cash benefits, on 
the other hand, are not statistically significant. To sum up the discussion in this section, I 
conclude that there is evidence that my measure o f childcare subsidies is capturing something 
sensible, and that childcare subsidies have a significant effect on the behaviour of households.
43
5 Effects of family support policies on working hours
5.1 Model calibrations: What is the magnitude of the effects?
In light of the data on family policies presented above, it would be interesting to check the 
magnitudes of the effects on working hours implied by the model from Section 2. The country 
with the highest childcare subsidies, Denmark, devotes 2.05% of its GDP for this measure. Is 
this high enough to result in a significant effect on aggregate working hours? What about 
other countries, with smaller share of family policies in their GDP? If the implied effects on 
working hours are found to be small, then it is hard to argue that family policies can 
contribute much to explaining differences in working hours across countries.
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 5 .1 use the OECD data on working hours 
and the OECD SOCX data on childcare subsidies and cash benefits in order to obtain 
corresponding values for h, r, g  and s (columns (1) - (4)). To obtain a value of the utility 
parameter a, I calibrate the model using equation (16) with the US data and obtain a value of 
a  -  0.35. I use this value for all countries. Using the US CPS data, I also obtain a value of 
8  = 0.39, which I also use for all countries. Columns (5) - (9) of Table 5 report the % change 
in working hours implied by the introduction of family policies, based on equations (14) - 
(16). Changes are computed by comparing working hours in two settings: in the first setting I 
set the family policy parameters equal to their actual values, whereas in the second setting I 
set them equal to zero. I report results for 6 cases choosing two countries from each group 
based on Figure 5. Sweden and Denmark represent the high subsidy - high cash benefits 
group, Belgium and UK represent the low subsidy - high cash benefits group, and Italy and 
US represent the low subsidy - low cash benefits group. Note that in all cases, one o f the two 
countries has relatively high tax rates and the other one relatively low tax rates.
On aggregate (column (5)), family policies do not seem to have a very strong effect on 
working hours. The biggest effect, as expected, is in Scandinavia, where family policy 
variables increase working hours for 2.25% in Denmark and 1.68% in Sweden compared to a 
situation with no family policies, but keeping tax rates constant. In contrast, Ragan (2005) in 
Tables 1, 5 and 6, evaluates corresponding effects to be equal to 16.7% and 25.0%, 
respectively. Rogerson (2007) in Table 6, evaluates that the public provision o f family 
services increases working hours by 8.2% for Scandinavian levels of policy parameters. 
Although their models are more complex, they don’t recognise that family policies directly
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influence only a certain proportion of the population15. Furthermore, in their measure of 
public support to family services they include subsidies for elderly care services; this is not 
justified and overstates the effect of public subsidies on working hours. ECHP data for the 
year 2000 reveal that in Europe persons of age 16-55 on average spend 0.7 hours per week 
looking after a person with special needs without pay, while persons older than 55 years 
spend 1.6 hours per week. Hence this activity does not take much time for an average person 
and furthermore it is concentrated among older people, who for the most part do not 
participate in the labour market regardless of public support for families.
Table 5: Calibration of the model: magnitude of the effects of family policies on working
hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Aggregate Parents Nonparents
Country h T i s
effect of 
including g 
and s
effect of 
including 
g and s
effect of 
including 
£ only
effect of 
including g 
and s
effect of 
including
g °niy
Sweden 0.24 0.58 0.0080 0.0094 1.68% -2.16% 2.61% 4.15% 1.09%
Denmark 0.23 0.50 0.0123 0.0090 2.25% 0.17% 3.49% 3.59% 1.46%
Belgium 0.19 0.49 0.0028 0.0110 0.50% -3.09% 0.78% 2.81% 0.33%
UK 0.25 0.34 0.0035 0.0137 0.52% -2.29% 0.81% 2.32% 0.34%
Italy 0.20 0.50 0.0028 0.0028 0.52% -0.23% 0.80% 1.00% 0.34%
US 0.28 0.30 0.0027 0.0067 0.38% -0.77% 0.59% 1.13% 0.25%
Time frame for calculations o f  h is 14 hours a day (as in Ragan (2005) and Prescott (2004)), 
h = (OECD working hours) /(14 * 7 ) .  Policy parameters are based on data sources described above (OECD, 
OECD SOCX). In the model h represents the value o f  the whole economy (= gdp), hence the real value o f  what 
government gives for childcare subsidies is totg  =  (childcare subsidies as %  GDP)*/?. This only goes to parents, 
hence g  = totg 1 5 .  s  is calculated in the same way.
In the calculations I compare values for h in the model where g  (and s) is set to their actual values, with h  from 
the model where g  and s  are set to zero, based on equations (14)-(16). I s e ta  = 0 .3 5 , calibrated from the U S data 
using equation (16), and 5  =  0.39 , calculated from the U S CPS.
In columns (6) and (7) of Table 5 I show the effects of family policies on parents. According 
to my model, on average family policies actually reduce the working time of parents due to 
the negative effect of cash benefits. This becomes clear after inspecting column (7), where 
cash benefits are set to zero and only the effect of childcare subsidies is considered; the effect 
on working time is positive, especially so for Scandinavian countries. Columns (8) and (9) 
report effects for nonparents. The total effect on this group is quite large, as both subsidies 
and cash benefits work in the same direction (via reducing the lump sum subsidy). However, 
as expected, when looking at the effects of childcare subsidies only, the effects are smaller 
than for parents. To summarise, in the aggregate, childcare policies do not seem to have very
15 The Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2006) models also don’t account for the effects o f  cash benefits. However, in 
aggregate cash benefits don’t have any effect in my model either, as they just redistribute a cash subsidy from 
one group to another.
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strong effects on working hours. Even for countries with generous public policies such as 
Scandinavian countries, the effects on working hours are only around 2%. This does not seem 
large enough to contribute greatly to the explanation of working-hours differences across 
countries.
5.2 OECD total working hours and family policy
I now turn to the empirical analysis of the question of whether family policies can explain the 
variation in working hours across countries and whether the effects are in accordance with the 
theory outlined in Section 2. In Table 6 I report regressions of OECD working hours on the 
family policy variables and other controls. Due to the low variation of policy variables over 
the short period of time, I use cross-sectional variation, with 16 countries included in the 
analysis. However, to increase precision I use a pooled OLS regression over the period 1998- 
2003 with reported standard errors clustered by country. I report three specifications. In 
column (1) I report a specification with childcare subsidies, family cash benefits and the tax 
wedge on the right hand side only. This specification refers to the argument by Prescott 
(2004) augmented by the public policy arguments of Ragan (2005) and Rogerson (2007). In 
the second specification I add the aggregate unemployment rate, which accounts for any 
involuntary unemployment. In countries with a higher unemployment rate, working hours 
may be lower due to fewer opportunities to find jobs. In the third specification, following the 
empirical analysis in Alesina et al. (2005), Tables 9-10, and Faggio & Nickell (2007), Table 
16, I include additional institutional indicators from the CEP-OECD dataset: union density 
and degree of employment protection. They control for differences in the rigidity and nature 
of labour markets across countries. As argued in Alesina et al. (2005), trade unions respond to 
adverse shocks by trying to protect employees, pressing for work sharing as well as 
employment protection more generally, which tends to reduce overall working hours. 
Therefore, one should control for these institutional characteristics. The regression analysis 
throughout this chapter will be based on these three specifications.
In column (1) of Table 6 the direction of the coefficients is more or less consistent with the 
theory; childcare subsidies have a significant positive effect, cash benefits have an 
insignificant (negative) effect and taxes have a negative though insignificant effect. However, 
after including more controls in columns (2) and (3), the results become by and large 
insignificant and inconsistent with the theory. After including the aggregate unemployment 
rate, the positive effect of childcare subsidies becomes insignificant, whereas the negative
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cash benefits coefficient becomes statistically significant. After including union density and 
employment protection measures, all three policy variables are insignificant. The effect of 
childcare subsides is close to zero, the effect of family cash benefits is negative but 
insignificant, and the effect of the tax wedge is negative, but too imprecisely measured, hence 
insignificant. Also all three included controls have statistically insignificant coefficients. It 
appears, therefore, that the OECD data does not have enough power to yield any firm 
conclusions on family policies and their role in explaining working-hours differences across 
countries.
Table 6: OECD total working hours and family policy: regression analysis (1998-2003)
Dependent variable: Working hours per week
(1) (2) (3)
childcare subsidies - % GDP 1.892 1.152 0.199
(0.983)* (0.836) (1.070)
family cash benefits - % GDP -1.018 -1.414 -1.344
(0.784) (0.702)* (0.779)
tax wedge -17.363 -9.553 -8.080
(11.640) (11.364) (11.912)
unemployment rate -0.295 -0.200
(0.167)* (0.171)
union density 0.033
(0.039)
employment protection -3.544
(2.411)
Constant 29.079 28.874 29.499
(4.907)*** (5.116)*** (3.955)***
Observations 82 80 63
N o. o f  clusters/countries 16 15 15
R-squared 0.25 0.34 0.55
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country), * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
5.3 Regressions of working hours on policy variables
I now turn to the micro level data where I will focus on comparisons of two groups: people 
with children and people with no children. For this I combine data from various sources. Data 
on hours worked together with personal and household characteristics are obtained from the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the US March Current Population 
Survey (CPS). The data set includes 15 EU countries and the US. The period of analysis will 
mainly be for the years 1998-2001, where policy variables and household panel data are 
consistently available. I supplement the individual level data with country level variables 
measuring family-support policies from the OECD Social Expenditure Data (SOCX) and
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measures of taxes and labour market institutions from the CEP-OECD Institutions Dataset 
(William Nickell (2006)).
First let me briefly discuss the regression estimation. I pool together the whole available 
period 1998-2001 in order to increase efficiency. To be on the conservative side, however, I 
cluster standard errors by country, despite having multiple observations over time for each 
country. The main variation exploited in this analysis is thus cross-country variation, with 14 
countries16. Due to the short time period and the slow movement of policy variables over 
time, I do not rely on fixed effects regressions. I report weighted regressions, using weights as 
provided in the original data sets. However, in order for each country to have the same 
weight, regardless of the sample size, I convert the weights so that the summation of weights 
equals to 1.0 for each country in each year.
Table 7 shows the results from regressing individual working hours on policy variables for 
individuals older than 15 years. All regressions control for an individual's age and age 
squared. Column (1) includes the main three fiscal policy parameters only: the childcare 
subsidies, the family cash benefits and the tax wedge. The results are consistent with the 
theory. Childcare subsidies have a significant positive effect and the tax wedge has a 
significant and negative effect. Family cash benefits have an insignificant effect on working 
hours. The size of the coefficients, however, decreases after including the aggregate 
unemployment rate, as reported in column (2). The effects o f childcare subsidies still remain 
statistically significant and positive, but the magnitude of the effect is reduced. In column (3) 
I report my preferred specification with the unemployment rate and the two measures of the 
rigidity of labour market institutions. The coefficients for childcare subsidies and cash 
benefits are both insignificant. The tax wedge has statistically significant negative effect, as 
expected. The same goes for the aggregate unemployment rate, which raises my confidence in 
this specification. Union density has a significant positive effect, corroborating the results in 
Faggio and Nickell (2007) and Bowles and Park (2005), but going against the story in Alesina 
et al. (2005). The effect of employment protection is not statistically different from zero.
16 Only 14 instead o f  16 countries are included in the regression analysis because data on tax rates for Ireland and 
Luxembourg are not available.
Table 7: Working hours and family policy: regressions on the sample of age 16 and
more (1998-2001)
Dependent variable: Working hours per week
(1) (2) (3)
childcare subsidies - % GDP 2.633 1.443 0.413
(0.972)** (0.792)* (0.925)
family cash benefits - % GDP 0.664 -0.078 -0.098
(0.868) (0.743) (0.566)
tax wedge -24.792 -12.232 -29.249
(9.996)** (8.314) (10.652)**
unemployment rate 
union density 
employment protection
-0.450
(0.172)**
-0.297
(0.150)*
0.084
(0.026)***
0.190
(2.793)
age 1.779 1.772 1.777
(0.144)*** (0.151)*** (0.151)***
ageA2 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Constant 3.110 3.082 6.884
(5.426) (5.136) (4.807)
Observations 829502 810698 810698
N o. o f  clusters/countries 14 13 13
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.27
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country), * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
To further explore what is driving the results, I decompose working hours into two 
components: first, the decision of whether or not to participate in the labour market, and 
second, the number of hours to work per week conditional on participating in the labour 
market. In Table 8 I report three different specifications. The “total effects” specification, 
where everyone is included in the sample, active as well as inactive people, and where 
working hours are on the left hand side, is reported in columns (1) and (4). Results of this 
specification are equivalent to the results reported in columns (1) and (3) of Table 7. In 
columns (2) and (5) of the Table 8 I report regressions with hours worked conditional on 
working on the left hand side. Hence, only employed people are included. The last 
specification, in columns (3) and (6), estimates the probability of working, with a categorical 
variable indicating whether an individual is employed (= 1) or not (= 0) on the left hand side. 
Marginal effects from probit regressions are reported.
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ITable 8: Participation, working hours of employed people and family policy: regressions 
on the sample of age 16 and more (1998-2001)
Dependent variable: Working hours per week Employed
dummy
Working hours per week Employed
dummy
Sample: All employed all all employed all
OLS Probit+ OLS Probit+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
childcare subsidies - % GDP 2.633
(0.972)**
-2.711
(0.889)***
0.159
(0.029)***
0.413
(0.925)
-2.412
(1.036)**
0.130
(0.030)***
family cash benefits - % GDP 0.664
(0.868)
-0.462
(0.552)
0.049
(0.024)**
-0.098
(0.566)
-0.063
(0.576)
0.025
(0.016)
tax wedge -24.792
(9.996)**
12.735
(7.597)
-1.085
(0.256)***
-29.249
(10.652)**
-4.074
(10.387)
-0.526
(0.327)
unemployment rate
union density
employment protection
age
ageA2
Constant
1.779
(0.144)***
-0.022
(0.001)***
3.110
(5.426)
1.042
(0.162)***
-0.012
(0.002)***
16.064
(4.708)***
0.061
(0.014)***
-0.001
(0.000)***
-0.297
(0.150)*
0.084
(0.026)***
0.190
(2.793)
1.777
(0.151)***
-0.022
(0.001)***
6.884
(4.807)
0.240
(0.174)
0.045
(0.029)
0.986
(2.646)
1.046
(0.163)***
-0.012
(0.002)***
18.393
(4.763)***
-0.014
(0.003)***
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.010
(0.070)
0.060
(0.014)***
-0.001
(0.000)***
Observations
No. of clusters/countries
R-squared
829502
14
0.26
515589
14
0.04
842056
14
0.25
810698
13
0.27
507171
13
0.04
823200
13
0.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country), + Marginal effects reported (evaluated at the mean of the 
independent variables), * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
An interesting result appears in Table 8. Although childcare subsidies are positively correlated 
with participation in the labour market across countries, they are also associated with shorter 
work weeks for those who are employed. Therefore, these two effects cancel each other out, 
and the total effect of childcare subsidies on working hours in column (4), after controlling for 
other institutional factors, is close to zero and statistically insignificant. In the preferred 
specification of Table 8 (columns (4) -  (6)) the effects of family cash benefits are statistically 
insignificant. While the positive effect of childcare subsidies on participation in column (6) is 
supportive of the theory, the negative effect on working hours of employed people in column 
(5) is inconsistent with the theory. One possible explanation is, of course that I am not 
controlling for other country level characteristics. It is possible, for example that in countries 
with higher childcare subsidies there is a higher incidence o f part-time work, for some 
unobservable reasons, and that the measure of childcare subsidies is simply picking up the 
effect of this. Another possible explanation is that in countries with higher childcare subsidies 
people tend to work shorter hours due to cultural factors. I will explore this in more detail in 
Section 7.
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To further examine possible explanations for the result in Table 7 column (3), where I find no 
effects of family policies on working hours, in Table 9 I report the results of an analogous 
analysis, but separately for men and women. Intuitively, one would expect that family support 
policies would have their effects mostly concentrated on women, since women still bear most 
of the childcare responsibilities within the household. For both groups the total effects of 
childcare subsidies on working hours are statistically insignificant, as reported in columns (1) 
and (4). In both cases, again, the effects on hours worked of employed people are negative 
and statistically significant for men (columns (2) and (5)), and the effects on participation for 
both groups are positive and statistically significant (columns (3) and (6)). The effects of 
family cash benefits are mostly insignificant, except in column (6), where they seem to have 
significantly positive effect on participation of women. The tax wedge has significantly 
negative effects in the regressions for men, but it is too imprecisely measured in the case of 
women17.
From the results so far I tentatively conclude that there is weak or no evidence that childcare 
subsidies have an effect on working hours in the economy as predicted by the simple model in 
Section 2. In the next section I turn my attention to comparisons of people with and without 
children.
5.4 Comparisons of people with and without children
It is good to first get an idea of the difference in working hours and labour market 
participation between people with children and people without children. I split people into 
two groups: the first group includes people living in households with at least one child of age 
0-15 present and the second group includes all the rest18. Table 10 reports differences across 
countries between parents and nonparents in their working hours and employment rates. It is 
based on the sample of age 16-55. As seen from the table, parents on average work 0.4 hours 
more per week than nonparents, however, there is considerable variation in the differences 
across countries. In the UK, for example, parents work 5.9 hours less than nonparents, while 
in Sweden they work 6.7 hours more. Similar conclusions can be inferred from the data on the 
employment rates, calculated from the ECHP and the US CPS data. Again, on average, the
17 In order to account for a large number o f  zeroes among the observed hours o f  work I repeated the above 
analysis using a Tobit specification. The results were similar.
18 One could argue that the most relevant group for analysing the effects o f  family policies would be parents o f  
children under the age o f  6. However, in many countries, families with older children are also beneficiaries o f  
favourable tax breaks. The same goes for family allowances. In any case, later in the analysis I also split parents 
into two sub-groups: parents with young children and parents with older children.
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employment rate is 2.2 % points higher for parents. However, in Luxembourg and the UK it is 
8.9 and 8.2 % points lower, respectively, whereas in Sweden it is 17.0 % points higher.
Table 9: Participation, working hours of employed people and family policy: regressions 
for males and females on the sample of age 16 and more (1998-2001)
, Gender group: Males Females
Dependent variable: Working hours per week Employed
dummy
Working hours per week Employed
dummy
Sample: all employed all all employed all
OLS Probit+ OLS Probit+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
childcare subsidies - % GDP -0.429
(0.670)
-2.439
(0.590)***
0.101
(0.013)***
1.228
(1.461)
-2.114
(1.622)
0.150
(0.049)***
family cash benefits - % GDP -0.176
(0.298)
0.737
(0.419)
0.004
(0.008)
-0.021
(0.891)
-0.932
(0.998)
0.044
(0.023)*
tax wedge
1
-31.559
(6.366)***
-14.615
(7.737)*
-0.434
(0.148)***
-26.449
(17.501)
6.131
(18.347)
-0.591
(0.516)
unemployment rate 
union density 
employment protection 
age
I
ageA2
Constanti
-0.265
(0.109)**
0.069
(0.015)***
0.673
(1.520)
2.621
(0.123)***
-0.032
(0.001)***
-2.408
(3.663)
0.192
(0.111)
0.057
(0.020)**
1.672
(1.508)
1.349
(0.178)***
-0.015
(0.002)***
18.257
(4.646)***
-0.013
(0.002)***
-0.001
(0.000)***
-0.009
(0.044)
0.074
(0.013)***
-0.001
(0.000)***
-0.329
(0.219)
0.092
(0.045)*
-0.320
(4.286)
1.084
(0.200)***
-0.015
(0.002)***
13.401
(6.581)*
0.253
(0.285)
0.040
(0.052)
-0.102
(4.732)
0.697
(0.203)***
-0.009
(0.002)***
19.425
(5.877)***
-0.016
(0.005)***
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.011
(0.094)
0.046
(0.014)***
-0.001
(0.000)***
Observations
No. of clusters/countries
R-squared
387639
13
0.34
274370
13
0.07
393591
13
0.32
423059
13
0.23
232801
13
0.03
429609
13
0.22
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country), + Marginal effects reported (evaluated at the mean of the independent 
variables), * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
| I now turn to the regression analysis. Recall from Section 2 that we expect a positive effect of 
childcare subsidies on the working hours of both parents and nonparents, and that these 
effects are expected to be stronger for parents. Similarly, cash benefits should reduce the 
working hours of parents and increase the working hours of nonparents. In absolute value the 
effects of cash benefits are expected to be stronger for parents. I report the results in Table 11. 
In order to capture possible differences in the effects of family policies on parents and 
nonparents I include dummy variables (and corresponding interactions) indicating whether 
children are present in the household. In this way I recognize the potential for heterogeneity in 
| the effects of public policies across groups of individuals; I allow for heterogeneity in the 
effects of childcare subsidies, cash benefits and the tax wedge. In columns (1) and (2) o f the 
Table 11 I split people into two groups: the first group includes everyone with children of age 
; 0-15 in the household, and the second group includes everyone else. I report two different
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specifications, one with policy variables only (family policies and taxes) and one with other 
institutional controls included (unemployment rate and labour market rigidities).
Table 10: Comparisons of people with and without children: working hours and 
employment rates for the sample of individuals aged 16-55 (year 2000)
W orking hours % em ployed
C ountry
C hildren
(0-15)
present
N o
children
(0-15)
present D ifference
No
Children children  
(0-15) (0-15) 
present present D ifference
Austria 31.8 32.9 -1.1 80.6 80.4 0.2
Belgium 30.2 26.4 3.8 77.2 65.8 11.4
Denmark 33.0 31.3 1.7 86.5 85.4 1.2
Finland 33.2 29.4 3.8 80.9 73.2 7.6
France 26.4 24.2 2.3 71.4 65.6 5.8
Germany 28.1 31.6 -3.5 75.6 80.5 -4.9
Greece 29.4 25.2 4.2 66.8 59.1 7.7
Ireland 24.9 27.5 -2.6 66.9 71.6 -4.7
Italy 25.4 23.0 2.4 65.1 58.1 7.0
Luxembourg 27.8 32.2 -4.4 75.9 84.8 -8.9
Netherlands 25.3 28.4 -3.1 79.6 81.4 -1.8
Portugal 33.8 30.2 3.7 79.8 72.1 7.7
Spain 24.6 23.8 0.8 58.7 57.3 1.4
Sweden 33.9 27.1 6.7 85.7 68.7 17.0
United Kingdom 28.2 34.1 -5.9 75.0 83.2 -8.2
United States 31.7 33.7 -2.1 81.0 84.4 -3.4
A verage 29.2 28.8 0.4 75.4 73.2 2.2
Data Sources: ECHP and IPUMS CPS (King et. al. (2004)).
The results in Table 11 do not support the theoretical predictions. Let me discuss the preferred 
specification in column (2). The effects of childcare subsidies for both parents and nonparents 
are insignificant. If anything, the effects are stronger for nonparents (as in column (1)). The 
effects of cash benefits are also insignificant. The effects of the tax wedge are negative, but 
statistically significant only for nonparents.
Intuitively, we would expect the results to be strongest for parents with small children. 
Therefore, in columns (3) and (4) of Table 11 I further split parents into two groups: parents 
with small children (children of age 0-6 in household) and parents with older children 
(children of age 7-15 in household and no younger children). The group with no children is 
the same as in columns (1) and (2). The results are again inconsistent with the theory. The 
effects of family policies in column (4) are small and statistically insignificant for all groups.
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Table 11: Working hours and family policy for people with and without children: 
regressions on the sample of individuals aged 16 and more (1998-2001)
Dependent variable: Working hours per week
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effects o f  childcare subsidies
people with children 0-15 2.252 0.142
(1.437) (1.169)
people with children 0-6 1.724 -0.371
(1.389) (1.008)
people with children 7-15 2.753 0.673
(1.725) (1.580)
people without children 0-15 2.827 0.446 2.827 0.451
(0.794)*** (0.917) (0.794)*** (0.914)
Effects o f  family cash benefits
people with children 0-15 0.749 0.025
(1.208) (0.831)
people with children 0-6 0.387 -0.206
(1.252) (0.880)
people with children 7-15 1.025 0.204
(1.326) (1.036)
people without children 0-15 0.590 -0.236 0.590 -0.234
(0.763) (0.538) (0.763) (0.538)
Effects o f  tax wedge
people with children 0-15 -9.361 -12.216
(12.684) (12.846)
people with children 0-6 -6.196 -9.433
(12.128) (12.037)
people with children 7-15 -12.288 -15.068
(14.611) (15.205)
people without children 0-15 -31.326 -35.386 -31.326 -35.464
(9.762)*** (10.631)*** (9.762)*** (10.562)***
children 0-15 in household dummy -2.085 0.944
(5.734) (5.310)
children 0-6 in household dummy -2.346 0.547
(5.253) (4.919)
children 7-15 in household dummy -1.735 1.455
(6.669) (6.271)
no 0-15 children in household dummy 5.595 9.659 5.590 9.675
(5.458) (4.690)* (5.448) (4.676)*
age 1.752 1.751 1.752 1.750
(0.136)*** (0.142)*** (0.136)*** (0.142)***
ageA2 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
unemployment rate -0.302 -0.300
(0.150)* (0.150)*
union density 0.083 0.083
(0.026)*** (0.026)***
employment protection 0.004 0.012
(2.824) (2.810)
Observations 829040 810236 829040 810236
No. of clusters/countries 14 13 14 13
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country), * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%
Finally, I report results separately for men and women. I also consider the participation 
decision and working hours’ decision separately and I include all other institutional controls. 
The results are reported in Table 12. Looking at total effects in columns (1) for men, there is 
evidence of a negative and significant effect o f childcare subsidies on the working hours of
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male parents and a close to zero effect for nonparents. In both cases, participation in the 
labour market increases with the childcare subsidy (column (3)), whereas hours conditional on 
working decrease with childcare subsidies (column (2)). Comparing male parents to male 
nonparents, the difference in the total effects goes in completely wrong direction, as we would 
expect the effect for parents to be more strongly positive. The positive effect of childcare 
subsidies on participation in column (3) is encouraging, but this effect is smaller for male 
parents than for male nonparents. The total effects of cash subsidies for men in column (1) go 
in the wrong direction; we would expect negative effects for parents and positive effects for 
nonparents but the effects go in the opposite direction.
Let me now turn to the effects on women. Here the direction of effects is more consistent with 
the theory, but the coefficients are very imprecisely measured, hence they are in most cases 
statistically insignificant. The total effects of childcare subsidies in column (4) are positive 
and stronger for parents; however, they are insignificant. For women, too, there is a positive 
effect on participation and negative effect on hours worked conditional on working. The 
effects of childcare subsidies on participation (column (6)) are positive and significant, with 
no real differences between parents and nonparents. The total effects of cash benefits for 
women (column (4)) are insignificant, but the effects at least go in the direction expected in 
theory: there is a negative effect on the working hours of female parents.
To sum up, there is no evidence to support the idea that family policies can help explain 
differences in working hours across countries. In aggregate, the effects do not show up 
empirically. There is evidence that childcare subsidies increase participation in the labour 
market, yet in countries with higher childcare subsidies, people who work tend to work fewer 
hours. When comparing parents and nonparents, the expected differences in effects and 
magnitudes also do not show up. The effects on parents do not seem stronger and in many 
cases go in the wrong direction. If anything, there is some evidence that the effects go in the 
expected direction for females. However, these effects are very imprecisely measured and are 
cancelled out by the effects on men. Therefore, they are not enough to be able to explain 
aggregate differences in working hours across countries.
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Table 12: Participation, working hours of employed people and family policy for people 
with and without children: regressions for males and females on the sample of age over
16 (1998-2001)
Gender group: Males Females
Dependent variable Working hours per week Employed
dummy
Working hours per week Employed
dummy
Sample: all employed all employed
OLS Probit+ OLS Probit+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effects o f  childcare subsidies 
people with children 0-15
people without children 0-15
-1.748
(0.517)***
0.130
(0.658)
-2.170
(0.609)***
-2.617
(0.573)***
0.069
(0.016)***
0.109
(0.018)***
2.178
(1.896)
0.680
(1.574)
-1.491
(2.062)
-2.629
(1.512)
0.147
(0.032)***
0.152
(0.065)**
Effects o f  family cash benefits 
people with children 0-15
people without children 0-15
0.727
(0.287)**
-0.601
(0.316)*
1.053
(0.354)**
0.529
(0.466)
0.009
(0.014)
0.001
(0.009)
-0.500
(1.466)
0.053
(0.840)
-2.123
(1.486)
-0.291
(0.827)
0.031
(0.029)
0.049
(0.027)*
Effects o f  tax wedge 
people with children 0-15
people without children 0-15
-15.825
(6.052)**
-36.347
(6.681)***
-18.051
(7.541)**
-12.639
(7.876)
-0.025
(0.175)
-0.509
(0.166)***
-11.074
(22.287)
-32.445
(17.284)*
12.227
(21.392)
4.071
(18.936)
-0.280
(0.544)
-0.736
(0.543)
children 0-15 in household 
dummy
no 0-15 children in household 
dummy
unemployment rate 
union density 
employment protection 
age 
ageA2
-4.828
(2.950)
-0.284
(3.810)
-0.269
(0.101)**
0.069
(0.014)***
0.438
(1.431)
2.523
(0.113)***
-0.030
(0.001)***
19.610
(4.732)***
17.967
(4.668)***
0.194
(0.110)
0.057
(0.020)**
1.679
(1.491)
1.329
(0.181)***
-0.015
(0.002)***
-0.078
(0.095)
-0.014
(0.002)***
-0.001
(0.000)***
-0.015
(0.041)
0.071
(0.012)***
-0.001
(0.000)***
6.300 13.450 
(8.439) (8.310) 
17.384 18.498 
(6.291)** (5.989)*** 
-0.340 0226 
(0.224) (0.293) 
0.091 0.039 
(0.047)* (0.055) 
-0.507 -0.197 
(4.423) (4.998) 
1.084 0.888 
(0.195)*** (0.191)*** 
-0.015 -0.011 
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
-0.199
(0.121)
-0.016
(0.005)***
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.014
(0.097)
0.046
(0.014)***
-0.001
(0.000)***
Observations
R-squared
387446
0.75
274219
0.94
393390 422790
0.56
232594
0.90
429315
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by countries). There are 13 clusters (countries) in each regression.
+ Marginal effects reported (evaluated at the mean of the independent variables), in case of dummy variables effects are 
computed for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%.
6 Effects of family-support policies on childcare at home
In order to further explore the effects of family support policies on hours worked, this section 
examines a parallel prediction of the model that can be tested in the data: that if a mother is 
encouraged to take up a job, she will likely reduce her time spent in childcare. This happens 
either because the child is put in some form of formal external childcare institution or the 
child is taken care of informally, by grandparents for example. Hence, in theory, a childcare 
subsidy should reduce the time spent in childcare at home for parents. On the other hand, cash 
benefits should increase the time spent in childcare of parents by increasing the non-eamed
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income of parents and thus encouraging them to stay at home. For people without children the 
effects on childcare are slightly different. Both childcare subsidies and cash benefits are 
expected to decrease their time spent in childcare at home. This happens via the government 
budget constraint (13): by increasing support to families, the government reduces the amount 
of money it awards as a lump sum subsidy, and thus nonparents are induced to work more and 
spend less time in other activities.
Information on the time spent in childcare is based on the ECHP variable pr007: Number of 
hours (per week) spent looking after children. This variable is based on two related survey 
questions: “Do your present daily activities include looking after children, whether your own 
or other, without pay?” and if the answer to this question is yes, “Roughly how many hours 
per week do you spend looking after children?” This variable is reported for those who did 
spend some time looking after children. For the rest (if applicable) I assume they spend 0 
hours looking after children. This variable is not available for the US and also not for 
Germany, Sweden, the UK and Luxembourg.
In Table 13 1 show a comparison between childcare at home for people with and without a 
child aged 0-15 in the household. Countries exhibit a very large variation in the time spent in 
childcare at home and there is also large variation in the differences in childcare time between 
the two types of individuals. People with children spend 31.4 hours looking after children in 
Denmark, but only 13.9 hours in Portugal. On the other hand, people without children spend 
0.7 hours per week looking after children in Denmark, France or Spain and 3.22 hours in 
Italy. On average parents spend 20.2 hours more in childcare at home than nonparents. This 
difference is highest in Denmark (30.7), Netherlands (28.9) and Ireland (27.9) and lowest in 
Portugal (13.0), Italy (15.7), Greece (16.0) and France (16.1) In general, south European 
countries such as Portugal, Greece and Italy tend to have low differences, indicating that there 
may be a lot of informal care for children going on, i.e. by grandparents.
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Table 13: Time spent in childcare a t home for people with and without children, sample
of age 16 and more (year 2000)
C ountry
C hildren
(0-15)
present
N o children
(0-15)
present D ifference
Austria 18.4 0.9 17.5
Belgium 21.9 1.9 20.1
Denmark 31.4 0.7 30.7
Finland 19.4 0.8 18.6
France 16.8 0.7 16.1
Greece 17.7 1.7 16.0
Ireland 29.0 1.1 27.9
Italy 18.9 3.2 15.7
Netherlands 31.1 2.3 28.9
Portugal 13.9 0.9 13.0
Spain 18.3 0.7 17.5
A verage 21.5 1.4 20.2
Data Sources: ECHP. Time spent in childcare is based on ECHP variable pr007: Number o f  hours (per week) 
spent looking after children. This variable is based on two related survey questions: “D o your present daily 
activities include looking after children, whether your own or other, without pay?” and i f  the answer to this 
question is yes, “Roughly how many hours per w eek do you spend looking after children?” This variable is 
reported for those who did spend som e time looking after children. For the rest ( i f  applicable) I assumed they 
spend 0  hours looking after children.
In Table 141 report regression results from regressing the hours looking after children on the 
policy variables. Because data on childcare is not available for quite a few countries, only 10 
countries are left for this analysis. Therefore, the results of this section cannot be directly 
comparable to the results from the previous section, where I analysed the effects of policies 
on working hours. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 14 report results from regressions on the 
whole sample with institutional controls either excluded or included, respectively. In 
aggregate, childcare subsidies are expected to decrease time in childcare at home, whereas 
cash benefits are expected to increase time in childcare. The empirical results, however, are 
not consistent with these predictions. In the specification with other controls included, column 
(2), the effect of childcare subsidies is statistically insignificant, but positive. The effect of 
cash benefits on the other hand is significantly negative. In columns (3) and (4) I do 
analogous analysis, but allowing for differential effects between parents and nonparents. 
Recall that the effect of childcare subsidies is expected to be more negative for parents, 
whereas the effect of family cash benefits is supposed to be positive for parents and negative 
for nonparents. This is not the case in my results. The effects of childcare subsidies on parents 
are in fact positive and significant, whereas for nonparents they are negative and significant. 
This means that in countries with higher childcare subsidies parents appear to take more care 
of children at home! The only statistically significant effect that goes in the right direction is 
the effect of cash subsidies on nonparents in column (4). Finally, in columns (5) and (6) I split
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the sample by gender, and again results are inconsistent with the theory for both males and 
females.
Table 14: Childcare at home and family policy for people with and without children: 
regressions on the sample of age over 16 (1998-2001)
Dependent variable: Hours per week looking after children
Sample: all all all all males females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effects o f  childcare subsidies
aggregate 2.189 0.719
(0.922)** (0.543)
people with children 0-15 9.523 7.705 9.533 5.819
(2.324)*** (1.719)*** (1.036)*** (2.501)**
people without children 0-15 -1.018 -2.790 -1.465 -4.044
(0.498)* (0.708)*** (0.567)** (0.910)***
Effects o f  family cash benefits
aggregate -0.434 -1.022
(0.645) (0.449)*
people with children 0-15 -0.254 -1.034 -0.861 -1.339
(1.618) (1.290) (0.879) (1.878)
people without children 0-15 -0.492 -1.118 -0.493 -1.650
(0.414) (0.449)** (0.386) (0.587)**
Effects o f  tax wedge
aggregate -11.019 -5.962
(13.376) (5.060)
people with children 0-15 -54.434 -50.417 -33.063 -63.657
(38.202) (27.113) (18.205) (37.790)
people without children 0-15 9.941 17.262 3.931 27.329
(8.893) (6.808)** (4.459) (10.927)**
children 0-15 in household 29.152 40.080 18.175 58.554
dummy (16.264) (12.735)** (8.112)* (18.421)**
no 0-15 children in household -10.237 -1.278 0.300 -3.061
dummy (4.570)* (4.161) (2.122) (6.865)
unemployment rate -0.052 -0.054 -0.053 -0.026
(0.057) (0.070) (0.038) (0.106)
union density -0.026 -0.030 0.006 -0.062
(0.019) (0.016)* (0.007) (0.026)**
employment protection -8.152 -10.034 -5.285 -14.917
(1.026)*** (1.373)*** (0.880)*** (2.032)***
age 0.639 0.636 0.431 0.424 0.236 0.656
(0.107)*** (0.112)*** (0.097)*** (0.102)*** (0.041)*** (0.166)***
ageA2 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.007
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)***
Constant 2.075 10.190
(6.346) (4.004)**
Observations 333447 314620 333385 314558 151885 162673
No. of clusters/countries 10 9 10 9 9 9
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.38 0.39 0.32 0.52
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by countries); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In order to better understand what is behind these results, I next split the sample by age into 
two groups, people aged 16-55 and people who are older than 55 years. I choose the 55 years 
cut-off because this is approximately the average age at which people become grandparents. I 
report the results in Table 15. In columns (1) and (2) I report the results for the sample of 
those aged 16-55. Similarly as before, there is a puzzling positive effect of childcare subsidies
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on time in childcare activities at home and a negative effect of cash benefits, column (1); both 
these effects are inconsistent with the predictions of the theory. Comparing parents and 
nonparents, the effects of childcare subsidies are strongly positive for parents, which is also 
puzzling. Moving to column (3), where I show results from the analysis on people o f age 56 
or more, we can see significant and negative effects of both types of family policies on time 
spent in childcare at home. There seems to be some indication that family policies do not have 
the expected effects on the prime-age group, or on parents, but there seem to be strong and 
significant effects on old people, for example grandparents. One potential explanation for this 
would be that if family policies are not relieving the childcare burden of parents, perhaps they 
are merely relieving the childcare burden of grandparents. Therefore, because grandparents 
are often not active in the labour market, the effects on working hours cannot be large. 
However, there may be certain cultural or institutional unobservables that are correlated with 
family policy variables and are thus contaminating the results. I explore this question further 
in the next section.
7 Controlling for cultural factors
In a cross-country analysis there is always a risk of unobservable country-level variables that 
are correlated with observed regressors contaminating the results. My analysis is very much 
prone to this kind of bias. I have discussed above that it is possible that cultural aspects affect 
my results and bias the coefficients on family policy variables. For example, in Section 5.3 I 
report that conditional on working, childcare subsidies have a negative effect on working 
hours. However, it could as well be the case that in countries with high public childcare 
support, part-time work is more prevalent. Furthermore, I also find that childcare subsidies 
have a positive effect on time spent in childcare at home by parents. This result, however 
could be caused by the fact that in countries with lower childcare subsidies, such as southern 
Europe, parents take less time to care for their children because using informal care by other 
family members is more readily available and more acceptable. The reported effect could thus 
appear merely due to cultural differences across countries that are correlated with the measure 
of childcare subsidies.
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Table 15: Childcare at home and family policy for people with and without children: 
regressions on the samples of individuals aged 16-55 and over 55 (1998-2001)
Dependent variable: Hours per week looking after children
Age group: 16-55 >55
(1) (2) (3)
Effects o f  childcare subsidies
aggregate 1.942 -1.875
(0.584)** (0.327)***
people with children 0-15 6.581
(1.373)***
people without children 0-15 -2.769
(0.896)**
Effects o f  fam ily cash benefits
aggregate -0.953 -1.088
(0.479)* (0.263)***
people with children 0-15 -1.381
(1.080)
people without children 0-15 -0.888
(0.616)
Effects o f  tax wedge
aggregate -22.950 23.768
(5.586)*** (2.818)***
people with children 0-15 -54.580
(21.538)**
people without children 0-15 7.074
(8.207)
children 0-15 in household dummy 15.526
(9.572)
no 0-15 children in household dummy -24.102
(6.934)***
unemployment rate 0.019 0.008 -0.123
(0.064) (0.072) (0.031)***
union density -0.012 -0.020 -0.019
(0.021) (0.016) (0.011)
employment protection -9.819 -12.289 -1.193
(1.087)*** (1.358)*** (0.618)*
age 4.062 2.215 -0.083
(0.404)*** (0.217)*** (0.060)
ag e^ -0.056 -0.030 -0.000
(0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)
Constant -38.294 3.443
(6.266)*** (2.353)
Observations 217131 217077 97489
R-squared 0.10 0.42 0.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by countries). There are 9 clusters (countries) in each 
regression. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In order to assess the impact of this I include into the analysis two more variables. The first 
measures the prevalence of part time work in a country, and the second measures the average 
number of adults in a household. Both variables are calculated from the information available 
in the ECHP and the US CPS. In Table 161 show these two variables across countries for the 
year 2000. The share of part-time workers measures the percentage of employed people who 
are employed part-time. The share of part-time workers is partly determined by institutional 
arrangements in the labour market, and partly by preferences of consumers/households. As
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evident from Table 16, 13% of workers are on average employed part-time19, but differences 
across countries are very large. In the Netherlands, for example 31.2% employed people work 
part-time. This is followed by Ireland (19.1%) and the US (17.5%). At the bottom end of the 
spectrum are southern European countries, Greece (5.5%), Italy (6.9%) and Portugal (7.8%).
Table 16: Measures of cultural factors across countries: Incidence of part-time work 
and the average number of adults in the household (2000)
C ountry
average num ber o f  
% o f part-tim e adults in household  
w orkers (>18)
Austria 13.2 2.0
Belgium 15.5 2.0
Denmark 15.3 1.9
Finland 9.7 1.7
France 8.9 2.0
Germany 16.9 1.9
Greece 5.5 2.3
Ireland 19.1 2.3
Italy 6.9 2.3
Luxembourg na 1.9
Netherlands 31.2 1.8
Portugal 7.8 2.5
Spain 8.9 2.6
Sweden 9.0 1.6
UK 10.0 1.8
U S 17.5 1.9
A verage 13.0 2.0
Data Sources: ECHP and IPUMS CPS (King et al. (2004)).
Another variable measures the average number of adults aged 18 or more in a household. 
With this measure I seek to capture cultural differences across countries regarding family size, 
living arrangements and the proximity of potential informal care for children. The unweighted 
average of the number of adults in the household across countries is equal to 2.0. As expected, 
the biggest size of households is observed in southern Europe: Spain (2.6), Portugal (2.5), 
Greece and Italy (both 2.3). Ireland also has a high average number of adults (2.3) in a 
household. At the lower end of the scale are countries such as Sweden (1.6), Finland (1.7), 
Netherlands (1.8) and the UK (1.8).
19 Based on unweighted cross-country average.
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Table 17: Impact of cultural factors -  the average number of adults in the household 
and the incidence of part-time work: Working hours regressions on the sample of age
over 16 (1998-2001)
Dependent variable: Working hours per week Employed
dummy
Working hours per week Employed
dummy
Sample: all employed all all employed all
OLS Probit+ OLS Probit+
(1) (2) . ( 3 ) . ............. (4) (5) (6)
Effects o f  childcare subsidies 
aggregate
people with children 0-15 
people without children 0-15
Effects o f  family cash benefits 
aggregate
people with children 0-15 
people without children 0-15
Effects o f  tax wedge 
aggregate
people with children 0-15 
people without children 0-15
share of part-time workers
average number of adults (>18) in 
household
children 0-15 in household dummy
no 0-15 children in household dummy
unemployment rate
union density
employment protection
age
ageA2
Constant
1.220 -1.142 0.135
(0.405)** (0.450)** (0.018)***
-0.251 0.392 0.004
(0.392) (0.376) (0.011)
-45.602 -14.183 -1.040
(10.289)*** (9.461) (0.278)***
-30.326 -28.809 -0.758
(7.026)*** (4.790)*** (0.208)’
-2.932 1.270 -0.180
(1.148)** (1.003) (0.038)’
-0.410 0.041 -0.015
(0.052)*** (0.048) (0.001)***
0.082 0.039 -0.001
(0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.000)**
2.181 0.698 0.092
(1.507) (1.218) (0.045)**
1.785 1.088 0.060
(0.149)*** (0.166)*** (0.014)***
-0.022 -0.013 -0.001
0.975 -0.809 0.117
(0.764) (0.600) (0.031)***
1.208 -1.337 0.141
(0.405)** (0.483)** (0.023)***
-0.142 0.113 -0.003
(0.701) (0.513) (0.021)
-0.442 0.574 0.004
(0358) (0.345) (0.011)
-28.710 -12.565 -0.630
(13.724)* (11.210) (0.331)*
-52.186 -14.857 -1.210
(9.813)*** (9.546) (0.290)***
-30.512 -29.190 -0.767
(7.229)*** (5.030)*** (0.214)***
-3.187 1.439 -0.186
(1.197)** (1.049) (0.038)***
17.493 20.906 -0.204
(6.875)** (6.523)*** (0.097)**
26.539 22.977
(5.659)*** (5.378)***
-0.412 0.029 -0.015
(0.054)*** (0.050) (0.002)***
0.082 0.038 -0.001
(0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.000)*
2.127 0.625 0.090
(1.579) (1.293) (0.046)*
1.759 1.168 0.060
(0.140)*** (0.178)*** (0.014)***
-0.022 -0.014 -0.001
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)***(0 .001)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)***
23.001 23.696
(5.800)*** (5.387)***____________
Observations 810698 507171 823200 810236 506813 822705
R-squared 0.27 0.06 0.26 0.65 0.91 0.26
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by countries). There are 13 clusters (countries) in each regression. + Marginal effects 
reported (evaluated at the mean of the independent variables), in case of dummy variables effects are computed for discrete change of 
dummy variable from 0 to 1; z values in parentheses (test of the underlying coefficient being 0), * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%
The first set of regression results is reported in Table 17. I repeat the analysis from before 
with the addition of the two new measures of cultural factors. I turn first to the effects of the
63
variables measuring cultural factors. They seem to have significant effects in most of the 
specifications. The incidence of part time work enters with a negative and significant 
coefficient in all six specifications, as expected. Similarly, the average number of adults has a 
negative and significant effect in 4 out of 6 cases, also in line with the intuition. In countries 
with larger families, people tend to work less on average, mainly due to lower participation in 
the labour market.
Columns (1) - (3) of Table 17 are analogous to the columns (4) - (6) in Table 8. They analyse 
the aggregate effects of family policies on working hours in the economy, decomposed into 
the participation and hours of work decision. First, with culture included in the regression, 
there is a positive and significant total effect of childcare subsidies on working hours (column 
(1))). In column (2), despite including the measure of the incidence of part-time work into the 
regression, there is still a significantly negative, but smaller than before, effect of childcare 
subsidies on working hours conditional on working. Hence, this effect seems to be quite 
robust. In column (3) the effect of childcare subsidies on participation is more or less the same 
as before. The effects of cash benefits on working hours are insignificant on aggregate. These 
results tend to be supportive of the theory, and hence indicate the possibility that after 
controlling for differences in household size and the incidence of part-time work, family 
policies have a scope to explain differences in working hours across countries.
However, when comparing parents with nonparents, the differences remain puzzling and 
contradict the theory. Columns (4) - (6) in Table 17 show the results of this exercise. The 
effects of childcare subsidies tend to be stronger for nonparents rather than parents, and the 
effects of cash benefits are all insignificant. The results also remain inconsistent with the 
theory when analysing the time spent in childcare at home, reported in Table 18 (analogous to 
results reported in Table 15). One can see that incidence of part-time work and the size of 
households have strong and significant positive effects on childcare at home; however, this 
does not prevent the coefficients on family policies from being “wrong”. On aggregate, in 
column (1), childcare subsides still tend to have a positive and significant effect on childcare 
at home. When comparing parents and nonparents in column (2), the difference in coefficients 
is still counterintuitive, as the effect on parents is, contrary to expectations, significantly 
positive. And when analysing the effects on older people, the negative effects of childcare 
subsidies and cash benefits are reduced after the inclusion of the measures of cultural factors, 
but remain negative and highly statistically significant. This confirms the idea that family 
policies relieve the childcare burden of nonparents rather than parents.
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Table 18: Impact of cultural factors -  the average number of adults in the household 
and the incidence of part-time work: Childcare at home regressions on the sample of
age over 16 (1998-2001)
Dependent variable: Hours per week looking after children
Age group: 16-55 >55
(1) (2) (3)
Effects o f  childcare subsidies
aggregate 2.210 -1.659
(0.351)*** (0.106)***
people with children 0-15 6.429
(1.184)***
people without children 0-15 -2.941
(0.546)***
Effects o f  family cash benefits
aggregate -0.317 -0.666
(0.228) (0.085)***
people with children 0-15 -1.036
(0.884)
people without children 0-15 -0.603
(0.503)
Effects o f  tax wedge
aggregate 2.943 38.828
(7.397) (2.657)***
people with children 0-15 -20.228
(17.191)
people without children 0-15 43.024
(12.158)***
share of part-time workers 27.399 36.989 15.975
(4.728)*** (4.370)*** (1.371)***
average number of adults (>18) in 6.237 5.119 3.964
household (1.459)*** (1.219)*** (0.426)***
children 0-15 in household dummy -21.316
(7.281)**
no 0-15 children in household dummy -61.655
(9.384)***
unemployment rate 0.009 0.030 -0.132
(0.042) (0.040) (0.013)***
union density 0.004 0.004 -0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003)***
employment protection -7.330 -7.001 0.080
(1.069)*** (1.022)*** (0.259)
age 4.055 2.198 -0.092
(0.405)*** (0.217)*** (0.063)
ageA2 -0.056 -0.030 -0.000
(0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)
Constant -70.510 -15.690
(9.103)*** (3.854)***
Observations 217131 217077 97489
R-squared 0.11 0.42 0.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by countries). There are clusters (countries) in each regression. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
8 Conclusion
In this chapter I test whether fiscal family-support policies can help explain the differences in 
working-hours across countries. This has been suggested in the literature by Rogerson (2007) 
and Ragan (2005), but has so far relied on simulations of stylised macroeconomic models
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with a representative agent. However, the proposed explanations imply some important 
effects at a more disaggregated level. I therefore focus on differences between people with 
children and people without children.
I consider two types of public family policies: childcare subsidies and family cash benefits. 
With a simple theoretical model I show that we would expect the effect of childcare subsidies 
on aggregate working hours 1) to be positive in general, 2) to be positive for both parents and 
nonparents, but 3) be stronger for parents. There should be 4) no aggregate effects of family 
cash benefits on working hours, 5) a negative effect for parents, and 6) a positive effect for 
nonparents. The effects of family policies are also expected to affect the time in childcare 
within a household. According to the model outlined in this chapter there is 1) a negative 
effect of childcare subsidies on aggregate time spent in childcare in general, 2) negative for 
both parents and nonparents, but 3) stronger for parents. There should be 4) positive aggregate 
effects of family cash benefits on childcare time, 5) the effects should be positive for parents, 
and 6) negative for nonparents.
I test these predictions using cross country variation from European Household Panel and US 
CPS data. In the aggregate setting there is no supportive evidence for the idea that family 
policies help explain differences in working hours across countries. In preferred specifications 
with other controls included, the effects are close to zero and insignificant. In countries with 
higher childcare subsidies, participation in the labour force is indeed higher, but working 
hours conditional on working are lower, bringing the aggregate effect of policies to zero. 
When comparing the effects of parents and nonparents, the differences in the coefficients are 
counterintuitive. There is an indication that results go in the right direction for females, but 
are cancelled out by the counter effects on males; hence, on the whole, family policies do not 
have the expected effect on working hours.
Furthermore, in regressions with time spent in childcare at home on the left hand side, the 
effects of policy variables contradict the theory. Childcare subsidies, for example, seem to 
increase the time in childcare at home and this effect seems to be, counter-intuitively, 
strongest for parents. An analysis performed on the sample of people older than 55 years, for 
which family policy should not matter much, seems to indicate that childcare subsidies tend to 
reduce the time in childcare for this group. One possible explanation for this is that public 
childcare support actually relieves grandparents from childcare, rather than parents. But, 
because older people do not participate in the labour market very much, family support cannot 
have a strong impact on working hours. Finally, I incorporate into the analysis two measures
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of cultural factors: the average number of adults in the household and the incidence of part- 
time work in the country. After controlling for these two variables, the aggregate effects of 
childcare subsidies on working hours become positive and significant; however, the effects on 
parents are still weaker than the effects on nonparents and the results from the analysis on the 
time in childcare spent at home still contradict the theory.
The lack of empirical evidence in support of the idea that family policies can help explain the 
differences in working hours across countries is striking. The family policy story can perhaps 
be used narrowly to explain the differences between Sweden and the US, but it does not bear 
the inclusion of a greater set of countries and a greater set of controls. Nor does it bear the 
separation of effects for parents and nonparents. I therefore conclude that the family policy 
story contributes little to the explanation of the differences in working hours across countries.
However, it is important to note that in practice, family policies are not implemented solely to 
affect labour supply. Instead, they may be directed at other objectives such as child protection, 
child development and education, parental health, gender equity and fertility. Indeed, some of 
these, e.g. fertility and gender equity, can affect labour supply in their own way, possibly 
masking the effects of child subsidies and cash benefits. Due to data limitations they have not 
been included in the analysis above, but they remain an important priority for future research.
The objective of this chapter is to test whether the predictions of macroeconomists trying to 
explain variation in working hours across countries are correct, and this was tested using 
individual level data. Therefore, the model presented here is more of a macro type, is gender 
neutral and includes only some minor variation across individuals regarding preferences and 
public policies. It is possible that very simple assumptions in such macro models give rise to 
effects that would not appear in more involved models. As exposed for example in Ermisch 
(1989), in models that take into account decisions within a household regarding labour supply, 
fertility and childcare, the effects of childcare policies are mostly of an ambiguous sign. This 
would lead one to conclude that the predictions that macroeconomists talk about are not 
grounded in microeconomic behaviour, a conclusion that in fact is in line with the empirical 
conclusions presented in this chapter.
Finally it is important to stress that given the slow variation in policies over time, the analysis 
is done mainly by exploiting variation across countries. However, with data available only for 
a relatively small number of countries, the power of the analysis to address this sort of 
question is arguably low. Hence, with more variation in public policies over time, or when
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data becomes available for a greater number of countries, future analysis may lead to more 
robust conclusions.
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Appendix
Here I show some results from the Section 2 analytically.
First order conditions
For completeness I state the first order conditions for maximising utility subject to specified 
constraints.
Parents FOC (based on equations (1) -  (4)):
dL a ( l - r )  _ 1 - a - f 3  
dhp (1 — r)hp + T + s \ — hP— H P 
dL . p  1 - a - p  
dHp ' H p + g ~ \ - h p - H p
Nonparents FOC (based on equations (5) -  (8)):
dL a(  1 - r )  _ 1 - a - y
W N : { \ - r ) hN + T ~ \ - h N - H N 
dL y _ 1 - a  — y
The effects of taxes on labour supply
Aggregate labour supply and labour supply of parents unambiguously decrease with taxes:
d h = (1 - a 2) cQ 
dr  ( 1 - a r ) 2
dhp _ (1 - a 2) ( 1 - ^ ( 1 - ^ ) ^
d t  (1-orr)2 ( l - r ) 2
For the labour supply o f nonparents:
^  =  _ i l z £ ! l + s ( l z ^ < 0 ; IF F
d t  ( 1 - a r )  (1 -r)  (1 -a r )  (1 -r)
Under plausible conditions, s and 5 are much smaller than 1, hence this condition will be 
satisfied. See “Realistic example” below.
The effects on childcare at home
Childcare from FOC:
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Effects of taxes on childcare:
dH a (a p + { \ -S )y )   ^ _( p - r )S ( \ -S ) ; Q 
dr  (1 - a t ) 2 0 - ^)2
dr (1-ar)2 (1-r)2
And,
(1-ar)2
a 8> s -----
The effect on childcare o f nonparents is ambiguous, although again, in realistic cases, s should 
be much smaller than a and the condition for a positive sign would hold.
“Realistic example”
Suppose a  = 0.4, r  = 0.4, 8 = 0.4 and g  = 0; then h « 0.2857. If government gives 10% of 
the GDP (deliberate overestimate) for family cash benefits then ^ = 0.0714. Then both 
conditions above hold by a wide margin. One can think of an exhaustive range of “realistic 
examples” where the above conditions would always hold.
Alternative set up for the government subsidy g  with the market for childcare
Alternatively, the utility maximisation problem of parents could look like this:
lP -  \ - h p - H p,
where C represents the “amount” of childcare that parents buy on the market and p determines
alnc” + p \n c hp + (1 - a  -J3)\nlp
subject to
Cp +( \ - g ) C  = ( \ -T)hp +T + s 
Cp =( Hp + C P)^P
the elasticity of substitution between childcare at home and childcare provided on the market.
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In this set up, the government pays for a share g  of the childcare C that a household buys on 
the market. The government hence implicitly reduces the price of childcare on the market 
relative to the self provision of childcare at home.
The utility maximisation problem of nonparent households remains unchanged.
Resulting in FOC for parents:
dL a{ 1 - r )  _  1 — a  — p
~dhp ' ( \ - r ) h p + T - ( \ - g ) C ~ \ - h p - H p
dL m (LH ^ _ 1 - a - p  
dHp ' H ? + C p ~ \ - h p - H p
dL a{\ - g )  _ PCP~X
dC ’ ( l - r ) h p + T - ( l - g ) C  ~ H p +CP
Closed-form solutions are complicated in this kind of set up. It turns out, however, that as 
long as market- and domestically-provided childcare are close substitutes (the elasticity of 
substitution is greater than 1), which is plausible, the government subsidy g  positively affects 
working hours h.
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Chapter II
Greater Wage Inequality Reduces Average Hours of Work
Urban Sila
Abstract: In this chapter I argue that a mean-preserving spread in offered wages (rising wage 
inequality) lowers average working hours in the economy. If labour supply is concave in 
wages, responses to changes in wages are stronger at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
Hence, a decrease in the working hours of low-paid workers is greater than an increase in 
working hours of high-paid workers. Furthermore, due to low market opportunities, some of 
the low-paid workers may leave the labour force and become inactive. Using CPS-MORG 
data for prime-age men for the 1979-2008 period, I find evidence in support of this 
explanation. I establish empirically the concavity of the labour supply function and find 
evidence that after controlling for the average wage, wage inequality has a negative and 
significant effect on labour supply. This result is robust to various specifications.
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1 Introduction
There has been a substantial increase in US wage inequality over the last three decades. The 
biggest rise in wage inequality among prime-age male workers took place in the 1980s, after 
which this upward trend somewhat slowed down. The changes in the distribution of wages 
have attracted a lot of attention from researchers. Two recent contributions by Autor, Katz 
and Kearney (2008) and Lemieux (2006) undertake extensive empirical analysis of the trends 
in wage inequality and discuss potential explanations.
Many economists have suggested that shifts in wage inequality can have important 
implications for the labour supply. Bell and Freeman (2001), for example, argue that forward- 
looking workers worry about future promotions and pay rises. Therefore, since higher 
inequality corresponds to higher wage gains, workers work harder in industries with more 
unequal distribution of wages. Similar findings are reported by Kuhn and Lozano (2008) who 
report that among salaried men, increases in long work hours (above 48 per week) were 
greatest in industries with the largest increases in wage inequality. Positive effects of 
inequality on working hours are also reported in Bowles and Park (2005). In their case this is 
explained by the so-called “Veblen effects”. People look up to the richest class in society and 
seek to match the rich class in their consumption. Hence, the higher the variation in incomes 
in society, the harder people will want to work in order to imitate the rich class1.
This branch of literature relies on workers’ career concerns and on interpersonal comparisons 
through which inequality affects working effort of each individual worker. My approach, 
however, is different. In my work I conceptually follow a more “conventional” labour supply 
literature such as Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991), Juhn (1992) and Welch (1997). In this type 
of setting an individual’s labour supply simply traces the wage that that individual 
(potentially) earns in the labour market. Assuming a positive effect of wages on working 
hours, if the offered wage of a worker rises, the labour supply of that worker will rise. On the 
other hand, if the offered wage falls, the worker will decrease her work effort or may drop out 
of the labour force altogether2. If in addition the labour supply function is stable over time
1 After a careful econometric analysis, Carr (2008) finds no empirical support for the positive causal effect o f  
wage inequality on working hours. He concludes that the positive correlation reported by other researchers is due 
to endogeneity. A positive effect arises either due to variations in the underlying institutional structure o f  
occupations or due to self-selection into occupations.
2 Evidence o f  such behaviour is reported in Juhn et al. (1991) and Juhn (1992). They observe that due to falling 
w ages for male workers with low  wages and low  skills, an increasing proportion o f  them are jobless and opting 
out o f  the labour force.
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then movements in a worker’s wage will closely determine movements in his or her labour 
supply over time. According to such a view of the labour market, it is obvious that changes in 
the wage inequality should have direct consequences for labour supply.
I argue that a mean-preserving spread in the wage distribution causes average working hours 
in the economy to fall. The reasoning behind this is quite simple. Suppose that the labour 
supply function is concave in offered wages. When variation in wages increases, keeping the 
mean wage constant, high-paid workers are getting paid more whereas low-paid workers are 
getting paid less. Due to the concavity of labour supply, the effects on labour supply at the 
bottom of the wage distribution will be stronger than at the top of the wage distribution. 
Therefore, while high-paid workers increase their work hours by little, low-paid workers 
decrease their labour supply by a lot. Moreover, for some workers offered wages are reduced 
below their reservation wage and they decide to drop out of the labour force and work zero 
hours. In practice, active workers usually work a certain amount of hours that is not close to 
zero. Hence, a decision to leave the labour force usually represents a discreet jump and 
decreases working hours substantially. By this argument, therefore, higher variation in wages 
causes working hours in the economy to be lower.
For the results of this chapter I rely heavily on the concavity of the labour supply function. 
The idea that the labour supply function is concave in offered wages has been around in the 
literature, at least implicitly, for some time. Much of the established labour-supply literature 
assumes a concave labour supply, as reported also in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). In some 
cases, the concavity of labour supply was reported also explicitly: Juhn et al. (1991) and Juhn 
and Murphy (1997) find that with rising wages labour supply elasticity falls. Furthermore, in 
the empirical section of this chapter, I find support for the concavity of labour supply with my 
data.
Finally, I report empirical evidence in support of the claim that greater wage inequality 
decreases average hours of work in the economy. I do this using the NBER extracts of the 
CPS Annual Earnings File (also known as the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups) for prime- 
age men for the period 1979-2008.1 find evidence that after controlling for the average wage, 
wage inequality indeed has a negative and significant effect on labour supply. This result is 
robust to various specifications. According to my results, an increase in wage inequality 
equivalent to the increase in the US over the 1979-2008 period would cause an approximately 
3 % decrease in average hours worked in the economy. During the same period, observed
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average working hours in the economy have fallen for about 8%. From this it follows that 
rising inequality can potentially explain 30-40% of the decrease in working hours over time.
The findings of this chapter are important for several reasons. The chapter deals with two 
central themes in labour economics -  labour supply and inequality. To my best knowledge 
this is the first paper that explicitly relates the conventional static view of labour supply, 
where labour supply is determined by a worker’s own offered wage, with wage inequality. 
Furthermore, the results of this chapter are also interesting from the point of view of the 
literature that attempts to explain the differences in working hours across countries (see for 
example Prescott (2004), Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005), Rogerson (2006), Rogerson 
(2007) and Faggio and Nickell (2007)). In this context wage inequality is another variable that 
affects working hours in the economy and should be taken into account when comparing 
working hours across countries. The results are also interesting from the point of view of 
public policies that affect wage inequality.
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 2 I argue theoretically that the concave labour 
supply function implies that a mean-preserving spread in wages may result in a fall in average 
hours worked in the economy. In section 3 I describe the data and show the evolution of 
wages and wage inequality over time for prime-age men. In section 4 I present the main 
results of the paper. First, I establish empirically that labour supply is indeed concave in 
wage. I then test the theoretical prediction that wage inequality, controlling for average wage, 
has a negative effect on working hours. In section 5 I conclude.
2 Labour supply and wage inequality
2.1 Concavity of labour supply
Theoretically, labour supply is not necessarily concave in wage. However, in much of the 
empirical labour-supply literature, researchers have implicitly assumed and estimated a 
concave functional form. In his influential analysis of the sensitivity of an empirical female 
labour supply model, Mroz (1987) assumes a semi-logarithmic specification. Pencavel (1986) 
mentions both logarithmic and semi-logarithmic specifications, but reports that the most 
commonly used specification is simply linear. In their survey of the labour supply literature, 
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) report that most often the empirical specifications of the static 
labour supply model are of two forms:
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ln/*; = /?ln wf +a ' Z t +s t 
ht = j3\n.wi + or'Z, + s f (1)
Where h represents hours worked, w is offered wage, Z is a vector of other controls, s is the 
error term, a and (3 are parameters and subscript i stands for an individual. Both specifications 
in (1) imply that the effect of wages on hours is decreasing with wage, and hence is concave.
The concavity of the labour supply has been reported also more explicitly. Juhn et al. (1991) 
estimate elasticities of labour supply for men by percentiles of the wage distribution and they 
find that for workers that are higher up in the wage distribution, cross-sectional estimates of 
the labour supply elasticities are significantly smaller. Similar findings are reported by Juhn 
and Murphy (1997); they estimate an employment equation for different groups of married 
men according to the percentile in the wage distribution and report that employment rate is 
clearly less responsive for those who are high in the wage distribution. Devereux (2004) also 
finds that own-wage elasticity is decreasing in the husband’s wage.
In the empirical section below I will report evidence that the cross-sectional labour supply 
curve is concave with respect to wages, consistent with the evidence just cited. For the 
remainder of this section I will thus assume that the relationship between working hours and 
wages is concave.
2.2 The effects of wage inequality
Let us assume the following full specification of the labour supply:
where g(.) is a concave function and w(.) represents a reservation wage function; X  is a 
vector of personal characteristics which may overlap with the vector Z. Note that function 
g(.) is defined over the whole range o f offered wages, above and below the reservation wage. 
We can assume, plausibly, that the value of h for w just above the reservation wage w(.) is 
not too close to zero. This is plausible because in practice active workers usually work a 
certain amount of hours that is not very close to zero. I will return to this point below.
Furthermore, assume that offered wages are distributed according to an exogenous 
distribution defined by the pdf / (w) . Assume that individuals differ only by wage and
ht =0, if wt <w(Xi) , (2)
^  = g K )  + a 'Z ,, if Wi>w(Xi) , (3)
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personal characteristics Z, whereas the reservation wage is the same for all: w(Xt) = w . In
this way I assume that the decision to participate in the labour market and how much to work 
is mainly dependent on someone’s offered wage.
The expected number of horns worked in the economy can be expressed as follows:
Eh = E{h | w < w) * Pr(w < w) + E(h \ w > w) * Pr(w > w)
= 0 * Pr(w < w) + E((g(w) + a 'Z)  \ w > iv) * Pr(w > w)
= 0+ f g(w)/ ( w)dw ^  + E(a'Z  \ w > w )*Pr(w > w) (4)
J Pr(w>w)
“ 'max
-  ^g{w)f(yv)dw + E{a'Z\  w > iv) * Pr(w > iv)
w
= J g(w)f (w)dw— ^g{w)f{\v)dw+E(a'Z \ w> w)*Pr(w > w)
^ m in  w rain
The second equality follows from my specification of the labour supply in (2) and (3) and the 
third equality follows from the definition of conditional expectation. For greater clarity I write 
down the last line of (4) again:
“ 'max w
Eh=  |  g(w)f (w)dw— ^g{w)f(w)dw+E(a'Z | w > w)*Pr(w > w)  (5)
^m in  ^m in
The expression for the average number of hours in the economy (5) allows us to analyse the 
effects of changes in the inequality in wages on working hours. Since I attempt to analyse 
changes in working hours purely due to changes in inequality, I want to keep the mean wage 
unchanged. Therefore, I will analyse the effect of a mean-preserving spread in wages on 
working hours.
Inspecting the expression (5), it turns out that the mean-preserving spread in wages can have 
an effect on working hours in any direction, either positive or negative. However, in what 
follows I will argue that the effect of rising inequality on working hours is negative. It is 
important to remember that I do not claim that this is a general result, or the only possible 
result. What I do claim, however, is that this result is empirically interesting and relevant. In 
the empirical section below I will show that the negative effect of wage inequality on working 
hours prevails in my data.
Let me now turn to the first term on the right hand side of (5); in order to analyse the effect of 
the mean-preserving spread I refer to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970 and 1972). They define
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the mean-preserving spread as a situation where one distribution has been constructed from 
the other by putting more weight into the tails, while keeping the mean unchanged. This is 
equivalent to saying that the new variable is distributed as the initial variable plus a white 
noise. The results from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970 and 1972) state that for a large class of 
random variables defined over a bounded interval, as long as g(.) is a bounded concave
w n* x
function, ^g{w)f{w)dw will decrease when there is a mean-preserving spread in the
^min
distribution of w3.
Intuitively, this stems directly from the concavity of g(.). Because the labour supply is 
concave, the effect of wages on working hours diminishes with the wage rising. This means 
that workers with low wages are more responsive to changes in wages than high-paid 
workers. Now, with the mean-preserving spread in wages, some high-paid workers are getting 
paid even more, whereas some low-paid workers are getting paid less. Since labour supply is 
concave, the reduction in hours worked by low-paid workers is large compared to the small 
increases in hours worked by high earners, hence the average hours in the economy decrease. 
To further illustrate this point I depict these changes in Figure 1.
Let me turn next to the second term on the right hand side of (5). This term is a residual term 
that remains after putting the whole wage distribution under the integration in the first term. 
For wages below the reservation wage the mean-preserving spread pushes the values of g(.) 
down. That is, offered wages of those who do not participate in the labour market become 
even smaller. However, at the same time, the number of people out of the labour force 
increases. Therefore, the resulting effect of this term on working hours is ambiguous. 
Empirically, it turns out that the negative effect on working hours prevails, as higher variation 
in wages, keeping the mean wage fixed, decreases working hours in the economy.
Finally, the third term on the right hand side of (5) represents hours worked due to personal 
characteristics Z, conditional on the fact that an individual is working. As the only change in 
the economy is the mean-preserving spread in wages, there is no change in personal 
characteristics Z nor is there any change in the reservation wage, w . Hence, each person that
3 The mean-preserving spread also implies an increase in the variance o f  w. For this reason, in the empirical 
section below, as a main measure o f  inequality in wages I w ill use the standard deviation o f  log wages. Note, 
however, that an increase in variance, keeping the mean unchanged, does not imply the mean-preserving spread. 
Nevertheless, I conjecture that for empirically relevant cases o f  offered wage distributions the implication works 
in both directions.
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remains in the workforce will work exactly the same amount of hours due to Z as before the 
change in inequality. Perceptive reader would have noticed, however, that the term 
E(a 'Z  | w > w) might have changed with the increase in wage inequality. Namely, those who 
remain in the workforce may on average have a different value of Z from those who opted 
out. However, in order to ease the discussion I will assume (perhaps unrealistically) that 
personal characteristics Z are mean independent of w, and thus the only thing that remains to 
be discussed is the effect on the share of the population that remains active: the 
probability Pr(w > vv). If the share of the people in the workforce becomes smaller, this would 
have as a consequence a negative effect on working hours.
Figure 1: Effect of earnings inequality on working-hours
h
Mean preserving 
spread in f(w)
w
Theoretically, one cannot say with certainty what happens with the share of the population 
that participates in the labour force. However, in this chapter I am interested in situations 
where, after the mean-preserving spread in wages, more people opt out of the labour force as 
their wages fall below the reservation wage. Such situations are, in fact, empirically relevant 
and have been reported in the literature. Many researchers have found that male participation 
in the US labour market has been falling over the long term in line with the falling market 
opportunities. Juhn et al. (1991) report that rising joblessness observed in the 1970s and 1980s 
is concentrated among groups with declining real wages. Juhn (1992) similarly reports that
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among prime-age men, declines in employment occur at all ages but are found to be 
particularly severe among less-educated and low-wage men. Welch (1997) finds that hours 
worked have fallen most rapidly among the groups that have experienced the greatest 
reduction in wages. Finally, Juhn and Potter (2006) report that following the decline in 
demand for less-skilled workers, there has been a decline in wages among less-skilled men 
and also a sharp fall in the employment of this group. To a large degree, this was 
characterized with dropping out of the labour force altogether, rather than entering 
unemployment, which, they argue, has become a predominant response to poor labour market 
conditions.
For this reason there is one more channel through which hours are reduced in the economy 
even though higher paid workers increase their labour supply. As assumed above, low-paid 
workers never supply hours that are very close to zero. In my sample, for example, only about 
0.3% of active males work less than 8 hours per week. Hence, when workers decide to leave 
the labour force, they reduce their working hours to zero from some positive amount and 
hours are reduced by a discrete interval.
Let me summarize this section. I have shown that much of the empirical labour supply 
literature supports the idea that labour supply is concave in wage. I will test and confirm this 
empirically with my data below. The concavity of labour supply in turn implies that 
increasing wage inequality, holding the average wage constant, decreases working hours in 
the economy. This can be explained by two effects. First, due to the concavity of the labour 
supply, working hours’ responses are stronger for workers with low and falling wages than for 
workers with high and rising wages. Second, due to falling wages, some people opt out of the 
labour force and start supplying zero hours.
3 Data and basic trends
3.1 Data
I use extracts from the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) available from the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) web page. The data set covers information 
on the US labour market over a period of 30 years, from 1979 to 2008, and includes all adult 
respondents in the outgoing rotation group each month. In my analysis I focus on prime-age 
men: I restrict the sample to men aged 25-54. By restricting the age band to 25-54 I try to 
avoid complications due to educational and retirement decisions. I exclude women as female
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labour supply of the last 30 years has been subject to very strong increases in participation. 
Furthermore, the labour supply of women is complicated by a multitude of other factors, 
including child-bearing decisions.
My main variables of interest are hours of work and measures of hourly wages. For the 
purposes of the analysis, both these variables have undergone certain modifications from the 
original data set. In what follows I describe this in more details. First I describe the processing 
of the wage data. Earnings are collected per hour for hourly workers and per week for other 
workers. Two wage variables are available in the original data set. The first reports the actual 
hourly wage for hourly workers only. The second reports hourly wage, which comprises of 
actual hourly wage for hourly workers and imputed hourly wage (weekly earnings divided by 
usual hours of work) for other workers. Following analogous procedures in Lemieux (2006) 
and Autor et al. (2008) I force all top-coded values to be equal to $99 and then multiply all 
top-coded values by factor of 1.4.1 convert wages into 2000 dollars using the quarterly PCE 
(Personal Consumption Expenditure) Deflator obtained from the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. I put to missing all observations with a wage below $2.1258 in 2000 dollars (below 
$1 in 1979 dollars). I also put to missing all wage observations for self-employed workers. 
Following Autor et al. (2008) I construct the measure of hourly wage for non-hourly workers 
by dividing weekly earnings by hours worked last week instead of usual weekly hours. This is 
done because usual hours are not consistently available over time; there is a break in the series 
in 1994.
This leaves me with two variables, one measuring hourly wages of workers paid per hour, and 
one measuring hourly wages for “all” workers. I use these two different measures in the 
analysis that follows. Wages of hourly workers are the most pure measure of the hourly wage, 
since they are reported directly by workers themselves. However, the subsample of workers 
paid per hour is not representative of the whole working population. The measure of hourly 
wages for “all” workers, on the other hand, is representative of a wider set of workers, but is 
by construction contaminated by using the information on working hours. If there is a 
measurement error in the hours worked last week, the constructed hourly wage will be 
measured with error as well.
These two variables are available only for those workers who are active in the labour market. 
Therefore, for all those not working (and those whose wage information was put to missing 
via the process described above) the wage data is missing. Recall that in this chapter I am 
interested in the behaviour of average hours worked, so I need the information on (offered)
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wages for both workers and non-workers. To be able to do this and to avoid the sample 
selection problem, I need to impute wages for all the missing observations. My imputation 
procedure follows the previous literature of Blau and Kahn (2007), Juhn and Murphy (1997), 
Juhn (1992) and Juhn et al. (1991), and is done as follows. All the missing observations of 
wages are imputed from separate regressions by year and by full-time/part-time status. For 
those not in the labour force, wages are imputed from regressions on the sample of part-time 
workers4. Regressions are done with log wages as the dependent variable and age, age 
squared, non-white dummy, two education dummies (no high-school as a baseline, high 
school and college dummy), married dummy and regional and metropolitan status dummies as 
independent variables. The imputation is done separately for wages of hourly workers and for 
wages of “all” workers. I thus end up with two basic measures of offered wages in the 
economy which I call hourly wage and hourly earnings, respectively.
Now I turn briefly to the measures of labour supply: hours worked per week. My data set 
contains two variables. The first variable measures usual hours worked and is obtained from 
the survey question: “How many hours per week does...USUALLY work at this job?”, where 
“this job” stands for the main job of the respondent. Second variable measures hours worked 
last week, and is obtained from the survey question: “How many hours did...work last week at 
all jobs?”. I set both variables to zero for everybody whose labour status is not employed. 
Originally these observations had hours information missing.
3.2 Basic trends in wages
In this section I show how the main wage variables of interest have evolved over the last 
thirty years. All the figures and the statistics, such as the mean or the standard deviation of 
wages, are calculated yearly, from the log real wage variable, and weighted by the earnings 
weights available from the data source. Recall that these measures include all prime-age men; 
for those with missing wage data I use imputed wages. Figure 2 shows the average (log) wage 
of prime-age men over time; as can be seen, hourly wage and hourly earnings move more or 
less together, only that hourly wage is slightly lower, as hourly workers are on average paid 
less than the rest of the workers. As has been reported in the literature, the 1980s were a 
period of falling real wages. Average hourly earnings fell by about 12% in the period from
4 In the literature, wages for non-workers are usually imputed from regressions on workers that work less than a 
certain number o f weeks per year, say 20 weeks. In my data, however, this information is not available. For this 
reason I use full-time/part-time status as a cut-off.
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1979 to about 1993. The 1990s, on the other hand, were a period of rising average wages, 
with hourly earnings rising by about 17% from 1993 until 2000. Since 2000 real wages have 
been more or less stable.
Next I show different measures of wage inequality. Figure 3 shows the standard deviation in 
log real wages over time and Figure 4 shows the ratio of 90th to 10th percentile of log real 
wage. Consistent with the inequality literature, Lemieux (2006) and Autor et al. (2008), there 
seems to be quite a steep increase in inequality in the 1980s with flattening of the inequality in 
the 1990s and after. Note that by the standard deviation measure of inequality, hourly wage 
and hourly earnings give more or less the same picture for the first 20 years of observations. 
Since the late 1990s, however, hourly earnings show a slight increase in inequality, whereas 
the hourly wage measure shows a slight decrease in inequality. Similarly, by the 90/10 
percentile ratio measure, the fall of inequality since early 1990s is more pronounced in the 
hourly wage measure, as compared to the hourly earnings measure.
Finally, I split the wage inequality into the upper-tail and lower-tail inequality. Figure 5 
depicts the 90/50 percentile ratio of log real wage, the so-called upper-tail inequality, and 
Figure 6 depicts the 50/10 percentile ratio of log real wage, the so-called lower-tail inequality. 
Wage inequality in the upper tail of the wage distribution rose during the 1980s and has more 
or less flattened or slightly reversed since 1993. Wage inequality in the lower tail rose during 
the early 1980s and has flattened and reversed since then. According to the two figures, the 
growth in the 50/10 wage gap has reversed more as compared to the 90/50 wage gap, but the 
disparity in the evolution of the lower and upper tail inequality does not seem as dramatic as 
reported in Autor et al. (2008).
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1979 1983 1987 1991 1995
year
1999 2003
(mean) hourly wage (mean) hourly earnings
Source: own calculations based on CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups obtained from the NBER web page. 
Sample is restricted to men aged 25-54. Hourly wage: based on actual hourly wage for hourly workers only. 
Hourly earnings: comprises o f actual hourly wage for hourly workers and constructed hourly wage (weekly 
earnings divided by hours worked last week) for other workers. Plotted wage is the mean log real wage weighted 
by the earnings weight available in the data source. Units o f measurement on the vertical axis are log points. 
Following Lemieux (2006) and Autor et al. (2008) I force all top-coded values to be equal to $99 and then 
multiply all top-coded values by a factor o f 1.4. I convert wages into 2000 dollars using the quarterly PCE 
Deflator obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. I put to missing all observations with a wage 
below $2.1258 in 2000 dollars. I also put to missing all wage observations for self-employed workers.
For all those not working and those whose wage information was put to missing via the process described above 
the wage data is missing. Hence, for these observations I impute the wages. The imputation procedure follows 
the previous literature, Blau and Kahn (2007), Juhn and Murphy (1997), Juhn (1992) and Juhn et al. (1991) and 
is done as follows. All the missing observations of wages are imputed from separate regressions by year and by 
full-time/part-time status. For those not in the labour force, wages are imputed from regressions on the sample of 
part-time workers. Regressions are done with log wages as the dependent variable and age, age squared, non­
white dummy, education dummies, married dummy and regional and metropolitan status dummies as 
independent variables. Imputation is done separately for hourly wage and for hourly earnings.
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Figure 3: Wage inequality: Standard deviation in wages of prime-age men (1979-2008)
^  i i i i i i i
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year
(sd) hourly w age -----«-----  (sd) hourly earnings
Source: own calculations based on CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups obtained from the NBER web page. 
The plotted measure of inequality is the standard deviation o f the log real wage. For more details see note under 
Figure 2. Units o f measurement on the vertical axis are log points. The measures of wage inequality show wage 
inequality in offered wages; for individuals that do not work I use imputed wages.
3.3 W ages by quintile in the w age  distribution
In this section I show the evolution of wages by wage quintiles. I split workers into 5 different 
groups according to the quintile o f their (offered) wage. Computed average wages from 
different quintiles are put on the same footing by setting the value o f the first observation 
(year 1979) in each quintile equal to 1. Thus the graph shows the evolution o f the average 
wage in a certain quintile relative to its own value in the year 1979. Similar graphs have been 
reported in the literature. Juhn et al. (1991), Juhn (1992), Juhn and Murphy (1997), Welch 
(1997) and Kuhn and Lozano (2008) look at wage changes by deciles or quintiles in the wage 
distribution. Similarly, Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Welch (1997) and Autor et al. (2008) 
report the evolution o f wages by education groups. My findings are in line with the literature.
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Figure 4: Wage inequality: 90/10 percentile ratio in wages of prime-age men (1979-2008)
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Source: own calculations based on CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups obtained from the NBER web page. 
The plotted measure o f inequality is the ratio o f 90th and 10th percentile of the log real wage. For more details see 
note under Figure 2. Units o f measurement on the vertical axis are log points. The measures o f wage inequality 
show wage inequality in offered wages; for individuals that do not work I use imputed wages.
In Figure 7 I show the evolution o f the hourly wage and in Figure 8 I show the evolution of 
the hourly earnings by wage quintiles. The two pictures tell more or less the same story, 
which is also consistent with the story from the graphs on overall wage inequality. In the 
1980s, whereas real (offered) wages o f the top two wage quintiles were basically stable, 
wages o f workers with wages lower than the 60th percentile fell. The steepest falls were 
experienced by the lowest paid workers in the first and second quintile. Looking at the hourly 
earnings in Figure 8, real wages for workers in the first and second wage quintile fell by about 
19% from 1979 to 1992!5 This o f course implies that inequality was on the rise in the 1980s at 
the expense o f low-paid workers. One can clearly notice the divergence o f the three lines 
towards the middle of the picture, indicating an increase in inequality. At the beginning o f the 
1990s this trend started to reverse. The five lines started to get closer together, as the wages of
5 Note that this cannot be read directly form the graph, because units o f measurement are in terms o f log ratios. I 
calculated this directly from the data.
the lowest paid workers started to catch up with the general increase in average wages. 
Depending on whether one looks at the hourly wage or hourly earnings picture, wage 
inequality seems to have slightly decreased or flattened by the end o f the period, respectively.
Figure 5: Wage inequality: 90/50 percentile ratio in wages of prime-age men (1979-2008)
CO
LO
m o  -
1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007
year
 •------  (90/50 ratio) hourly wage -----*------  (90/50 ratio) hourly earnings
Source: own calculations based on CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups obtained from the NBER web page. 
The plotted measure of inequality is the ratio o f 90th and 50th percentile of the log real wage. For more details see 
note under Figure 2. Units of measurement on the vertical axis are log points. The measures of wage inequality 
show wage inequality in offered wages; for individuals that do not work I use imputed wages.
This graph is suggestive o f a simple story that I am trying to tell in this chapter. Take for 
example the inequality increase from the 1980s. We can clearly see how the wages o f low- 
paid workers were falling whereas wages o f high-paid workers remained largely unchanged. 
Now what does this imply for the labour supply? It implies, as already suggested by Juhn et 
al. (1991), Juhn (1992), Welch (1997) and Juhn and Potter (2006), that the labour supply o f 
high-paid workers remained stable, while the labour supply o f low-paid workers must have 
fallen significantly, since their market opportunities diminished. Similar logic can be used for 
the later period, when the wages o f all groups were rising. Now, all groups should be putting 
more effort into the labour market as they are being rewarded with higher wages.
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Figure 6: Wage inequality: 50/10 percentile ratio in wages of prime-age men (1979-2008)
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Source: own calculations based on CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups obtained from the NBER web page. 
The plotted measure o f inequality is the ratio o f 50th and 10th percentile o f the log real wage. For more details see 
note under Figure 2. Units o f measurement on the vertical axis are log points. The measures of wage inequality 
show wage inequality in offered wages; for individuals that do not work I use imputed wages.
So far, however, there has been no discussion o f wage inequality per se, and all these labour 
supply effects could in aggregate simply be attributed to the rising and falling o f the average 
wage in the economy. The question therefore is what happens if  one keeps the average wage 
constant. Suppose again that the spreading out of wages by wage quintiles would be as it was 
in the 1980s, but the average wage in the economy would remain constant -  a mean- 
preserving spread in wages. That is, wages would fall for low-paid workers and rise for high- 
paid workers. In this case I argue that due to the concavity of the labour supply, working 
hours o f low-paid workers would decrease more than the working hours o f high-paid workers, 
and average working hours in the economy would fall. In the next section I turn to the 
analysis o f working hours and their dependence on wages and wage inequality.
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Figure 7: Average hourly wage by wage quintiles of prime-age men (1979-2008)
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Source: own calculations based on CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups obtained from the NBER web page. 
Hourly wage: based on actual hourly wage for hourly workers only. The graph shows the evolution of average 
log real wage by quintiles o f the wage distribution, “wage quintile 1” represents the first (lowest) quintile and so 
on, with the “wage quintile 5” representing the highest fifth quintile. Computed average wages from different 
quintiles are put on the same footing by setting the value o f the first observation (year 1979) equal to 1. Thus the 
graph shows evolution of the log average wage in a certain quintile relative to the value of the log real wage in 
that quintile in the year 1979. Units of measurements on vertical axis are in terms o f log ratios! For more details 
about the wage measure see note under Figure 2. The measures are based on offered wages; for individuals that 
do not work I use imputed wages.
4 Results
4.1 W orking hours and the concavity  o f labour su pp ly
In Figure 9 I show average weekly hours o f work over time. It is obvious from Figure 9 that 
there is a strong cyclical component in working hours over time, closely following the 
(opposite) movements in the aggregate unemployment rate (not shown). I could regress out 
the cyclical component, or try to derive a trend measure o f working hours. However, working 
hours depend on several things, such as the economic cycle, the unemployment rate, the age 
composition o f the population etc. The choice o f controlling for any o f these for the purposes 
of graphical representation would be arbitrary, so I decided to show a crude measure o f
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working hours over time instead. In the regression analysis below, I will o f course control for 
the unemployment rate and age.
Figure 8: Average hourly earnings by wage quintiles of prime-age men (1979-2008)
' l-i----------------- r----------------- 1---------------- 1----------------- 1-----------------1------------ -----1--------—------1—
1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007
year
wage quintile 1----- ♦----- wage quintile 2
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wage quintile 5
Source: own calculations based on CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups obtained from the NBER web page. 
Hourly earnings: comprises o f actual hourly wage for hourly workers and constructed hourly wage (weekly 
earnings divided by hours worked last week) for other workers. Units of measurements on vertical axis are in 
terms of log ratios! For more details see note under Figure 7. The wage measures are based on the distribution of 
offered wages; for individuals that do not work I use imputed wages.
In Figure 10 I show the evolution o f working hours over time by quintiles of hourly earnings. 
The measure o f working hours used here is hours worked last week. Due to an apparent break 
in the series in 1994,1 regress the hours’ measures in each wage quintile on a dummy variable 
whose value is set to 0 before 1994 and to 1 in 1994 and after. Residuals from these 
regressions are put on the same footing by setting the starting value to zero6. One can clearly 
see from the picture how working hours o f low-paid workers are more responsive than o f the 
rest. However, from a graphical analysis it is not possible to say anything about the response 
of the labour supply o f different quintile groups to wages. Most likely, the obvious patterns in
6 Autor et al. (2008) mention the break in the series for the usual hours worked in the year 1994. However, after 
inspecting graphs of working hours over time by quintiles, it becomes apparent that there is some kind of break 
also in the hours worked last week variable. It is not clear to me where this break comes from.
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the picture follow the evolution o f the economic cycle -  showing large responsiveness of low- 
paid workers’ employment to economic shocks.
Figure 9: Average hours of work per week of prime-age men over time (1979-2008)
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Source: own calculations based on CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups obtained from the NBER web page. 
Hours last week measure is obtained from the survey question: “How many hours did...work last week at all 
jobs?”. Usual hours measure is obtained from the survey question: “How many hours per week 
does...USUALLY work at this job?”, where “this job” stands for the main job of the respondent. I set both 
variables to zero for everybody whose labour status is not employed; originally these observations had hours 
information missing. Graph is for men aged 25-54. There is an apparent break in the series in 1994.
I next turn to testing whether labour supply is indeed concave in wages. In order to test this 
hypothesis I regress individual working hours on wage and wage squared. If  labour supply is 
concave, I would expect the coefficient on the wage level to be positive and the coefficient on 
the wage squared to be negative. In all regressions I include year dummies, age, age squared, 
a non-white dummy, a married dummy, regional dummies, a metropolitan status dummy and 
a constant. I am in effect estimating a cross-sectional labour supply function. Note that 
education is excluded from my empirical model; following Juhn et al. (1991) I assume that 
more educated persons work more because they earn higher wages. Hence, the main measure 
o f marketable skill in the labour market is someone’s (offered) wage.
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Figure 10: Average hours worked last week by wage quintile of prime-age men (1979-
2008)
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Source: own calculations based on CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups obtained from the NBER webpage. 
This picture shows evolution of working hours over time by quintiles of hourly earnings. The measure of 
working hours used here is hours last week. Due to apparent break in the series in 1994, I regress hours’ 
measures in each wage quintile on a dummy variable, whose value is set to 0 before 1994 and to one 1 in 1994 
and after. Residuals from these regressions are put on the same footing by setting the starting value to zero. For 
more details see note under Figure 9.
Results are reported in Table 1. I show four different specifications, with two different 
measures of working hours (hours last week and usual hours worked) and two different 
measures o f wages (hourly wage and hourly earnings). Due to potential endogeneity of the 
wage variable, I report results from both OLS and Instrumental variables (two stage least 
squares) regressions. To instrument for wage and wage squared I use wage decile dummies as 
instruments, indicating in which decile o f the wage distribution an individual’s wage offer 
falls (Baker & Benjamin (1997), Juhn & Murphy (1997), Blau et al. (2003), Blau & Kahn 
(2007)). Using wage decile dummies can potentially correct for measurement error in wage.
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Table 1: Concavity of labour supply for prime-age men
Dependent variable: hours worked last week usual hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
O LS
hourly wage 
hourly wage squared 
hourly earnings 
hourly earnings squared
1.561
(0.004)***
-0.013
(0.000)***
0.528
(0.003)***
-0.006
(0.000)***
1.396
(0.004)***
-0.011
(0.000)***
0.544
(0.003)***
-0.004
(0.000)***
Instrum ental variables
hourly wage 
hourly wage squared 
hourly earnings 
hourly earnings squared
3.900
(0.014)***
-0.078
(0.000)***
0.871
(0.006)***
-0.013
(0.000)***
3.461
(0.013)***
-0.068
(0.000)***
0.712
(0.005)***
-0.007
(0.000)***
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All regressions include year dummies, regional dummies, 
metropolitan status dummy, age, age squared, non-white dummy, married dummy 
and a constant. In instrumental variables regressions w age and wage squared are 
instrumented using wage decile dummies.
In all specifications there is evidence of a positive and concave effect of wages on working 
hours. The effect of the wage level is positive and the effect of wage squared is negative, as 
predicted. All coefficients are very precisely estimated. In confirmation with the attenuation 
bias hypothesis, wage effects are larger in absolute value in the instrumental variables 
specification. To give a feel for the extent of concavity, I compute wage effects for the 
specification reported in the column (2) in Table 1. Based on the OLS (IV) regression results, 
compared to the wage effect at the 10th percentile, the effect of wage at the median (50th 
percentile) is 8 (12) % smaller, while the effect at the 90th percentile is 23 (32) % smaller. 
Therefore, I conclude that labour supply is concave in wage and that at the top of the wage 
distribution the effects of wages are about one third smaller than at the bottom of the wage 
distribution.
In the preceding analysis I basically ignored the fact that for many observations the value of 
the dependent variable is equal to zero. That is, some prime-age men do not work. In my 
sample, about 12% of men aged 15-54 report zero hours worked. In order to check whether 
my results are robust to alternative specifications in which this fact is accounted for explicitly 
I do the analysis using two alternative specifications7. First, in order to take into account the
7 Results are not reported here but can be obtained upon request.
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mass of observations at zero hours, I use a Tobit instead of the linear regression. However, as 
expected with male labour supply, the Tobit specification gives very similar results. 
Comparing the results of the Tobit specification with results in the top panel of Table 1 
confirms the results reported above. Second, following alternative specifications in Blau and 
Kahn (2005, 2007), I assign missing wages using Heckman (1979) selectivity bias correction. 
I estimate the wage equation following the Heckman maximum likelihood estimation with 
age and age squared, a non-white dummy, two dummies for education, metropolitan area, 
year and region dummies on the right hand side, and a married dummy included as an extra 
identification variable in the selection equation. The resulting wage equation is then used to 
predict wages for all those whose wage data was missing. With this new data for wages I then 
do the same analysis as above and the results are again similar.
4.2 Effects of wage inequality on working hours
In this section I explore the effects of wage inequality on the labour supply in the economy. I 
argued theoretically in section 2.2 that average hours of work become lower with a mean- 
preserving spread in wages. In other words, a rise in wage inequality, holding the average 
wage constant, decreases average hours of work. Since the basic theoretical idea refers to 
averages and aggregate measures of variation, I first test it using aggregated data. This is 
obtained by collapsing the micro-data set by years, computing means and measures of 
inequality using earnings weights. By its nature, this is a time-series data set and identification 
is obtained by exploiting the variation over time.
The results are reported in Table 2. Again, I report four different specifications, with two 
different measures of working hours (hours last week and usual hours worked) and two 
different measures of wages (hourly wage and hourly earnings). The dependent variable 
(average working hours in the economy) is regressed on average log wage and standard 
deviation of log wages. Furthermore, I include the aggregate unemployment rate and average 
age. The first is used to control for the involuntary unemployment and the business cycle 
while the second is used to control for effects o f the age composition of the population on 
working hours. In the last thirty years there has been significant aging of the (prime-age) male 
workforce, which may have effects on its own. Note that due to a break in the hours’ series in 
1994,1 first use an auxiliary regression of working hours on a dummy variable, whose value 
is set to 0 before 1994 and to 1 in 1994 and after. In the main regressions I use the residuals 
from the auxiliary regression on the left hand side as measures of working hours.
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Table 2: Effects of wage inequality on working hours -  aggregate regressions
Dependent variable: (mean) hours last w eek (mean) usual hours
(1) (2) (3) (4)
O LS
(mean) hourly wage 
(sd) hourly w age 
(mean) hourly earnings 
(sd) hourly earnings
-6.190
(3.090)*
-23.547
(7.207)***
-5.425
(2.393)**
-19.201
(4.908)***
-7.434
(2.385)***
-28.033
(5.563)***
-5.332
(2.029)**
-20.317
(4.160)***
unemployment rate 
(mean) age
-0.833
(0.058)***
-0.826
(0.098)***
-0.820
(0.055)***
-0.322
(0.199)
-0.794
(0.044)***
-0.738
(0.076)***
-0.770
(0.046)***
-0.235
(0.169)
Breusch-Godfrey AR(1) test (p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05
M L E  A R(1)
(mean) hourly w age 
(sd) hourly wage 
(mean) hourly earnings 
(sd) hourly earnings
-1.362
(3.817)
-13.329
(7.179)*
-1.342
(3.921)
-11.961
(5.337)**
1.173
(2.565)
-10.941
(5.860)*
3.700
(2.639)
0.516
(4.048)
unemployment rate 
(mean) age
-0.780
(0.057)***
-0.904
(0.176)***
-0.782
(0.051)***
-0.637
(0.269)**
-0.715
(0.047)***
-0.829
(0.172)***
-0.694
(0.056)***
-0.623
(0.424)
Observations 30 30 30 30
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
Constant included in all regression but not reported. Breusch-Godfrey test for AR(1) process in 
disturbances; p-values based on F-statistic. The wage measures are based on the distribution o f  
offered  wages; for individuals that do not work I use imputed wages.
In the top panel of Table 2 I report simple OLS results. In general, the results support the idea 
that higher inequality has a negative effect on working hours, after controlling for average 
wage, unemployment rate and average age. The coefficient is negative and highly significant 
in all four specifications. This is a good result. Furthermore, the coefficients in front of 
unemployment rate and average age have the expected negative and significant signs. What is 
puzzling, however is the negative (and significant) sign of the coefficient in front of the 
average wage variable. According to theory, this coefficient should be positive. It is possible 
however, that there is a time component that my model does not capture. Therefore, I test for 
the AR(1) process in the errors by using Breusch-Godfrey test. In all four specifications, the 
null hypothesis of no AR(1) process is rejected at high significance. Therefore, in the bottom 
panel of Table 2 I report results of the Maximum Likelihood estimation with the AR(1) 
process in the error term. The negative effect of wage inequality on working hours is again
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confirmed in three out of four cases (at lower significance, though), and the coefficient on 
average wage becomes insignificant.
Now I turn to the analysis of the individual data. I test the same idea as before: What is the 
effect on working hours of individuals of the change in the standard deviation of wages, 
keeping the average wage constant. Hence I regress individual working hours on the 
aggregate measure of average log wage and the measure of wage inequality. Individual data 
allow me to also control for some personal characteristics. Results are reported in Table 3 and 
Table 4. In Table 3 I use standard deviation in log wages as a measure of wage inequality, 
while in Table 4 I use the 90/10 percentile ratio of log wages. Other controls include 
aggregate unemployment rate and individual controls such as age, age squared, non-white 
dummy and married dummy. All regressions also include regional and metropolitan status 
dummies. Because regressions are done on individual data but using aggregate regressors 
(average log wage, log wage inequality and unemployment rate) I report clustered standard 
errors, clustered by year.
Table 3: Effects of wage inequality on working hours (I)
Dependent variable: hours worked last week usual hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(mean) hourly wage -15.490 -8.439
(3.601)*** (1.690)***
(sd) hourly wage -32.989 -22.633
(9.709)*** (3.889)***
(mean) hourly earnings -7.353 -2.516
(0.846)*** (1.011)**
(sd) hourly earnings -16.490 -7.761
(1.859)*** (1.968)***
unemployment rate -0.637 -0.769 -0.770 -0.784
(0.074)*** (0.044)*** (0.039)*** (0.051)***
age 1.053 1.061 0.948 0.950
(0.034)*** (0.034)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)***
age squared -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.013
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
non-white dummy -5.363 -5.342 -5.113 -5.109
(0.190)*** (0.189)*** (0.116)*** (0.116)***
married dummy 6.849 6.811 6.670 6.662
(0.055)*** (0.055)*** (0.077)*** (0.076)***
Constant 71.607 49.112 52.283 33.549
(12.513)*** (2.816)*** (5.422)*** (3.168)***
Observations 2318780 2318780 2148705 2148705
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by year), * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include regional dummies and metropolitan 
status dummy. The wage measures are based on the distribution o f  offered  wages; for 
individuals that do not work I use imputed wages.
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There is very strong evidence of a negative effect of wage inequality on working hours. 
Effects in all specifications except one are negative and highly significant. While this result is 
reaffirming, the puzzling negative and significant effect of average log wage on working 
hours remains. One potential reason for this is because non-eamed income is not included as a 
control into my regressions. If non-eamed income is positively correlated with average wages 
in the economy then this could explain the negative coefficient. However, this information is 
not available in my data. For this reason I will do an analogous analysis with an alternative 
data set, where this information is available. See section 4.3 below.
Table 4: Effects of wage inequality on working hours (II)
Dependent variable: hours worked last week usual hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(mean) hourly wage -11.682 -9.815
(5.558)** (2.864)***
(90/10 ratio) hourly wage -8.519 -10.849
(6.709) (2.986)***
(mean) hourly earnings -10.921 -4.375
(1.126)*** (1.137)***
(90/10 ratio) hourly earnings -9.314 -4.817
(1.473)*** (0.951)***
unemployment rate -0.489 -0.756 -0.685 -0.787
(0.055)*** (0.045)*** (0.036)*** (0.045)***
age 1.049 1.059 0.945 0.950
(0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.023)*** (0.024)***
age squared -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.013
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
non-white dummy -5.373 -5.345 -5.117 -5.109
(0.189)*** (0.190)*** (0.115)*** (0.116)***
married dummy 6.871 6.816 6.680 6.663
(0.056)*** (0.055)*** (0.078)*** (0.076)***
Constant 61.715 65.404 62.787 42.435
(23.237)** (5.118)*** (11.274)*** (4.025)***
Observations 2318780 2318780 2148705 2148705
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by year), * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. A ll regressions include regional dummies and metropolitan status 
dummy. The wage measures are based on the distribution o f  offered  wages; for individuals that 
do not work I use imputed wages.
To check the robustness of the results I do the analysis with the two alternative specifications 
mentioned above. The Tobit specification gives results that are in line with the conclusions 
drawn above. Comparing the results of the Tobit specification with the results in Table 3 and 
Table 4 shows that the results are very similar. Second, I use wages that were imputed using 
the Heckman procedure. When I compare the results of the analysis on aggregated data 
(analogous to Table 3), in two out of eight cases the results are statistically significant with a 
negative sign, in six other cases the results are not statistically significant, but in five cases the
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sign is negative. Turning to individual data (analogous to Table 3 and Table 4), in six out of 
eight cases the results are similar. In the other two cases, the results are not statistically 
significant but exhibit the correct sign. To summarize, the two alternative specifications, a 
Tobit analysis and a Heckman procedure for missing wages, give the same conclusions as the 
main analysis in most cases and support the hypothesis that increased wage inequality reduces 
working hours.
Let me now give some perspective on the empirical importance of the effect of inequality on 
working hours. I compute the magnitude of the effects of the change in wage inequality on 
working hours. For example, the results from column (2) in Table 3 with hourly earnings as a 
measure of wages and working hours last week on the left hand side report a value of -16.490 
for the coefficient on the standard deviation of log wage. What is the significance of this in 
practice? From 1979 to 2008, the standard deviation in log hourly earnings rose from 0.43 to 
about 0.52. This would cause, assuming that the average wage8 and other things did not 
change over time, a 1.4 hours decrease in hours worked last week, which represents a 3.6% 
decrease in working hours from the year 1979. Similarly, doing the same computation for the 
specification in column (1) of Table 3, the increase in the standard deviation of log hourly 
wage would represent a 1.6 hours (4%) decrease in hours worked last week. The magnitudes 
are slightly lower if I compute the effect of the standard deviation in wages on usual hours 
worked (columns (3) and (4) of Table 3). For the same time period, standard deviation in log 
hourly wages would decrease usual hours worked by 1.1 hours (2.8%), whereas the standard 
deviation in log hourly earnings would decrease usual hours worked by 0.7 hours (1.7%). To 
give more perspective, note that in the US over the period from 1979 to 2008, hours worked 
last week decreased by about 8.6% and usual hours decreased by about 5.6% on average. 
From this it follows that, if we take the results at face value, the rising inequality could 
potentially explain 30-40% of the decrease in working hours over time.
The empirical analysis so far has been supportive of the idea that greater wage inequality, 
keeping the average wage constant, decreases working hours. But the analysis has been done 
with the measures of wages gross of taxes. One could argue that what workers really care 
about in the labour market is their wage net of taxes. It is important to note that there have 
been considerable changes in marginal tax rates in the US during the period analysed in this 
chapter, and hence the results may be biased. However, I rely on findings reported in Mroz
8 From 1979 to 2008 the average real wage did in fact change very little, i f  one looks only at the beginning 
period and the end period.
100
(1987), Devereux (2004) and Blau and Kahn (2007). Mroz estimates labour supply of married 
women and compares results from the model without taxes to the model with taxes. He 
concludes that the influence of taxes on the estimates of the labour supply parameters appears 
to be at most of a second order importance. Similarly, Devereux (2004) and Blau and Kahn 
(2007) in their robustness checks, use some simplifying assumptions to compute after-tax 
wages from their pre-tax wages data, and find that an analysis with after-tax data yields very 
similar results. I conclude that using wages gross of taxes does not bias my results very much.
4.3 Effect of wage inequality - IPUMS-CPS data
In the preceding section I find evidence that wage inequality, ceteris paribus, has a negative 
effect on working hours in the economy. However, this came along with a puzzling result that 
the coefficient in front of the average wage variable was negative. For this reason I do 
analogous analysis on alternative data obtained from the IPUMS CPS data base (King et al. 
(2004)). The time span of this data is shorter, going back only to the year 1990, but there are 
some added advantages: there is information on the non-eamed income of individuals as well 
as information on the number of weeks worked in a (previous) year.
I use the same sample restrictions and processing of the data set as described in section 3.1 
above, the only exception being the way in which I impute wages for individuals not in the 
labour force. Recall that in the literature (Blau and Kahn (2007), Juhn and Murphy (1997), 
Juhn (1992) and Juhn et al. (1991)) wages for non-workers are usually imputed using the 
wage regressions for people who work less than a certain number of weeks per year. 
Previously, this information was not available; however, now that it is available, I impute 
wages for non-workers based on the estimated wage equation for workers that worked less 
than 20 weeks in the previous year.
Table 5 reports results from regressions on individual data, with average log hourly earnings 
as a measure of average wage and standard deviation of log hourly earnings as a measure of 
wage inequality9.1 report four different specifications, depending on what variable is used on 
the left hand side to measure working hours: hours worked last week, usual weekly hours 
worked last year, share of weeks worked last year and the product of the last two (usual 
weekly hours times the share of weeks worked last year). Other controls include the aggregate 
unemployment rate and individual controls such as age, age squared, non-white dummy and
9 I only report results for hourly earnings because results using hourly wage as a measure o f  wages produces 
qualitatively similar results.
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married dummy. All regressions include regional dummies. One additional control that was 
not available in the CPS MORG data is the measure of non-eamed income of the individual.
Results in Table 5 support the theoretical prediction that wage inequality decreases hours 
worked in the economy. In all four specifications the coefficient in front of the wage 
inequality variable is negative and highly significant. Note that in this case the coefficient in 
front of the wage level variable is not significantly different from zero, which is reassuring. 
Other coefficients have the expected signs. The analysis on this alternative data set therefore 
provides one more piece of evidence for the idea that the mean-preserving spread in wages 
lowers hours worked in the economy.
Table 5: Effects of wage inequality on working hours (IPUMS-CPS data set)
Dependent variable: hours worked 
last week
usual weekly  
hours worked 
(last year)
share o f  weeks 
worked (last year)
usual weekly hours 
* share o f  weeks 
worked (last year)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(mean) hourly earnings -1.964 0.638 0.074 3.627
(2.271) (2.433) (0.055) (2.725)
(sd) hourly earnings -32.168 -35.615 -0.319 -26.609
(7.608)*** (7.082)*** (0.163)* (7.365)***
unemployment rate -0.707 -0.209 -0.009 -0.491
(0.106)*** (0.092)** (0.002)*** (0.096)***
non-eamed income (000) -0.270 -0.236 -0.007 -0.282
(0.020)*** (0.017)*** (0.000)*** (0.021)***
age 0.918 0.703 0.010 0.903
(0.078)*** (0.066)*** (0.001)*** (0.070)***
age squared -0.012 -0.010 -0.000 -0.012
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)***
non-white dummy -4.834 -4.203 -0.078 -4.668
(0.233)*** (0.194)*** (0.003)*** (0.204)***
married dummy 7.080 5.766 0.116 6.668
(0.129)*** (0.148)*** (0.003)*** (0.152)***
Constant 43.062 43.021 0.663 24.558
(5.926)*** (6.651)*** (0.170)*** (8.243)***
Observations 140060 140060 140060 140060
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by year), * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. A ll regressions include regional dummies. The wage measures are based on the distribution o f  
offered  wages; for individuals that do not work I use imputed wages.
To check the robustness of the results, I do the analysis also using Tobit specification. In this 
data about 15% of men report zero hours worked, and as expected, results with Tobit 
specification are very similar to results reported in Table 5. When checking the results using 
Heckman selectivity bias correction, I estimate the wage equation with age and age squared, a 
non-white dummy, two dummies for education, metropolitan area dummies, year dummies, 
and region dummies on the right hand side. The selection equation includes non-eamed 
income and a married dummy as additional regressors. The resulting wage equation is then
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used to predict wages for all those whose wage data was missing. With the new data on 
wages, results are again similar to those reported in Table 5, providing additional evidence 
that a mean-preserving spread in wages has a negative effect on the hours worked in the 
economy.
5 Conclusion
In this chapter I argue that a mean-preserving spread in offered wages (rising wage inequality) 
lowers average working hours in the economy. The exact mechanism works through the 
concavity of the labour supply. Intuitively, with wage inequality rising, the wages of highly 
paid workers rise and wages of low-paid workers fall. Due to the concavity in the labour 
supply, responses to the changes in wages are stronger at the bottom of the wage distribution, 
hence working hours of low-paid workers decrease more than working hours of high-paid 
workers. Some of the low-paid workers may also decide to drop out of the labour force and 
become inactive, thus reducing their labour supply to zero. Therefore, as a consequence, 
average working hours in the economy fall.
This explanation implicitly assumes that working hours are just a response to labour market 
opportunities. In this I follow the labour supply literature such as Juhn et al. (1991), Juhn 
(1992) and Welch (1997). The contribution of this chapter is that it explicitly recognizes that 
changes in the inequality of offered wages have effects on average working hours in the 
economy. Using the CPS-MORG data for prime-age men I find evidence for this explanation. 
First I establish empirically the concavity of the labour supply function. Secondly, using 
various variables to measure wages and labour supply, and using several different 
specifications, I find empirical evidence that after controlling for the average wage, wage 
inequality has indeed a negative and significant effect on the labour supply. According to my 
results, the increase in wage inequality that occurred in the US over the 1979-2008 period 
would cause a 3% decrease in average hours worked in the economy. Rising inequality can 
thus potentially explain 30-40% of the decrease in working hours over time.
The results in this chapter are interesting for students of labour supply, for students of 
inequality and for researchers interested in explaining differences in working hours across 
countries and over time. Moreover, the results are also interesting from the point of view of 
public policies that affect wage inequality.
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Chapter III
Do Windfall Gains Affect Labour Supply? Evidence from 
the European Household Panel
Urban Sila Ricardo M. Sousa
Abstract: We investigate whether workers adjust hours worked in response to windfall gains 
using data from the European Household Panel from 1994 to 2001. The results suggest that 
unexpected variation in income has a negative (although small) effect on working hours. In 
particular, after receiving an unanticipated windfall gain, individuals are more likely to drop 
out of the labour force and the effects become larger as the size of windfall increases. 
Furthermore, the empirical findings show that the impact of windfall gains on labour supply: 
(i) is more important for young and old individuals, (ii) is most negative for married 
individuals with young children, (iii) but can be positive for single individuals at the age of 
around 40 years.
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1 Introduction
What is the effect of windfall gains on economic behaviour? A popular belief presumes that 
the majority of people would quit work if they won a lottery. But do windfall gains have an 
impact on individuals’ working hours? According to the life-cycle model, a relaxation or 
tightening of the consumer’s intertemporal budget constraint can lead both to changes in 
consumption and to changes in labour supply. Windfall gains represent an unanticipated 
increase in non-eamed income and by reducing an agent’s marginal utility of wealth they 
therefore reduce her incentive to work.
In this chapter we analyze the linkages between windfall gains and working hours using data 
from the European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database from 1994 to 
2001. We show that an unanticipated rise in wealth reduces working hours in accordance with 
the life-cycle model, although the effect is, in general, small. The impact of windfall gains is 
stronger at the external margin, that is, individuals adjust their labour supply primarily by 
dropping out of the labour force, rather than by reducing their work hours conditional on 
working.
We also look whether “size matters” with respect to the effects of windfall gains on working 
hours. We assess how households respond to small, medium or large windfall gains. We find 
that the effects become stronger as the size of windfall increases. In particular, men receiving 
a windfall of 50,000 EUR or more, on average reduce labour supply by 1.3 hours per week, 
which is equivalent to a 3.4% reduction in working hours.
Finally, analysing the effects of windfall gains along various personal characteristics, we find 
that: (i) at younger and older ages, the effect of windfall gains on labour supply is the most 
negative; (ii) for married people and people with young children, the windfall gain leads to a 
stronger decrease in working hours and (iii) for single individuals at the age of around 40, the 
effect can be positive. A potential explanation for the latter empirical finding is in the effect of 
windfall gains on reducing liquidity constraints in capital markets. By doing so, windfall 
gains may encourage people to set up their own business, become self-employed and increase 
their working hours, as suggested by Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) and Taylor (2001).
This chapter contributes to the literature in following ways. This is the first paper that 
analyses effects of windfall gains on working hours using European data with more than one 
country included. Henley (2004) was the first paper done on European data, but he analyzes 
the effects of capital gains on labour supply using data for Britain only. Furthermore, because
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we include 15 countries in our analysis, the sample of people for which we observe windfall 
gains is large, offering a further empirical advantage to our approach. With the panel data set 
we observe a rich set of personal characteristics of individuals. This gives us an opportunity to 
better understand the ways that participation and working-hours decisions differ between 
different types of individuals.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature 
on the effects of unexpected variation in income. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 
presents the theoretical and the econometric approach and Section 5 discusses the empirical 
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 A brief review of the literature
The launch of the pan-European lottery, Euromillions, in 2004 induced many people to 
fantasize about what they would do if they actually won. Notable wins include prizes of 
around 180 Million EUR which, therefore, reveals the extraordinary importance that a lottery 
may play in people’s life and behaviour.
A vast literature has explored the reaction of consumption and savings to exogenous changes 
in income. An early example is Bodkin (1959), who used an unexpected National Service Life 
Insurance dividend paid to veterans of the World War II in 1950. Similarly, Brickman et al. 
(1978) focused on how the income effect affects consumption. More recent examples include 
Imbens et al. (2001), who look at the differences among major-prize winners of the 
Megabucks Lottery in Massachusetts between 1984 and 1988, and Kuhn et al. (2008), who 
analyze the differences in winnings in the Dutch postcode lottery1.
Unexpected variation in income may also affect the level of happiness of individuals. 
Whereas some surveys suggest that money indeed makes people happy (Gardner and Oswald, 
2001, 2007), others find only a weak link between unexpected wealth variation and happiness 
(Myers, 1992; Diener et al., 1999; Argyle, 2001; Nettle, 2005; Layard, 2005).3
Another dimension of the effects of exogenous changes in income refers to fiscal policy and, 
in particular, the effectiveness of temporary fiscal measures. In fact, understanding the effect 
of unearned income on labour supply is also of great importance for policy makers, as it is at
1 Some recent studies have also used exogenous variation to analyze neighbourhood and peer effects on 
individuals (Sacerdote, 2001; Katz et al., 2001; Kling et al., 2005; Ludwig et al., 2001; Kuhn, 2008).
2 For discussions o f  this question, see, for example, Easterlin (1974), Martin (1995), and Diener and Biswas- 
Diener (2002).
3 Lindahl (2005) show s that higher income from a monetary lottery prize generates good health.
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least part of what is needed to evaluate such programs (Kuhn, 2008). For instance, Hankins et 
al. (2009) show that cash transfers’ programs merely postpone bankruptcy of those who are in 
financial trouble.
In addition to the potential effects of income shocks on consumption and savings or on the 
level of happiness, a popular belief presumes that the majority of people would quit work if 
they won a lottery. But do individuals who win continue to work, and if so, why? While the 
literature on the empirical and theoretical inter-temporal substitution effects in labour supply 
is well established (Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980; Altonji, 1986), the research on the effects 
of capital gains is still somewhat insipient (Henley, 2004), despite the fact that lottery 
winnings are a source of exogenous variation in income (Altonji, 1986).
In the US, Kaplan (1985, 1988) show that the level of education and the type of profession 
can help explain the percentages of winners who choose to continue to work. Holtz-Eakin et 
al. (1993) and Imbens et al. (2001) find that windfall gains lead to a reduction in working 
hours or even a withdrawal from the labour force. In contrast, Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) 
suggest at most a small (although significant) effect for married women and men. Hirschfeld 
and Eield (2000) use the proposition of work centrality, that is, the degree of importance that 
working has in one's life at any given time to explain why lotteries may have a limited impact.
In Europe, Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), Taylor (2001), using UK data, and Lindh and 
Olhsson (1996), based on evidence for Sweden, report a positive effect of windfall gains 
(inheritance and lottery wins) on the probability of entering self-employment. Arvey et al. 
(2004) show that the likelihood of quitting work is smaller for individuals who won large 
amounts in the lottery when they have a greater degree of work centrality. Henley (2004) 
analyzes the impact of both windfall financial gains and house price shocks on hours worked 
and suggests that there are significant substitution effects, in particular, in response to house 
price shocks.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Data
The data is obtained from the European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' 
Database (ECHP henceforth). This is a large panel data set that contains household-level and 
person-level information over time, covering eight survey years from 1994 to 2001. The data 
includes 15 EU countries: Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg,
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France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland and 
Sweden. It is an unbalanced panel with a maximum length of 8 years for each individual.
In what follows, the analysis is done at the individual level, rather than at the level of 
households, with age restricted to 25-60 years. This age band is chosen to avoid complications 
that arise due to education and retirement choices. The data on incomes and wages are 
converted using PPP in order to allow for comparisons across countries and over time.
The question of interest relates to the effects of unanticipated windfall gains on labour supply. 
Working hours are described by the ECHP variable PE005: Total number o f hours working 
per week (in main + additional jobs). In the data, this variable is only available for employed 
workers. However, we set hours worked to zero for all unemployed individuals and those out 
of the labour force.
The variable that measures windfall gains is the ECHP variable HF017: Inherit, receive gift or 
lottery winnings worth 2000 EURO or more. It is the response to a following survey question: 
“During (... year prior to the survey ...), did anyone in the household inherit any property or 
capital, or receive a gift or lottery winnings, worth 2000 EURO or more? ”. Observations for 
which the information on the windfall receipt is missing are discarded.
One major drawback of this variable is that it does not provide information about the exact 
amount of the windfall gain. However, it can be complemented by the variable HF018: 
Amount o f  the inheritance, gift or lottery winnings. This variable offers three brackets for the 
windfall gains: less than 10,000 EURO, more than 10,000 EURO but less than 50,000 EURO 
and 50,000 EURO or more. We label the three brackets for windfall gains as “small”, 
“medium” and “large”, respectively.
These two variables hence give information on the size of windfall gains received by 
individuals. Nevertheless, given that they are reported in categorical terms, one cannot 
convert them into PPP terms. As a result, they are not perfectly comparable across countries 
and over time. Another weakness is that both variables are reported at the household level. 
Consequently, there is no way to identify which household member was the actual recipient of 
the windfall gain.4
4 It should be noted, however, that an indicator for a windfall gain is, to som e degree, a personal characteristic. 
For example, in cases where individuals change households (i.e. get married) and they receive windfall gains 
only after they have moved to a new household, they are recorded as recipients o f  windfall gains together with 
their partner. Naturally, individuals from the initial household have not received any windfall gains. Should the
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It is important to emphasise that the variable measuring windfall gains is recorded for the 
“year prior to the survey”.5 Notwithstanding this, we did not decide to adjust the timing of the 
variable. First, a substantial fraction of the data (that is, 19% of person-year observations) 
would be lost by lagging the windfall gains variable by one period. Second, leaving the 
variable as it is, we can be sure that at the time of the interview in the time period t, an 
individual knows whether she has received windfall gains or not. On the contrary, if  we 
lagged windfall gains variable by one period, to t-1, we would not know for sure whether at 
the time of the interview at t-1 the individual had already received the windfall gains or not6. 
Furthermore, in practice individuals take a bit of time before they react to new economic 
information. Therefore, it seems more appropriate not to lag the windfall gains variable back 
by one period.
In Table 1 we report the number of individuals in the sample and the number of times they 
received windfall gains. Only those individuals who were observed at least twice are included. 
To ease discussion, we label people that have received windfall gains as “winners” and the 
rest as “non-winners”. There are 100,289 individuals in the sample, and most of them (88.4%) 
never received any inheritance, gift or lottery winnings of more than 2000 EUR. In addition, 
8,824 individuals (or a fraction of 8.8%) received windfall gains only once, and about 2% of 
individuals received windfall gains twice.
For the purpose of the analysis, the most important group is the one with 8,824 individuals 
who received windfall gains only once, as in the regression analysis it is not straightforward 
to deal with individuals who received windfall gains more than once. Most of the empirical 
analysis will therefore be based on that group. Compared to similar research done by other 
authors, this is quite a large sample and represents one of the advantages of using the ECHP 
dataset.7
individual move households again with a new partner, for example, then he would still be recorded as a recipient 
o f windfall gains, but his new partner would not.
5 Similarly, income variables are also recorded for “year prior to the survey”. On the other hand, net monthly 
wage and other variables are recorded for “the time o f  the interview”.
6 How much information the individual possesses at the time o f  the interview o f  course depends on the relative 
timings o f  windfall gains and survey interview, but on average there is a 50% chance that the individual had 
already received the windfall gains.
7 For instance, Imbens et al. (2001) have about 237 winners, Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) have 439 heirs in 
their sample, Holtz-Eakin (1993) have 2,700 married couples and 1632 individuals in their sample, and Henley  
(2004) has around 5,400 men and women included.
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In Table 2 we report the number of individuals by size of windfall gains received. There are 
4,172 (48.8%) observed individuals with small windfall gains, 3,353 (39.2%) with medium 
windfall gains, and 1,023 (12.0%) individuals with large windfall gains.
Table 1: Number of individuals in the sample and number of times they received 
windfall gains during the period in the sample
#  o f  tim es w in d fa ll gains received F requency P ercent
0 8 8 ,6 9 2 8 8 .4 4
1 8 ,8 2 4 8 .8 0
2 1,957 1.95
3 501 0 .5 0
4 165 0 .1 6
5 82 0 .0 8
6 2 6 0 .0 3
7 25 0 .0 2
8 17 0 .0 2
Total 100 ,289 1 00 .00
Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. 
A ll individuals o f  age 25-60. Only individuals who are observed for at least 
two periods are included.
Table 2: Number of individuals who ever received small/medium/large windfall gains
S ize  o f  w in d fa ll gains received F requency Percent
sm all (2 0 0 0 -1 0 ,0 0 0  E U R ) 4 ,1 7 2 48 .81
m ed iu m  (1 0 ,0 0 0 -5 0 ,0 0 0  E U R ) 3 ,353 3 9 .2 3
large (m ore than 5 0 ,0 0 0  E U R ) 1,022 11 .96
T otal 8 ,547 1 00 .00
Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' 
Database. A ll individuals o f  age 25-60. Only individuals who are observed 
for at least two periods are included.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
In this sub-section, we analyse differences in personal characteristics between winners and 
non-winners prior to the receipt of windfall gains, and differences among winners of windfall 
gains of different sizes (i.e. small versus large winners). We also compare the means of 
variables before and after the receipt of windfall gains.
Table 3 reports the means and number of observations for selected variables, comparing 
winners, (columns (1) and (2)) and non-winners (columns (3) and (4)). Column (5) reports the 
/>-value of the test for differences in means between winners and non-winners. The reported 
statistics refer to one year before the receipt of windfall, which, on average, corresponds to a 
third year in the sample for winners. Therefore, for non-winners we report the means of the 
variables in the third year in the sample.
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Among the 18 variables reported, only three (the number of children in the household, the 
percentage of women and the percentage of those who are married) have differences that are 
not statistically significant. Otherwise, winners tend to be older and they live in slightly 
smaller households, but for these two variable differences are small. For the rest of the 
variables, the differences are large and important.
Table 3: Comparing personal information for winners and non-winners (prior to
receiving windfall gains)
have received 
windfall gains
have not received 
windfall gains
Diff. in 
means
Mean Obs. Mean Obs. p-value
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
household size 3.29 6,674 3.46 75,040 0.000
number o f  adults (>16) in household 2.45 6,674 2.63 75,040 0.000
number o f  children (16<) in household 0.84 6,674 0.83 75,040 0.739
age 42.01 6,674 41.23 75,040 0.000
female dummy 0.51 6,674 0.51 75,040 0.484
married dummy 0.73 6,664 0.72 74,974 0.249
secondary education dummy 0.38 6,576 0.36 73,598 0.000
post secondary education dummy 0.29 6,576 0.18 73,598 0.000
employed dummy 0.77 6,656 0.70 74,998 0.000
household income 31,186 6,648 25,863 74,584 0.000
household income - from working 26,758 6,651 21,337 74,598 0.000
household income - unearned income 1,448 6,651 848 74,598 0.000
personal income 15,589 6,674 12,095 75,040 0.000
personal income - from working 13,270 6,674 10,222 75,040 0.000
personal income - unearned income 690 6,674 376 75,040 0.000
personal hourly wage 7.68 6,674 6.78 75,040 0.000
total hours working per week 30.57 6,497 28.26 73,932 0.000
Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. A ll individuals o f  
age 25-60. Winners are observed one period before receiving windfall gains. This approximately 
corresponds to period 3 in the sample for non-winners.
Winners are more educated; the share of individuals with post secondary education is 29% for 
winners and 18% for non-winners; winners are 7 percentage points more likely to be 
employed than non-winners. According to income variables, winners have higher incomes 
and wages even before windfall gains. By all measures of income (total income, income from 
working and non-work income), winners are better off than non-winners: the personal total
Q
income of winners is about 29% higher and their hourly wage is 13% higher. Higher income
8 Hourly wage is a measure o f  offered wages in the labour market. Reported data is in purchasing power parity 
units in order to be comparable across countries. Hourly wage is calculated from the net monthly wage given in 
the data, divided by weekly working hours times 4.33 to correct for the average number o f  w eeks in one month.
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is partly a consequence of the fact that winners, on average, work more hours per week and 
they are more likely to be employed. They are also more educated and thus have a higher 
hourly wage. However, another potential reason for the difference in incomes lays also in the 
fact that our measure of windfall gains includes gifts and inheritances. It can then be the case 
that people from better family backgrounds are more likely to receive (large) gifts or 
inheritances, which is reflected in our data. Family background is of course a fixed effect and 
will eventually drop out of the analysis when data will be analysed using our econometric 
methodology9.
The observed differences between winners and non-winners from Table 3 could of course 
reflect simply differences across countries. If there were a country with above average 
number of winners, and also with above average incomes, this would make winners, in a 
spurious fashion, appear to have higher incomes in the full sample. Data show that in most 
countries, between 87% and 96% of the sample is comprised of non-winners. However, four 
countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Belgium) have a lower percentage of non­
winners, but when we checked differences in means after excluding these four countries, the 
magnitudes and conclusions were similar. Therefore, we conclude that the differences 
reported in Table 3 reflect genuine differences between winners and non-winners.
In Table 4, we turn to comparisons of personal characteristics among winners of small, 
medium and large windfall gains. We report means and number of observations one period 
prior to the receipt of windfall. Columns (7) -  (9) report /7-values from testing the null 
hypothesis of no differences in means between groups.
No statistically significant differences between winners of windfall gains of different sizes are 
found for household size, number of adults, number of children in household, percentage of 
females, marital status, and employment status. On the other hand, there are statistically 
significant differences in age and education: the group with small windfall gains is 
significantly younger than the other two groups (i.e. 41.4 years compared to 42.5 and 42.8 
years for medium and large windfall gains groups, respectively); the group of large winners is 
also more educated (37% of large winners have education beyond the secondary level, while 
only 27% of small winners and 28% of medium winners have education of such level).
All hourly wages lower than 1 euro or higher than 100 euros are put to missing. W ages o f  people who do not 
work or wages otherwise missing are then imputed. For those individuals for whom w age information is 
available in som e periods but not in others, the average wage o f  the individual is imputed from the other periods. 
Other wages are imputed using a regression equation separately for men and women using age, age squared, a 
married dummy, tw o education dummies and wave and country dummies as regressors.
9 This w ill be discussed in more detail below.
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There are also large and highly significant differences in incomes between the three groups; 
the larger the windfall gains, the higher the income. Such differences in incomes and 
education can again be explained with family characteristics. If people with higher education 
and household incomes tend to be from families of better background, then this may be 
reflected in higher inheritances or gifts. However, this will be controlled for by fixed effects 
in our estimation.
Table 4: Comparison of personal information among winners by the size of windfall 
gains received (prior to receiving windfall gains)
received small 
windfall gains
received medium  
windfall gains
received large 
windfall gains
small vs  
medium
small
vs
large
medium  
vs large
Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Difference in means p-value
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
hh size 3.30 3,098 3.27 2,579 3.24 762 0.358 0.284 0.669
no. o f  adults in hh 2.45 3,098 2.43 2,579 2.44 762 0.406 0.721 0.852
no. o f  children in hh 0.85 3,098 0.84 2,579 0.80 762 0.662 0.297 0.470
age 41.40 3,098 42.45 2,579 42.77 762 0.000 0.001 0.428
female dummy 0.51 3,098 0.52 2,579 0.52 762 0.344 0.555 0.974
married dummy 0.73 3,095 0.73 2,574 0.71 761 0.683 0.308 0.207
second, educ. dummy 0.39 3,064 0.37 2,542 0.35 742 0.243 0.029 0.167
post sec. educ. dummy 0.27 3,064 0.28 2,542 0.37 742 0.341 0.000 0.000
employed dummy 0.77 3,091 0.76 2,573 0.77 757 0.463 0.811 0.811
hh income 28,804 3,091 32,185 2,568 36,711 756 0.000 0.000 0.000
hh income - working 24,958 3,092 27,569 2,570 31,346 756 0.000 0.000 0.000
hh income - unearned 1,386 3,092 1,181 2,570 2,646 756 0.077 0.000 0.000
personal income 14,612 3,098 15,987 2,579 18,443 762 0.001 0.000 0.002
pers. income - working 12,413 3,098 13,656 2,579 15,717 762 0.002 0.000 0.006
pers. income - unearned 665 3,098 552 2,579 1,280 762 0.086 0.003 0.000
pers. hourly wage 7.07 3,098 7.98 2,579 8.95 762 0.000 0.000 0.000
weekly hours working 31.04 3,016 30.01 2,521 31.22 736 0.062 0.834 0.166
Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. Individuals o f  age 25-60 that have at 
some point received windfall gains. Winners are observed one period before receiving windfall gains. Small windfall 
gains (2000-10,000 EUR), medium windfall gains (10,000-50,000 EUR), large windfall gains (more than 50,000 EUR)
Finally, in Table 5, we compare the means of personal characteristics before and after the 
receipt of windfall gains. “Before” stands for one period prior to windfall and “after” stands 
for one period after the windfall. Intuitively, we would expect non-work income to increase 
from the period before to the period after the receipt of windfall gains. However, this is not 
necessarily the case, because, strictly speaking, windfall gains bring a one-off increase in non­
work income that lasts only for one period. Nevertheless, it is possible that individuals save or
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invest part of their unanticipated gains and start earning interest, which may increase their 
non-work income also in subsequent periods. According to the life-cycle theory of labour 
supply, the receipt of an unexpected windfall should also reduce working hours and 
employment of the winners.
Table 5: Comparing personal information before and after the receipt of windfall gains
Before After
Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
Difference 
in means, 
p-value
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ALL
employed dummy 0.77 6,656 0.76 7,079 0.781
hh income 31,186 6,648 31,823 7,068 0.099
hh income - working 26,758 6,651 27,312 7,068 0.147
hh income - unearned 1,448 6,651 1,614 7,068 0.061
personal income 15,589 6,674 15,986 7,082 0.151
pers. income - working 13,270 6,674 13,592 7,082 0.228
pers. income - unearned 690 6,674 762 7,082 0.173
pers. hourly wage 7.68 6,674 7.81 7.082 0.072
w eekly hours working 30.57 6,497 30.56 6,923 0.966
SMALL WINDFALL GAIN
employed dummy 0.77 3,091 0.76 3,444 0.341
hh income 28,804 3,091 28,874 3,442 0.885
hh incom e -  working 24,958 3,092 24,928 3,442 0.951
hh incom e -  unearned 1,386 3,092 1,399 3,442 0.918
personal income 14,612 3,098 14,690 3,446 0.824
pers. income - working 12,413 3,098 12,478 3,446 0.847
pers. income - unearned 665 3,098 678 3,446 0.859
pers. hourly wage 7.07 3,098 7.28 3,446 0.012
w eekly hours working 31.04 3,016 30.57 3,366 0.362
MEDIUM WINDFALL GAINS
employed dummy 0.76 2,573 0.78 2,683 0.261
hh income 32,185 2,568 33,030 2,675 0.194
hh incom e - working 27,569 2,570 28,663 2,675 0.084
hh income - unearned 1,181 2,570 1,430 2,675 0.035
personal income 15,987 2,579 16,563 2,684 0.211
pers. income - working 13,656 2,579 14,238 2,684 0.194
pers. income - unearned 552 2,579 664 2,684 0.077
pers. hourly wage 7.98 2,579 8.09 2,684 0.348
w eekly hours working 30.01 2,521 30.58 2,628 0.308
LARGE WINDFALL GAINS
employed dummy 0.77 757 0.75 762 0.516
hh income 36,711 756 40,587 761 0.008
hh income - working 31,346 756 33,858 761 0.090
hh income - unearned 2,646 756 3,268 761 0.134
personal income 18,443 762 20,297 762 0.094
pers. income - working 15,717 762 16,961 762 0.238
pers. income - unearned 1,280 762 1,497 762 0.437
pers. hourly wage 8.95 762 9.07 762 0.691
w eekly hours working 31.22 736 31.10 743 0.912
Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. Individuals o f  age 
25-60. Before: one period before receiving windfall gains. After: one period after receiving 
windfall gains (not in the period when windfall gains were received). Small windfall gains (2000-
10.000 EUR), medium windfall gains (10,000-50,000 EUR), large windfall gains (more than
50.000 EUR)
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Consider first the top panel of Table 5, where differences for the whole sample are reported. 
Only three variables are (marginally) significantly different between the two periods: total 
household income is slightly higher after the receipt o f windfall gains at a 10% significance 
level, household non-work income is higher at a 6% significance level and personal hourly 
wage is higher at a 7% significance. Weekly hours worked show no difference in the two 
periods. Looking at the group with small windfall gains, changes in none of the variables are 
statistically significant from one period to another, except for the hourly wage, which tends to 
be higher after the receipt of windfall gains. The percentage of employed people and weekly 
working hours both slightly decrease, but the differences are not significantly different from 
zero. In the case of individuals who received medium windfall gains, there is a statistically 
significant rise in the household income from working, in the unearned household income and 
in the personal unearned income. Interestingly, the share of employed people and weekly 
working hours show a slight increase, although the differences are not significant. Finally, for 
the group with large windfall gains, household total income (at a 1% significance level), 
household income from working (at a 9% significance level) and personal total income (at a 
9% significance level) all rise from one period to another. Employment and working hours 
slightly decrease, but the differences are not statistically significant.
3.3 Non-work income and working hours over time
In this sub-section, we show the evolution of unearned income and working hours over time. 
From the previous analysis, windfall gains do not seem to have strong effects on income or on 
labour supply, since differences over time, before and after the windfall gains, are mostly not 
statistically significant. Hence, one could ask whether the windfall gains variable is a correct 
measure. For this reason, Figure 1 depicts the average (household and personal) non-work 
income over time. The time period “0” refers to a time of windfall gains receipt. Since the 
maximum number of periods for an individual in the sample is eight, the graph is plotted only 
for five years prior and five years after the receipt of windfall gains. Moving further away 
from the point of receipt would make the sample size become very small. From Figure 1 it 
can be seen that the variable windfall gains is meaningful and informative. Indeed there is a 
positive blip in both household and personal non-work income at the time of receipt. After 
that, non-work income returns to its upward trend.
Figure 2 displays household income over time by size of windfall gains. Due to limitations in 
the sample size, we put the large windfall gains and the medium windfall gains groups into a
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time (time of windfall = 0)
household non-work income personal non-work income
Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. Individuals who received 
windfall gains o f age 25-60. Time period 0 is period when windfall gains were received.
single category. Non-work household income o f the medium/large group is, in general, higher 
than for the small group. The discrete jump in income in the period the windfall gains are 
received is still visible for both groups, and, as expected, is larger for the group that receives 
medium/large gains.
Figure 1: Non-work income over time for those who received windfall gains
o  -
Next, we turn to the evolution o f weekly working hours (Figure 3 and Figure 4). Figure 3 
shows that the positive trend in average weekly working hours is reversed after the receipt o f 
windfall gains. Similar information is conveyed by Figure 4, where we split the sample 
between those who receive small windfall gains and those who receive either medium or large 
windfall gains. Whereas the evolution o f working hours for the small group seems to be more 
or less unchanged, the downward trend after windfall gains for medium/large group is more 
apparent. This is consistent with the hypothesis that, after receiving windfall gains, 
individuals adjust their labour supply downwards. O f course, this is a very crude method of 
relating working hours to windfall gains and in the analysis that follows we will proceed with 
the regression analysis.
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Figure 2: Non-work household income over time by size of windfall gains
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Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. Individuals who received 
windfall gains o f age 25-60. Time period 0 is period when windfall gains were received. Small windfall gains 
(2000-10,000 EUR), medium windfall gains (10,000-50,000 EUR), large windfall gains (more than 50,000 EUR)
4 Theory and econometric approach
4.1 The impact of windfalls on working hours: A theoretical 
illustration
Consider a representative consumer who chooses consumption, Ch and leisure hours, Lh in 
order to maximize lifetime utility
+Pru(c„L,) (i)
i=0
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
A0 + f i R ,N ,W ,= fi RlC, (2)
1=0 z'=0
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where U represents the utility function in time period t that is separable in consumption and 
leisure, Nt denotes hours worked equal to L* (a fixed time endowment) minus Lh Ao refers to
/
initial assets, Wt is the hourly wage rate, Rt is the discount rate, + r ,) , where r is the real
1=1
rate o f  interest, and p  is the rate o f time preference.
Figure 3: Working hours per week over time
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Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. Individuals who received 
windfall gains o f age 25-60. Time period 0 is period when windfall gains were received.
Following MaCurdy (1981), we assume that U has the following form for individual i at time
U,(C,l,Ll,) = a luC? - a u N ?  (3)
where a x and a 2 are ‘taste-shifters’ which depend on consumer f  s preferences at /, 0 < cox < 
1 and co2 > 1.
If we consider an interior optimum (that is, for Njt > 0), the logarithm o f the labour supply 
function for a given marginal utility o f wealth can be expressed as
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log Nu = (0)2- \ y '  (log Ait -  log a 2it -  log o)2 + log{Rt (1 + p)') + log Wit). (4)
CD 
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where X denotes the marginal utility o f wealth.
Figure 4: Working hours per week over time by size of windfall gains
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Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. Individuals who received 
windfall gains o f age 25-60. Time period 0 is period when windfall gains were received. Small windfall gains 
(2000-10,000 EUR), medium windfall gains (10,000-50,000 EUR), large windfall gains (more than 50,000 EUR)
Following MaCurdy (1981) we assume that ‘tastes’ for work are randomly distributed 
according to the relationship log a 2it = yXit +cri +uit where Xlt denotes the set o f  observable 
determinants o f consumer’s tastes, <xf. represents the unobserved permanent component o f 
consumer’s characteristics and uit is a time-varying random component with zero mean.
Assuming a constant real interest rate, replacing the distribution for ‘tastes for work’ in 
equation (4) and using the approximation log(l + x ) » jc , we can simplify the labour supply 
function as:
log Nit = - 8  (cr + log co2) + 8{p  -  r)t + 8  log Xit + 5  log Wit +  8yXit + uit (5)
where 8 -  (co2 - 1)-1, and n(Y = 8u*t.
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Following Altonji (1986) and Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994), we assume that the marginal 
utility of wealth evolves as
log 4, = log V ,  +<* + & (6)
where <f>h represents the forecast error of the marginal utility for next period and a is a 
parameter determined by the discount factor, the interest rates, and the distribution of the 
forecast error. We approximate Ait_} by
log V .  =5Z, + 6\og(Et_l(Gi)) + s i (7)
where Z represents the family background characteristics and the effect of the expected 
lifetime wage profile on the marginal utility, Et.j[GJ denotes the expected present value of the 
capital gain (loss), including for example potential inheritance and other windfall gains, and 
s. captures any individual unobserved time invariant heterogeneity in marginal utility of
wealth. Combining equations (6) and (7) and plugging into equation (5), we obtain the 
following labour supply representation:
log Nu = 8 fa  -  cr,) + S£Zf + 86 log(£,_i (G,)) -  8{a + log <o2) + S (p  -  r)t +
+ 8\ogWit+8rXu +8<t>it+uir
It is clear from the first and the second term on the RHS of (8) that labour supply response 
should be estimated using fixed effects estimation. Thus one eliminates the need to explicitly 
control for family background and also removes any potential biases due to ei .
When the capital gain is fully unanticipated (that is, Et.][GJ=0), capital gains affect labour 
supply only via the forecast error, <j).a . Assuming that the forecast error is a proportion k of
the actual capital gain, that is, <f)it -  kG u , where k < 0, then labour supply response will be
8k  , which is negative.
However, when the capital gain is fully anticipated (that is, Et_x(Gt) = Gt and <f>H =0),  then
capital gains will exert their effects on labour supply by 8 6 . Given that marginal utility 
would have lowered before the time period in question, there would be no further adjustment 
at the time of inheritance. Therefore, the unanticipated windfall gains reduce the marginal 
utility of wealth, and thus reduce labour supply.
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4.2 The impact of windfalls on working hours: the econometric 
specification
Despite the large literature concerned with estimating the impact of unearned income on 
labour supply, the use of an exogenous measure of income variation is not consensual. As a 
result, different approaches have been considered, namely: (i) the capital income or spousal- 
labour earnings as variables measuring unearned income (Imbens et al., 2001); (ii) 
experimental data with exogenous components of unearned income (Rees, 1974; Pencavel, 
1986); and (iii) natural experiments in which large amounts of money were allocated using 
distribution rules that were independent of preferences and other determinants of economic 
behaviour (Bodkin, 1959; Kreinin, 1961; Landsberger, 1963; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993).
We start by looking at whether the windfall gain affects the probability of being employed, 
and estimate the following linear probability model:
Prob(Eft = 1) = c0 + c0j + Cj Windfallit + c2Wit + c3X u + s it (9)
for i = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ..., T, where Eit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
individual i is employed or 0 otherwise, Windfallit is our variable of interest and takes the 
value of 1 if the household has received a windfall gain or 0 otherwise, Wu denotes the hourly 
wage, Xu represents a set of controls for age, civil status and family characteristics, c0i is
individual fixed effect and sh is an i.i.d. error term.
In order to assess the effect of unexpected capital gains on working hours, we estimate the 
empirical counter-part of Equation (8) as described by10:
H it = c o + c oi + cxWindfallit + c2Wu + c3X„ + eit (10)
for i = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ..., 7, where Hit stands for weekly working hours of household i in year 
t.
Taking into account that the impact of windfalls on labour supply differs for different 
amounts of unanticipated gains, we also disaggregate the Windfall dummy into three different 
categories: (i) Small Windfall, in the case of capital gains between 2,000 and 10,000 EUR; (ii) 
Medium Windfall, for capital gains between 10,000 and 50,000 EUR; and (iii) Large Windfall, 
when the capital gain exceeds 50,000 EUR. Then, we consider the model:
10 Additionally assuming p  = r .
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Hft = c0+ cw + c\Small Windfallit + cf Medium Windfallit + c* Large Windfallit + ^
+ c2Wit + c3X it + eu
for i = 1, ..., N ,t = l, ..., T.
Finally, we look at whether the effect of the windfall varies with different personal 
characteristics. Therefore, we interact the regressors with the Windfall dummy and estimate 
the following model:
Ha = c o + c oi + cfVindfallit + c2Wu x  (1 + Windfallit) + c3X it x  (1 + Windfallit) + ett (12)
for i = 1, ..., N, t — 1, ..., T.
The estimation of the above models is complicated by the potential endogeneity of the wage 
term on the right-hand side11. Altonji (1986) emphasizes that current labour supply depends 
on all past and expected future wage rates and that it is important to control for permanent 
differences in wages across individuals.
Consequently, we assess the robustness of the results using both the fixed effects (FE) 
estimator and the fixed effects instrumental variable (FEIV) estimator. In the IV regressions, 
we follow Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) and Henley (2004) and instrument log monthly 
wages using conventional eamings-function control variables, namely, two dummies for 
education, interactions between education dummies and a quadratic in age, as well as country- 
year dummies.
5 Empirical results
5.1 The effects of windfall gains on working hours
In this and subsequent sub-sections, we analyse the effect of windfall gains on working hours. 
According to the empirical specification of the theoretical model presented above, we use the 
fixed effects estimation, thus controlling for family background and other time-invariant 
personal characteristics. Windfall gains are measured using a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 in the period of windfall receipt and after, and 0 in periods prior to windfall gains. 
This is in line with the life-cycle model of labour supply where after an unanticipated shock in 
personal wealth, an individual adjusts her whole labour-supply profile.
11 Pencavel (1986) also highlights the endogeneity o f  non wage income. In the context o f  our framework w e  
consider windfall gains as unanticipated and exogenous.
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In all specifications we include the following set of regressors: the dummy variable for the 
windfall gain, age, age squared, a dummy for married status and two dummy variables 
indicating whether there are any children aged 0-6 or 7-15 in the household. We focus on 
three main specifications, each of them being estimated for the full sample (Table 6), and then 
separately for men (Table 7) and for women (Table 8).
The first specification (column (1)) analyses the effects of windfall gains on the probability of 
being employed. According to the theory, after receiving unanticipated windfall gains, 
individuals are more likely to drop out of the labour force and use windfall gains to enjoy 
more leisure. Such behaviour is reported in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993), who find a negative 
effect of unanticipated inheritances on participation in the labour market. As a dependent
17variable we use a dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual is employed . 
Normally, probit specification would be used to analyse this; however, due to inconsistency 
of probit regression in settings with fixed effects, we use a linear probability model instead13.
The second specification (column (2)) uses working hours per week as a dependent variable. 
In this case we include all individuals who ever received windfall gains no matter whether 
they participate in the labour force in any particular period or not. That is, working hours can 
take any positive value, but they can also be zero. The second specification thus covers both 
external and internal margins of adjustment of labour supply to windfall gains14. In addition to 
the standard controls on the right hand side, this specification also includes a measure of 
hourly wage. As the hourly wage is computed from monthly wages and weekly working 
hours, it is endogenous. Consequently, we also report the results from an instrumental 
variables estimation (column (3)). Here we overcome the endogeneity problem by using two 
dummies for education, interactions of education dummies with quartic in age, as well as 
country-year dummies as instruments for hourly wage.
Finally, in the third specification (column (4)), we express working hours and wages in logs. 
As a consequence, only person-year observations with positive working hours and positive 
wages are included. This specification is closest to the theoretical approach based on the 
interior solution of the life-cycle optimisation problem derived in section 4.1. From an 
econometric perspective, however, one should note that a potential problem in this context
12 In our sample, about 25% o f  people change their employment status at least once.
13 In all cases in the paper where w e estimated the linear probability model w e also checked the results using 
logit specification with fixed effects. Results were very similar with the same conclusions.
14 Due to the number o f  zeroes on the left hand side, w e estimated this specification also using the Tobit with 
fixed effects estimator from Honore (1992). The results were again very similar and conclusions would be the 
same.
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stems from the fact that when receiving windfall gains individuals may decide to reduce their 
working effort either by reducing working hours or by dropping out of the labour force, which 
can generate a selection bias problem. We present the results both from the fixed effect setting 
(column (4)) and the instrumental variable estimation with fixed effects (column (5)).
Table 6: Effects of windfall gains on working hours -  all
Dependent variable: Employment
dummy
Working hours per week Log working hours per week
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE IV FE FE IV
windfall gains dummy -0.00424 -0.0618 0.00194 0.00125 0.00236
(0.00360) (0.159) (0.161) (0.00365) (0.00375)
hourly wage -0.831*** -0.441**
(0.0262) (0.203)
log hourly wage -0.404*** -0.197***
(0.00610) (0.0469)
age 0.0823*** 3.876*** 3.625*** 0.0564*** 0.0386***
(0.00272) (0 .121) (0.150) (0.00295) (0.00464)
ageA2 -0.000986*** -0.0452*** -0.0439*** -0.000490*** -0.000391***
(3.09e-05) (0.00137) (0.00142) (3.40e-05) (3.88e-05)
married dummy 0.0129* 1.205*** 1.157*** 0.0146** 0.00932
(0.00680) (0.301) (0.312) (0.00671) (0.00708)
children 0-6  in household dummy -0.0516*** -2.841*** -2.961*** -0.0491*** -0.0534***
(0.00571) (0.253) (0.259) (0.00560) (0.00584)
children 7-15 in household dummy -0.0425*** -2.318*** -2.333*** -0.0293*** -0.0292***
(0.00519) (0.230) (0.233) (0.00518) (0.00533)
Constant -0.841*** -41.45*** -36.29*** 2.974*** 3.131***
(0.0589) (2.615) (3.089) (0.0617) (0.0680)
Observations 54164 53011 52348 40239 39789
Number o f  individuals 10395 10357 10322 8735 8700
R-squared 0.024 0.049 0.126
Hausman test* 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. + Reports p-value o f  
the Hausman test o f  endogeneity. In IV regression (log) monthly w age is  instrumented using two dummies for 
education, interactions between education dummies and quartic in age and country-year dummies.
Table 6 summarizes the findings for the effects of windfall gains on working hours using the 
whole sample. The empirical evidence is not supportive of theoretical prediction of the life­
cycle model that an unanticipated rise in wealth reduces an individual*s working hours via a 
reduction in the marginal utility of wealth, in particular, the coefficients of the windfall gains 
dummy are not statistically significant. On the other hand, most coefficients of the other 
control variables have the expected signs and magnitudes and are statistically significant: (i) 
age has a nonlinear, inverted “U” shaped effect on labour supply; (ii) being married tends to 
increase labour supply; and (iii) having children reduces it. Only hourly wage has a surprising
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negative effect on working hours, which is reduced after using instrumental variables 
estimation, but it nevertheless remains negative and significant15.
Table 7: Effects of windfall gains on working hours -  men
Dependent variable: Employment
dummy
Working hours per week Log working hours per week
0 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE IV FE FE IV
windfall gains dummy -0.00493 -0.158 -0.0525 0.00126 0.00130
(0.00443) (0.237) (0.239) (0.00398) (0.00408)
hourly wage -0.879*** -0.812***
(0.0360) (0.218)
log hourly wage -0.368*** -0.192***
(0.00704) (0.0462)
age 0.0955*** 5.188*** 5.064*** 0.0621*** 0.0471***
(0.00338) (0.181) (0.205) (0.00323) (0.00490)
ageA2 -0.00115*** -0.0602*** -0.0593*** -0.000580*** -0.000495***
(3.83e-05) (0.00205) (0.00208) (3.69e-05) (4.23e-05)
married dummy 0.0197** 2.126*** 2.050*** 0.0349*** 0.0293***
(0.00843) (0.449) (0.460) (0.00748) (0.00785)
children 0-6  in household dummy -0.0309*** -1.207*** -1.406*** 3.02e-05 -0.00319
(0.00684) (0.366) (0.372) (0.00602) (0.00625)
children 7-15 in household dummy -0.0356*** -1 4 9 7 *** -1.579*** -0.00605 -0.00580
(0.00640) (0.341) (0.346) (0.00566) (0.00582)
Constant -0.980*** -59.98*** -56.94*** 2.959*** 3.076***
(0.0733) (3.925) (4.335) (0.0679) (0.0738)
Observations 26176 25626 25327 22503 22278
Number o f individuals 5087 5073 5061 4691 4679
R-squared 0.044 0.070 0.140
Hausman test+ 0 .000 0.008
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. + Reports p-value o f  
the Hausman test o f  endogeneity. In IV regression (log) monthly wage is instrumented using two dummies for 
education, interactions between education dummies and quartic in age and country-year dummies.
Table 7 reports the results for the sample consisting of men. Again, the coefficients of the 
windfall gains dummy are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, they are negative, which 
is in accordance with the theoretical formulation of the life-cycle model. Other controls have 
coefficients of sensible signs and magnitudes and, in particular, one can see that being 
married increases men’s labour supply.
Table 8 shows the results for the sample consisting of women. Again, in all five 
specifications, the effects of windfall gains are not statistically significant and are close to 
zero. These findings are therefore in line with Imbens et al. (2001), who show that the
15 This is perhaps due to the income effect being stronger than the substitution effect, although empirically this 
remains an unresolved issue. A ll regressions reported in the chapter have also been run using net monthly wage 
instead. In this case, the coefficient on the wage variable was always positive in both the OLS and instrumental 
variables specifications. However, the coefficients on the other variables and the conclusions regarding the 
effects o f  windfall gains were very similar to the results from the specifications which included the hourly wage.
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reaction of people to non-eamed income does not differ significantly between men and 
women.
Table 8: Effects of windfall gains on working hours -  women
Dependent variable: Employment
dummy
Working hours per week Log working hours per week
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE IV FE FE IV
windfall gains dummy -0.00367 0.0201 0.0563 0.000261 0.00366
(0.00558) (0.213) (0.216) (0.00659) (0.00687)
hourly wage -0.759*** -0.0268
(0.0385) (0.330)
log hourly w age _0 441*** -0.149**
(0.0103) (0.0752)
age 0.0699*** 2.651*** 2.259*** 0.0474*** 0.0230***
(0.00419) (0.160) (0.216) (0.00532) (0.00763)
ageA2 -0.000832*** -0.0314*** -0.0294*** -0.000357*** -0.000232***
(4.77e-05) (0.00182) (0.00195) (6.21e-05) (6.81e-05)
married dummy 0.00581 0.179 0.190 -0.0135 -0.0198
(0.0105) (0.402) (0.420) (0.0118) (0.0125)
children 0-6  in household dummy -0.0757*** -4.828*** -4.893*** -0 .12 2 *** -0.130***
(0.00915) (0.350) (0.362) (0.0103) (0.0109)
children 7-15 in household dummy -0.0512*** -3.309*** -3.232*** -0.0635*** -0.0643***
(0.00808) (0.308) (0.313) (0.00932) (0.00974)
Constant -0.705*** -23.60*** -16.21*** 3.015*** 3.245***
(0.0907) (3.472) (4.363) (0 .110) (0 .121 )
Observations 27988 27385 27021 17736 17511
Number o f  individuals 5308 5284 5261 4044 4021
R-squared 0.015 0.036 0.128
Hausman test+ 0.003 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. + Reports p-value o f  
the Hausman test o f  endogeneity. In IV regression (log) monthly w age is instrumented using two dummies for 
education, interactions between education dummies and quartic in age and country-year dummies.
So far we have found no supportive evidence that the receipt of unanticipated windfall gains 
has a significant and negative impact on labour supply. This finding however could either 
reflect that these effects are non-existent, or that they are very small and not well captured in 
the data. In fact, other researchers have reported that unanticipated windfall gains 
(inheritances, financial wealth, housing prices) have, at most, a small impact on labour 
supply, which in many cases are only marginally statistically significant (Holtz-Eakin, 1993; 
Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994; Henley, 2004). Another possible explanation for the small and 
not statistically significant results may lay in the fact that the windfall gains dummy used so 
far does not contain enough information. This is because it simply indicates whether an 
individual has received a windfall gain or not, no matter what the size of the gain was. 
Therefore, in the next sub-section, we split the windfall dummy into three groups: small, 
medium and large.
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5.2 The effects of small, medium and large windfall gains
We now introduce into the regression three dummies representing the size of windfall gains 
that individuals receive: small (less than 10,000 EURO), medium (more than 10,000 EURO 
but less than 50,000 EURO) and large (50,000 EURO or more). The benchmark for 
comparison is the time before the windfall gains are received. For example, the small windfall 
gains dummy tells us by how much working hours decrease (or increase), on average, due to 
the windfall gain in comparison to the situation where the windfall gain has not yet been 
received. According to the theory, the higher the unanticipated windfall gain, the stronger the 
effect on the marginal utility of wealth and the more negative we expect the effect on labour 
supply to be. Therefore, we expect the effect of the large windfall gains dummy to be negative 
and largest in absolute value.
Table 9: Effects of small/medium/Iarge windfall gains on working hours -  all
Dependent variable: Employment , .  , ., J Working hours per week  dummy r Log working hours per week
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE IV FE FE IV
small windfall gains dummy -0.00283 -0.132 -0.114 0.00671 0.00599
(0.00458) (0.203) (0.204) (0.00464) (0.00476)
medium windfall gains dummy -0.00597 -0.0102 0.0740 -0.00356 -0.00143
(0.00494) (0.218) (0 .22 1 ) (0.00502) (0.00517)
large windfall gains dummy -0.0213** -0.568 -0.406 -0.0137 -0.00931
(0.00835) (0.371) (0.378) (0.00851) (0.00882)
hourly wage -0.830*** -0.427**
(0.0262) (0.204)
log hourly wage -0.404*** -0 .2 0 0 ***
(0.00610) (0.0471)
age 0.0824*** 3.885*** 3.630*** 0.0565*** 0.0388***
(0.00272) (0.121) (0.150) (0.00295) (0.00464)
ageA2 -0.000985*** -0.0452*** -0.0439*** -0.000488*** -0.000391***
(3.09e-05) (0.00137) (0.00142) (3.40e-05) (3.88e-05)
married dummy 0.0131* 1.213*** 1.159*** 0.0148** 0.00942
(0.00680) (0.301) (0.312) (0.00671) (0.00708)
children 0 -6  in household dummy -0.0518*** -2.848*** -2.970*** -0.0491*** -0.0534***
(0.00571) (0.253) (0.259) (0.00560) (0.00584)
children 7-15 in household dummy -0.0427*** -2.323*** -2.338*** -0.0294*** -0.0293***
(0.00519) (0.230) (0.233) (0.00518) (0.00533)
Constant -0.848*** -41.78*** -36.56*** 2.971*** 3.126***
(0.0587) (2.609) (3.085) (0.0616) (0.0679)
Observations 54164 53011 52348 40239 39789
Number o f  individuals 10395 10357 10322 8735 8700
R-squared 0.024 0.049 0.127
Hausman test+ 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. + Reports p-value o f  
the Hausman test o f  endogeneity. In IV regression (log) monthly w age is instrumented using two dummies for 
education, interactions between education dummies and quartic in age and country-year dummies.
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We report the results separately for the whole sample, for men and for women, in Table 9, 
Table 10 and Table 11, respectively.
Column (1) of Table 9 suggests that windfall gains have a negative effect on the probability of 
being employed. Despite not being statistically significant for small and medium windfall 
gains, the coefficient associated with large windfall gains is negative and statistically 
significant. This lends some empirical support to the idea that after receiving large windfall 
gains, individuals are more likely to drop out of the labour force. As for the other 
specifications (columns (2) - (5)), the results are not statistically significant, although large 
windfall gains tend to have the most negative impact on labour supply.
Table 10: Effects of small/medium/large windfall gains on working hours -  men
Dependent variable: Employment
dummy Working hours per week Log working hours per week
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE IV FE FE IV
small windfall gains dummy -0.00104 -0.177 -0.126 0.00557 0.00517
(0.00563) (0.301) (0.303) (0.00502) (0.00515)
medium windfall gains dummy -0.00617 0.0221 0.111 0.00139 0.00153
(0.00610) (0.326) (0.329) (0.00552) (0.00566)
large windfall gains dummy -0.0306*** -1.337** -0.966* -0.0208** -0.0184*
(0.0103) (0.552) (0.560) (0.00927) (0.00953)
hourly wage -0.878*** -0.795***
(0.0360) (0.219)
log hourly wage -0.368*** -0.196***
(0.00704) (0.0463)
age 0.0954*** 5.191*** 5.065*** 0.0620*** 0.0473***
(0.00338) (0.181) (0.206) (0.00323) (0.00490)
ageA2 -0.00115*** -0.0601*** -0.0592*** -0.000577*** -0.000495***
(3.84e-05) (0.00205) (0.00209) (3.69e-05) (4.23e-05)
married dummy 0.0199** 2.138*** 2.055*** 0.0350*** 0.0295***
(0.00843) (0.449) (0.460) (0.00748) (0.00784)
children 0 -6  in household dummy -0.0311*** - 1.2 2 1 *** -1.418*** -6.81e-05 -0.00316
(0.00684) (0.366) (0.372) (0.00602) (0.00625)
children 7-15 in household dummy -0.0357*** -1.505*** -1.586*** -0.00606 -0.00580
(0.00640) (0.341) (0.346) (0.00566) (0.00582)
Constant -0.983*** -60.20*** -57.13*** 2.960*** 3.075***
(0.0730) (3.914) (4.333) (0.0677) (0.0737)
Observations 26176 25626 25327 22503 22278
Number o f  individuals 5087 5073 5061 4691 4679
R-squared 0.044 0.070 0.141
Hausman test+ 0.000 0.034
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. + Reports p-value o f  
the Hausman test o f  endogeneity. In IV regression (log) monthly wage is  instrumented using two dummies for 
education, interactions between education dummies and quartic in age and country-year dummies.
Table 10 displays the results for the sample of men. In all five specifications, not only is the 
coefficient of large windfall gains the most negative, but it is also statistically significant in all 
cases. Column (1) indicates that receiving large unanticipated windfall gains induces some
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men to leave the labour force. Similarly, in specifications with working hours on the left hand 
side (columns (2) -  (5)) there is a statistically significant and negative effect of large windfall 
gains on working hours.
Column (2) captures both external and internal margins of adjustment: on average, receiving 
an unanticipated windfall gain of 50,000 EUR or more reduces the labour supply of men by 
1.3 hours per week. Since average working hours for men in the sample are equal to 39.2 
hours per week, this represents on average a 3.4% reduction in working hours. In column (4), 
where only the internal margin is considered, the evidence suggests that the large windfall 
gains reduce working hours by 2.1%. Since only the adjustment o f working hours conditional 
on working is taken into account, the effect is plausibly smaller.
Table 11: Effects of small/medium/large windfall gains on working hours -  women
Dependent variable: Employment
dummy Working hours per week Log working hours per week
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE IV FE FE IV
small windfall gains dummy -0.00442 -0.0920 -0.127 0.00806 0.00690
(0.00712) (0.272) (0.275) (0.00845) (0.00877)
medium windfall gains dummy -0.00583 -0.0449 0.0757 -0.0111 -0.00479
(0.00765) (0.291) (0.297) (0.00897) (0.00943)
large windfall gains dummy -0.0123 0.211 0.183 -0.00496 0.00332
(0.0129) (0.495) (0.508) (0.0154) (0.0163)
hourly wage -0.759*** -0.0251
(0.0385) (0.330)
log hourly wage -0.442*** -0.148**
(0.0103) (0.0754)
age 0.0702*** 2.660*** 2.270*** 0.0476*** 0.0231***
(0.00419) (0.160) (0.215) (0.00532) (0.00763)
ageA2 -0.000833*** -0.0315*** -0.0294*** -0.000357*** -0.000231***
(4.77e-05) (0.00182) (0.00195) (6.21e-05) (6.81e-05)
married dummy 0.00593 0.178 0.192 -0.0135 -0.0199
(0.0105) (0.402) (0.419) (0.0118) (0.0126)
children 0-6  in household dummy -0.0758*** -4.824*** -4.893*** -0 .122*** -0.130***
(0.00915) (0.350) (0.363) (0.0103) (0.0109)
children 7-15 in household dummy -0.0513*** -3.308*** -3.232*** -0.0636*** -0.0643***
(0.00808) (0.308) (0.313) (0.00932) (0.00974)
Constant -0.715*** -23.90*** -16.58*** 3.009*** 3.237***
(0.0906) (3.466) (4.341) (0 .110) (0 .121)
Observations 27988 27385 27021 17736 17511
Number o f  individuals 5308 5284 5261 4044 4021
R-squared 0.015 0.036 0.129
Hausman test+ 0.005 0.004
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. + Reports p-value o f
the Hausman test o f  endogeneity. In IV regression (log) monthly wage is instrumented using two dummies for
education, interactions between education dummies and quartic in age and country-year dummies.
The results for women in Table 11, on the other hand, are not supportive of the idea that 
windfall gains reduce labour supply. None of the coefficients on windfall gains dummies are
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statistically significant, and many of them are nonnegative. In light of the fact that women are 
usually considered as being less attached to the labour market than men, this result is 
surprising. One would indeed expect the effect of windfall gains to be stronger and more 
negative for women. For instance, Henley (2004) finds a significant adjustment in hours 
worked to unanticipated financial gains for both men and women, but the largest impact 
occurs for women. In addition, the author shows that while men seem to make a (positive) 
adjustment in hours to housing losses but not a (negative) adjustment to gains, for women the 
reverse is true. On the other hand, Imbens et al. (2001) estimate the marginal propensity to 
earn out of unearned income and find that it does not differ significantly between men and 
women. Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) also show that the hours’ reduction by married women 
is of the same order of magnitude as men's.
A potential reason why the effects do not come through very strongly in the analysis above is 
due to heterogeneity in the effects of windfall gains. The effects of windfall gains may 
possibly depend on personal characteristics in an important way, so that the impact cancels 
out across different individuals. For example, an old worker may retire from the labour 
market after receiving the windfall gain, whereas a young employed worker may use it as a 
starting capital for a new business, become self-employed and increase his labour supply16. In 
order to assess the potential heterogeneity in the effects of windfall gains, in the next sub­
section we interact the windfall gains dummy with several personal characteristics.
5.3 The effects of windfall gains and interactions
In order to see whether the effects of unanticipated positive wealth shocks differ with respect 
to personal characteristics, we interact the windfall gains dummy with the other regressors. As 
discussed above, if the effects of windfall gains depend on personal characteristics and if, in 
addition, they cancel each other out across individuals, then this would explain why in the 
previous regressions the effects were small and often not statistically significant.
In Table 12 we report the results for the whole sample. Note that the coefficient in front of the 
windfall gain dummy alone simply represents the effect of windfall gains when all other 
controls are set to zero. In most cases, the coefficients of the interaction terms are statistically 
significant. Column (1) displays the results for the probability of being employed. Looking at 
the interactions, age has a “U“ shaped curve effect: at younger and older ages, the effect of
16 Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) and Taylor (2001) find empirical evidence o f  such behaviour. The authors argue 
that windfall gains can contribute to the relaxation o f  the liquidity constraints in capital markets and they find 
evidence that windfall gains increase the probability o f  becoming self-employed.
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windfall gains on participation is the most negative. This is in line with evidence reported by 
Holtz-Eakin (1993) and Imbens et al. (2001).
Table 12: Effects of windfall gains and interactions -  all
Dependent variable: Employment
dummy Working hours per w eek Log working hours per week
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE IV FE FE IV
windfall gains dummy -0.351*** -11.64*** -11.52*** 0.0568 -6.97e-05
(0.0582) (2.579) (2.633) (0.0631) (0.0670)
hourly wage -0.912*** -0.158
(0.0334) (0.300)
interaction o f  windfall gains with 0.117*** -0.187
wage (0.0287) (0.118)
log hourly wage -0.399*** -0.193***
(0.00714) (0.0475)
interaction o f  windfall gains with -0.00797 0.00363
log wage (0.00617) (0.0196)
age 0.0700*** 3.371*** 2.969*** 0.0529*** 0.0324***
(0.00378) (0.168) (0.207) (0.00410) (0.00569)
interaction o f  windfall gains with 0.0186*** 0.637*** 0.726*** -0.000138 0.00192
age (0.00291) (0.129) (0.134) (0.00318) (0.00339)
ageA2 -0.000843*** -0.0390*** -0.0367*** -0.000440*** -0.000312***
(4.53e-05) (0 .0 0 2 0 1 ) (0.00209) (4.97e-05) (5.52e-05)
interaction o f  windfall gains with -0.000217*** -0.00792*** -0.00869*** -7.41 e-06 -3.52e-05
ageA2 (3.45e-05) (0.00153) (0.00157) (3.82e-05) (4.02e-05)
married dummy 0.0398*** 2.082*** 2.115*** 0.0268*** 0 .0 2 2 1 ***
(0.00790) (0.350) (0.361) (0.00781) (0.00824)
interaction o f  windfall gains with -0.0436*** -1.505*** -1.619*** -0.0233*** -0.0244***
married dummy (0.00694) (0.308) (0.316) (0.00702) (0.00724)
children 0 -6  in hhold dummy -0.0425*** -1.978*** -2.251*** -0.0332*** -0.0371***
(0.00740) (0.328) (0.336) (0.00732) (0.00760)
interaction o f  windfall gains with -0.00801 -1.223*** -0.947*** -0.0247*** -0.0247***
children 0 -6  dummy (0.00783) (0.347) (0.358) (0.00783) (0.00827)
children 7-15 in hhold dummy -0.0433*** -2.135*** -2.149*** -0.0303*** -0.0312***
(0.00676) (0.299) (0.304) (0.00679) (0.00699)
interaction o f  windfall gains with 0.00822 0.0116 0.0738 0.00755 0.00931
children 7-15 dummy (0.00755) (0.334) (0.339) (0.00756) (0.00778)
Constant -0.610*** -32.06*** -25.22*** 3.009*** 3.222***
(0.0765) (3.395) (3.928) (0.0807) (0.0897)
Observations 54164 53011 52348 40239 39789
Number o f  individuals 10395 10357 10322 8735 8700
R-squared 0.026 0.051 0.128
Hausman test+ 0.001 0 .0 0 0
Standard errors in parentheses, * !significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% .+ Reports p-value o f  the
Hausman test o f  endogeneity. In IV regression (log) monthly w age is instrumented using two dummies for education,
interactions between education dummies and quartic in age and country-year dummies.
Being married also makes the negative effect of windfall gains on participation stronger. 
Thus, married people are more likely to reduce their labour supply. One possible explanation 
for this is that married people have less to worry about their income situation, as they have a
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partner who usually earns an income. Such behaviour can also be explained with a social 
multiplier (Glaeser et al., 2003). If people like to spend leisure in groups, then they are more 
likely to consume leisure when they have someone to spend the leisure with.
Table 13: Effects of windfall gains and interactions -  men
Dependent variable: Employment , T . .  , ,
a Working hours per week Log working hours per week
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE IV FE FE IV
windfall gains dummy -0.292***
(0.0719)
-12.85***
(3.857)
-12.35***
(3.929)
-0.00101
(0.0688)
-0.0175
(0.0718)
hourly wage
interaction o f  windfall gains with 
wage
log hourly wage
interaction o f  windfall gains with log  
w age
-0.933***
(0.0446)
0.0820**
(0.0393)
-0.510
(0.334)
-0 .212
(0.144)
-0.366***
(0.00810)
-0.00325
(0.00685)
-0.185***
(0.0465)
-0.0191
(0 .02 0 1 )
age
interaction o f  windfall gains with age 
ageA2
interaction o f  windfall gains with 
ageA2
0.0862***
(0.00470)
0.0154***
(0.00360)
-0.00104***
(5.60e-05)
-0.000180***
(4.26e-05)
4.614***
(0.252)
0.687***
(0.193)
-0.0531***
(0.00300)
-0.00862***
(0.00228)
4.361***
(0.288)
0.750***
(0 .2 0 0 )
-0.0516***
(0.00307)
-0.00898***
(0.00233)
0.0560***
(0.00448)
0.00231
(0.00347)
-0.000498***
(5.39e-05)
-3.98e-05
(4.14e-05)
0.0388***
(0.00612)
0.00469
(0.00373)
-0.000386***
(6.03e-05)
-6.76e-05
(4.38e-05)
married dummy 0.0353***
(0.00992)
2.579***
(0.529)
2.514***
(0.542)
0.0387***
(0.00884)
0.0344***
(0.00924)
interaction o f  windfall gains with
married dummy
children 0-6  in hhold dummy
interaction o f  windfall gains with 
children 0 -6  dummy 
children 7-15 in hhold dummy
interaction o f  windfall gains with 
children 7-15 dummy
-0.0251***
(0.00904)
-0.0152*
(0.00897)
-0.0214**
(0.00955)
-0.0321***
(0.00839)
-0.000463
(0.00939)
-0.735
(0.485)
-0.328
(0.479)
-1.235**
(0.510)
-1.285***
(0.448)
-0 .112
(0.502)
-0.758
(0.494)
-0.726
(0.488)
-0.893*
(0.519)
-1.408***
(0.455)
0.0145
(0.507)
-0.00908
(0.00824)
0.0130*
(0.00790)
-0.0224***
(0.00845)
0.00313
(0.00749)
-0.0125
(0.00834)
-0 .0 1 0 0
(0.00850)
0.00975
(0.00817)
-0 .0 2 1 0 **
(0.00881)
0.00272
(0.00770)
-0.0105
(0.00855)
Constant -0.807***
(0.0951)
-49.14***
(5.093)
_44 7i ***
(5.583)
3.053***
(0.0887)
3.198***
(0.0976)
Observations 
Number o f  individuals 
R-squared 
Hausman test+
26176
5087
0.045
25626
5073
0.072
25327
5061
0.001
22503
4691
0.141
22278
4679
0.048
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. + Reports p-value o f  the 
Hausman test o f  endogeneity. In IV  regression (log) monthly wage is instrumented using two dummies for education, 
interactions between education dummies and quartic in age and country-year dummies.
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In Columns (2) and (3) where total working hours are used as a dependent variable, results are 
similar: (i) there is an indication of a non-linear effect of age; (ii) being married makes the 
effect of windfall gains more negative; and (iii) similarly, having children of age 0-6 leads to 
a larger decrease in working hours, indicating that parents of young children do not drop out 
of the labour force after receiving windfall gains, but they seek shorter working hours. 
Columns (4) and (5) show the results for the sample with positive hours worked. They 
confirm that being married and having small children makes the effect of windfall gains more 
negative.
Table 13 reports the empirical findings for the sample of men. In Columns (1), (2) and (3), 
one can see that if they are of younger or older age, have young children or are married, then 
windfall gains reduce the probability of being employed. However, when we take away the 
adjustment along the external margin (columns (4) and (5)), the effects largely lose statistical 
significance, except for the effects of having young children.
Table 14 provides similar findings for women. In Column (1), where the probability of being 
employed is explored, there is a “U" shaped effect of age and a statistically significant 
negative effect of being married. The coefficients on the interactions of children dummies 
with windfall gains are not statistically significant. In the regressions with working hours on 
the left hand side (columns (2) and (3)), the results show that women with young children 
tend to reduce working hours after the receipt of windfall gains. Columns (4) and (5) also 
corroborate this finding.
In order to obtain a better understanding of the heterogeneity in the effects of windfall gains 
and how they depend on personal characteristics, Table 15 reports the predicted effects of 
windfall gains on labour supply by various types of individuals. We compute the effects of 
windfall gains for 8 hypothetical types of individuals. We start by choosing four different age 
groups: 25, 30, 40 or 55 years. We assume that: (i) individuals of age 25 can only be single 
and have no children; (ii) individuals of age 30 are either single with no children, or married 
with one child of age 0-6, (iii) individuals of age 40 can be single without children, married 
without children, or married with one child of age 0-6 and one child of age 7-15; (iv) 
individuals of age 55 can either be single or married, but they do not have any young children.
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Table 14: Effects of windfall gains and interactions -  women
Dependent variable: Employment
dummy Working hours per week L og working hours per w eek
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE IV FE FE IV
windfall gains dummy -0.387***
(0.0909)
-7.540**
(3.465)
-8.464**
(3.528)
0.213*
(0.115)
0.0951
(0.125)
hourly wage
interaction o f  windfall gains with
-0 919*** 
(0.0512) 
0 .2 1 0 ***
-0.224
(0.425)
0.115
wage
log hourly wage
interaction o f  windfall gains with 
log wage
(0.0442) (0.177)
-0.438***
(0.0124)
-0.00632
(0.0113)
-0.170**
(0.0786)
0.0393
(0.0383)
age
interaction o f  windfall gains with
0.0558***
(0.00586)
0.0204***
2.361***
(0.224)
0.401**
I .9 4 4 ***
(0.283)
0.482***
0.0511***
(0.00741)
-0.00848
0.0246***
(0.00950)
-0.00642
age
ageA2
interaction o f  windfall gains with 
ageA2
(0.00453)
-0.000670***
(7.03e-05)
-0.000236***
(5.41e-05)
(0.173)
-0.0278***
(0.00268)
-0.00500**
(0.00206)
(0.182)
-0.0251***
(0.00284)
-0.00596***
(0.00214)
(0.00581)
-0.000394***
(9.10e-05)
9.49e-05
(7.04e-05)
(0.00626)
-0.000246**
(9.82e-05)
6.62e-05
(7.51e-05)
married dummy 0.0403***
(0 .0 1 2 1 )
1 .2 1 2 ***
(0.464)
1.279***
(0.482)
0.00334
(0.0135)
-0.00508
(0.0145)
interaction o f  windfall gains with
married dummy
children 0-6  in hhold dummy
interaction o f  windfall gains with 
children 0-6  dummy 
children 7-15 in hhold dummy
interaction o f  windfall gains with 
children 7-15 dummy
-0.0549***
(0.0103)
-0.0739***
(0.0117)
0.00775
(0.0124)
-0.0564***
(0.0105)
0.0176
(0.0117)
-1.788***
(0.396)
-4.075***
(0.448)
-1.070**
(0.475)
-3.356***
(0.400)
0.406
(0.447)
-1.803***
(0.414)
-4.127***
(0.460)
-1.017**
(0.492)
-3.230***
(0.406)
0.353
(0.454)
-0.0315***
(0.0117)
-0 .10 0 ***
(0.0134)
-0.0330**
(0.0144)
-0.0778***
(0 .0 1 2 1 )
0.0333**
(0.0135)
-0.0288**
(0.0125)
-0.107***
(0.0141)
-0.0340**
(0.0154)
-0.0807***
(0.0127)
0.0353**
(0.0141)
Constant -0.440***
(0.118)
-18.02***
(4.520)
-10.49**
(5.328)
2.912***
(0.145)
3.231***
(0.159)
Observations 
Number o f  individuals 
R-squared 
Hausman test+
27988
5308
0.017
27385
5284
0.039
27021
5261
0.007
17736
4044
0.130
17511
4021
0.007
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. + Reports p-value o f  the 
Hausman test o f  endogeneity. In IV regression (log) monthly wage is instrumented using two dummies for education, 
interactions between education dummies and quartic in age and country-year dummies.
In those specifications where hourly wage is one of the regressors, predicted effects are 
computed at the mean wage in the sample. Specification (1) represents effects from 
participation regressions, specification (2) reports the FE IV regressions with working hours
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per week on the left hand side17, and specification (3) reports effects from FE IV regressions 
with log working hours as the dependent variable. In brackets we also report p-values from 
the Wald test of whether the computed predicted effects are statistically different from zero.
For young single people who have no children (first row of Table 15), receiving windfall 
gains reduces the probability of participating in the labour force. This can be seen, for 
example, in column (1), where the coefficient is -0.021. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that after winning an unanticipated windfall young people may decide to prolong 
their education and finance it with the money they have won. However, as specification (3) 
suggests, conditional on being employed, windfall gains increase the labour supply of young 
people, perhaps inducing young people to become self-employed and work more.
For individuals of age 30 and with no children, there is a positive effect of windfall gains on 
the probability of participating in the labour market and also on working hours conditional on 
working. On the other hand, for individuals of the same age who are married and have 
children of young age, the effects of windfall gains on labour supply are negative, with effects 
being strongly negative for both men and women.
In the case of individuals aged 40 with no spouse and no children, there is a positive effect of 
windfall gains on labour supply. Weekly working hours, on average, increase by 2.152 hours 
(specification (2)) or, conditional on working, for 0.028 log hours (specification (3)). This 
piece of evidence can again be related with the rise in probability of becoming self-employed 
as discussed in Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) and Taylor (2001). Interestingly, however, these 
effects decrease and end up being not statistically significant for individuals of age 40 who are 
married, especially if they have children.
We also find support in our data for the behaviour suggested by Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) 
and Taylor (2001). The results are reported in the Appendix. We find that winning windfall 
gains increases the probability of becoming self-employed for men. Including interaction 
terms supports the story that men aged about 40 years have a higher probability of becoming 
self-employed after winning a windfall gain. However, married men have a higher probability 
of becoming self-employed compared to single men.
Turning back to the results in Table 15, the effects of windfall gains on the labour supply of 
married individuals aged 55 tend to be statistically significant and negative. The impact of
17 The results o f  this specification were also checked using the Honore (1992) estimator, without instruments. 
The results were very similar and conclusions would be unchanged.
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windfall gains in the employment participation (specification (1)) is equal to -0.028 and the 
effect on weekly working hours (specification (2)) is equal to -0.966. These general patterns 
are similar for men and for women.
Table 15: Effects of windfall gains on labour supply by types of individuals
Full sample Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
25 yrs, 
single, no 
children
-0 .0 2 1 **
(0.034)
-0.259
(0.609)
0.033***
(0.005)
-0 .0 2 0 *
(0.091)
- 1.002
(0.182)
0.019
(0.173)
-0.025
(0.119)
0.682
(0.311)
0.049**
(0.016)
30 yrs, 
single, no 
children
0 .0 1 2 *
(0.093)
0 979*** 
(0.006)
0.033***
(0 .0 00 )
0.007
(0.411)
0.279
(0.597)
0.024**
(0 .0 1 1 )
0 .012
(0.318)
1.455***
(0 .0 0 2 )
0.035**
(0 .0 1 1 )
30 yrs, 
married, 
with one 
child 
40 yrs, 
single, no 
children
-0.039***
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.046***
(0 .0 0 0 )
-1.587***
(0 .00 0 )
2.152***
(0 .00 0 )
-0.016**
(0.041)
0.028***
(0 .0 0 0 )
-0.040***
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.034***
(0 .0 0 0 )
-1.372***
(0 .01 0 )
I.494***
(0.003)
-0.007
(0.410)
0.023***
(0.007)
-0.035***
(0 .002 )
0.050***
(0 .000 )
-1.365***
(0.003)
2.107***
(0 .00 0 )
-0.028*
(0.054)
0.017
(0 .2 0 2 )
40 yrs, 
married, no 
children
0.003
(0.701)
0.533*
(0.083)
0.003
(0.650)
0.009
(0.275)
0.736
(0 .110)
0.013*
(0.090)
-0.005
(0 .6 66 )
0.305
(0.455)
-0.011
(0.371)
40 yrs, 
married
0.003
(0.764)
-0.340
(0.427)
-0.012
(0.225)
-0.013
(0.275)
-0.143
(0.819)
-0.018*
(0.087)
0.021
(0.165)
-0.358
(0.540)
-0 .0 1 0
(0.589)
children
55 yrs, 
single, no 
children
0.016*
(0.069)
0.652
(0.109)
0.006
(0.535)
0.008
(0.471)
-0.051
(0.934)
-0.002
(0.826)
0 .020
(0.142)
0.853
(0.108)
0.015
(0.394)
55 yrs, 
married, no 
children
-0.028***
(0 .000 )
-0.966***
(0 .0 02 )
-0.018**
(0.032)
-0.017**
(0.042)
-0.809*
(0.093)
-0.013
(0.167)
-0.035***
(0 .001 )
-0.950**
(0 .02 0 )
-0.013
(0.384)
p-values in parentheses; testing the null whether linear combination o f coefficients equal to zero. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (1) Employment dummy as dependent variable, FE; (2) Working hours per week as 
dependent variable, FE IV; (3) Log working hours per week as dependent variable, FE IV. In (2) and (3) wages are also included 
in the regression; in these cases effects are calculated at the value o f the average wage in the sample (all, men or women).
Summing up, several interesting results emerge when we interact personal characteristics with 
windfall gains. First, the effects of windfall gains operate both at the external and internal 
margin, but they tend to be stronger at the external margin. This suggests that after receiving 
unanticipated windfall gains, people adjust their labour supply mainly by dropping out of the 
labour force, rather than by reducing their hours worked. Second, there is evidence that for 
some individuals (e.g., for single middle-aged individuals), effects on working hours can be 
positive. And third, for young and old people as well as individuals who are married with 
young children, windfall gains tend to have the most negative impact on labour supply.
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6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate whether European workers adjust labour supply (that is, labour 
market participation and working hours) in response to windfall gains. According to the life­
cycle model of labour supply, unanticipated gains in non-eamed income are expected to have 
negative effects on labour supply (MaCurdy, 1981). We use information from the European 
Household Panel for the 1994 to 2001 period to shed some light on the question of interest.
We find weak evidence that individuals react to windfall gains by reducing their working 
hours. The effects, however, seem to be small, which is in line with some previous findings 
(Holtz-Eakin, 1993; Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994; Henley, 2004). There is evidence that 
individuals adjust their labour supply mostly along the external margin, by dropping out of 
the labour force, rather than by reducing their working hours while staying in employment. 
Furthermore, we report that the effects on labour supply are stronger in the case of large 
windfall gains. The results and conclusions are robust to different specifications and they are 
not affected by the choice of which measure of wage is used on the right hand side: the hourly 
wage or the net monthly wage.
Finally, when we allow for heterogeneity of the effects across individuals, the results suggest 
that the impact of windfall gains on labour supply: (i) is more important for young and old 
individuals, (ii) is most negative for married individuals with young children, (iii) but can be 
positive for single individuals aged around 40 years. The last effect can be explained by the 
effect of windfall gains on reducing liquidity constraints in capital markets and thus 
encouraging people to become self-employed, as suggested in Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) and 
Taylor (2001) and confirmed also in our data.
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Appendix
Appendix Table 1: Effects of windfall gains on probability of becoming self-employed
Dependent variable: Self-employed dummy
all men women all men women
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6)
windfall gains dummy 0.00807***
(0.00231)
0 .0 1 2 2 ***
(0.00358)
0.00399
(0.00297)
small windfall gains 
dummy
medium windfall gains 
dummy
large windfall gains 
dummy
0.00198
(0.00294)
0.00900***
(0.00317)
0.0144***
(0.00535)
0.00599
(0.00454)
0.0147***
(0.00492)
0.0175**
(0.00832)
-0.00195
(0.00378)
0.00345
(0.00406)
0 .0 1 2 0 *
(0.00685)
age
ageA2
married dummy
children 0 -6  in household  
dummy
children 7-15 in household
dummy
Constant
0.0208***
(0.00175)
-0.000243***
(1.99e-05)
0.0219***
(0.00437)
-0.000748
(0.00367)
-0.00284
(0.00333)
-0.316***
(0.0378)
0.0312***
(0.00272)
-0.000359***
(3.09e-05)
0.0335***
(0.00680)
-0.00464
(0.00552)
-0.00471
(0.00516)
-0.490***
(0.0591)
0.0114***
(0 .0 0 2 2 2 )
-0.000139***
(2.53e-05)
0.00945*
(0.00560)
0.00135
(0.00486)
-0.00221
(0.00429)
-0.156***
(0.0482)
0 .0 2 1 2 ***
(0.00174)
-0.000245***
(1.99e-05)
0.0219***
(0.00437)
-0.000758
(0.00367)
-0.00280
(0.00333)
-0.328***
(0.0377)
0.0316***
(0.00272)
-0.000361***
(3.09e-05)
0.0334***
(0.00680)
-0.00475
(0.00552)
-0.00469
(0.00516)
-0.502***
(0.0589)
0.0117***
(0 .0 0 2 2 2 )
-0.000140***
(2.53e-05)
0.00944*
(0.00560)
0.00147
(0.00487)
-0.00214
(0.00429)
-0.169***
(0.0481)
Observations 
Number o f  individuals 
R-squared
54210
10397
0.005
26177
5088
0.011
28033
5309
0 .002
54210
10397
0.006
26177
5088
0.011
28033
5309
0.002
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. A ll regressions include individual 
fixed effects.
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Appendix Table 2: Effects of windfall gains on probability of becoming self-employed
(with interactions)
Dependent variable: Self-employed dummy
all men women
( 1) (2 ) (3)
windfall dummy -0.0731* -0.0709 -0.0698
(0.0374) (0.0580) (0.0483)
age 0.0159*** 0.0283*** 0.00510
(0.00243) (0.00379) (0.00311)
interaction o f  windfall gains with 0.00465** 0.00449 0.00435*
age (0.00187) (0.00290) (0.00241)
ageA2 -0.000182*** -0.000322*** -6.07e-05
(2.91e-05) (4.52e-05) (3.73e-05)
interaction o f  windfall gains with -6.13e-05*** -5.84e-05* -5.82e-05**
ageA2 (2.22e-05) (3.44e-05) (2.87e-05)
married dummy 0 .0 2 0 1 *** 0.0257*** 0.0114*
(0.00508) (0.00801) (0.00645)
interaction o f  windfall gains with  
married dummy
0.00361 0.0139* -0.00218
(0.00447) (0.00730) (0.00549)
children 0 -6  in hhold dummy 0.00358 0.00496 0.000725
(0.00476) (0.00724) (0.00625)
interaction o f  windfall gains with -0.00653 -0.0161** 0.00311
children 0 -6  dummy (0.00503) (0.00770) (0.00661)
children 7-15 in hhold dummy 0.00251 0.00485 -0 .0 0 1 2 2
(0.00435) (0.00678) (0.00558)
interaction o f  windfall gains with -0.00808* -0.0149** -0.000610
children 7-15 dummy (0.00486) (0.00758) (0.00625)
Constant -0.225*** -0.436*** -0.0395
(0.0492) (0.0768) (0.0629)
Observations 54210 26177 28033
Number o f  individuals 10397 5088 5309
R-squared 0.006 0.011 0 .002
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All regressions include individual fixed effects.
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General Conclusion
This work consists of three chapters on the general topic of working hours. I study working hours 
in relation to childcare support, wage inequality and windfall gains.
In Chapter I test whether fiscal family-support policies can help explain the differences in 
working-hours across countries. This has been suggested in the literature by Rogerson (2007) and 
Ragan (2005), but has so far relied on simulations of stylised macroeconomic models with a 
representative agent. However, the proposed explanations imply some important effects at a more 
disaggregated level. I therefore focus on differences between people with children and people 
without children.
I consider two types of public family policies: childcare subsidies and family cash benefits. With 
a simple theoretical model I show that we would expect the effect of childcare subsidies on 
aggregate working hours 1) to be positive in general, 2) to be positive for both parents and 
nonparents, but 3) be stronger for parents. There should be 4) no aggregate effects of family cash 
benefits on working hours, 5) a negative effect for parents, and 6) a positive effect for nonparents. 
The effects of family policies are also expected to affect the time in childcare within a household. 
According to the model outlined in this chapter there is 1) a negative effect of childcare subsidies 
on aggregate time spent in childcare in general, 2) negative for both parents and nonparents, but 
3) stronger for parents. There should be 4) positive aggregate effects of family cash benefits on 
childcare time, 5) the effects should be positive for parents, and 6) negative for nonparents.
I test these predictions using cross country variation from European Household Panel and US 
CPS data. In the aggregate setting there is no supportive evidence for the idea that family policies 
help explain differences in working hours across countries. In preferred specifications with other 
controls included, the effects are close to zero and insignificant. In countries with higher childcare 
subsidies, participation in the labour force is indeed higher, but working hours conditional on 
working are lower, bringing the aggregate effect of policies to zero. When comparing the effects 
of parents and nonparents, the differences in the coefficients are counterintuitive. There is an 
indication that results go in the right direction for females, but are cancelled out by the counter 
effects on males; hence, on the whole, family policies do not have the expected effect on working 
hours.
Furthermore, in regressions with time spent in childcare at home on the left hand side, the effects 
of policy variables contradict the theory. Childcare subsidies, for example, seem to increase the 
time in childcare at home and this effect seems to be, counter-intuitively, strongest for parents.
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An analysis performed on the sample of people older than 55 years, for which family policy 
should not matter much, seems to indicate that childcare subsidies tend to reduce the time in 
childcare for this group. One possible explanation for this is that public childcare support actually 
relieves grandparents from childcare, rather than parents. But, because older people do not 
participate in the labour market very much, family support cannot have a strong impact on 
working hours. Finally, I incorporate into the analysis two measures of cultural factors: the 
average number of adults in the household and the incidence of part-time work in the country. 
After controlling for these two variables, the aggregate effects of childcare subsidies on working 
hours become positive and significant; however, the effects on parents are still weaker than the 
effects on nonparents and the results from the analysis on the time in childcare spent at home still 
contradict the theory.
The lack of empirical evidence in support of the idea that family policies can help explain the 
differences in working hours across countries is striking. The family policy story can perhaps be 
used narrowly to explain the differences between Sweden and the US, but it does not bear the 
inclusion of a greater set of countries and a greater set of controls. Nor does it bear the separation 
of effects for parents and nonparents. I therefore conclude that the family policy story contributes 
little to the explanation of the differences in working hours across countries.
However, it is important to note that in practice, family policies are not implemented solely to 
affect labour supply. Instead, they may be directed at other objectives such as gender equity and 
fertility, for example, and some of these can affect labour supply in their own way, possibly 
masking the effects of child subsidies and cash benefits. Due to data limitations they have not 
been included in the analysis above, but they should be addressed in future research.
The objective of this chapter is to test whether the predictions of macroeconomists trying to 
explain variation in working hours across countries are correct, hence the model used is a macro 
type model and includes only minor variation across individuals regarding preferences and public 
policies. It is possible, however, that very simple assumptions in such macro models give rise to 
effects that would not appear in more involved models. It has been shown that in models that take 
into account labour supply, fertility and childcare decisions, the effects of childcare policies are 
mostly of an ambiguous sign. Therefore, one could conclude that in this particular instance, the 
hypotheses of macroeconomists are not grounded in microeconomic behaviour, a conclusion that 
is in line with the empirical conclusions presented in this chapter.
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Finally, it is important to stress that given the slow variation in policies over time, the analysis is 
done mainly by exploiting variation across countries. However, the data is available only for a 
relatively small number of countries. With more variation in public policies over time, or when 
data becomes available for a greater number of countries, future analysis may lead to more robust 
conclusions.
In Chapter I I I  argue that a mean-preserving spread in offered wages (rising wage inequality) 
lowers average working hours in the economy. The exact mechanism works through the 
concavity of the labour supply. Intuitively, with wage inequality rising, the wages of highly paid 
workers rise and wages of low paid workers fall. Due to the concavity in the labour supply, 
responses to the changes in wages are stronger at the bottom of the wage distribution, hence the 
working hours of low-paid workers decrease more than working hours of high-paid workers rise. 
Some of the low-paid workers may also decide to drop out of the labour force and become 
inactive, thus reducing their labour supply to zero. Therefore, as a consequence, average working 
hours in the economy fall.
This explanation implicitly assumes that working hours are just a response to labour market 
opportunities. In this I follow the labour supply literature such as Juhn et al. (1991), Juhn (1992) 
and Welch (1997). The contribution of Chapter II is that it explicitly recognizes that changes in 
the inequality of offered wages have effects on average working hours in the economy. Using the 
CPS-MORG data for prime-age men I find evidence for this explanation. First I establish 
empirically the concavity of the labour supply function. Secondly, using various variables to 
measure wages and labour supply, and using several different specifications, I find empirical 
evidence that after controlling for the average wage, wage inequality has indeed a negative and 
significant effect on the labour supply. According to my results, the increase in wage inequality 
that occurred in the US over the 1979-2008 period would cause a 3% decrease in average hours 
worked in the economy. Rising inequality can thus potentially explain 30-40% of the decrease in 
working hours over time.
The results in Chapter II are interesting for students of labour supply, for students of inequality 
and for researchers interested in explaining differences in working hours across countries and 
overtime. Moreover, the results are also interesting from the point of view of public policies that 
affect wage inequality.
In Chapter III my co-author and I investigate whether European workers adjust labour supply in 
response to windfall gains. According to the life-cycle model of the labour supply, unanticipated
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gains in non-eamed income are expected to have negative effects on labour supply (MaCurdy, 
1981). We use information from the European Household Panel for the 1994 to 2001 period to 
shed some light on the question of interest.
We find evidence that individuals react to windfall gains by reducing their working hours. The 
effects, however seem to be small, which is in line with some previous findings (Holtz-Eakin, 
1993; Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994; Henley, 2004). There is evidence that individuals adjust their 
labour supply mostly along the external margin, by dropping out of the labour force, rather than 
by reducing their working hours while staying in employment. Furthermore, we report that the 
effects on labour supply are stronger in the case of large windfall gains.
Finally, when we allow for heterogeneity of the effects across individuals, the results suggest that 
the impact of windfall gains on labour supply: (i) is more important for young and old 
individuals, (ii) is most negative for married individuals with young children, (iii) but can be 
positive for single individuals at the age of around 40 years. The last effect can be explained by 
the effect of windfall gains on reducing liquidity constraints in capital markets and thus 
encouraging people to become self-employed, as suggested in Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) and 
Taylor (2001) and confirmed also in our data.
At the end I will give a brief critical assessment of the work that has been done and discuss some 
potential avenues for future research.
In Chapter I, I initially expected, consistent with a large body of macroeconomic theory, that 
family policies would turn out to have an effect on aggregate labour supply. However, it turns out 
that I am left with proving that cash benefits to families and childcare subsidies have no impact 
on aggregate labour supply across a group of countries. As an empirical question, it is an uphill 
battle to prove that some factor has zero effect, as any test of this sort essentially has no power, 
therefore such analysis is very much prone to criticism. One must be confident that the model is 
appropriately specified, that the measures of the policy variables are good and that one has 
controlled adequately for other policies and cultural differences that might affect employment and 
working hours decisions. Furthermore, it is difficult to tackle a macroeconomic question with 
individual data, because even though the large number of individuals yields many data points, the 
country level variables still suffer from a limited number of degrees of freedom.
Nevertheless, the question being asked in Chapter I remains an interesting one and more research 
can be done on it. The most obvious thing to do is to wait for a longer data series, which would 
hopefully bring more variation into the policy variables. Similarly, with data available for a
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greater set of countries, the degrees of freedom problem will become less severe. However, some 
research could be done also with existing data. For example, instead of individuals, analysis could 
be done on households. Empirical work on working hours could also rely on testing more 
complex models of household behaviour, following household behaviour regarding labour 
supply, fertility and childcare more closely.
In Chapter III examine changes in working hours in the US for the 1979-2008 period using data 
on prime-age men. I exclude women due to strong growth in female participation during this 
period and due to complications of female labour supply associated with childbearing. But, trends 
in the labour supply of men and women might be related, resulting in reductions of male labour 
supply precisely due to increases in female labour supply. This could occur if women are 
substitutes for men at low wages, or if husbands can remain inactive because wives are now 
earning a salary. Hence, further research should include female labour supply and delve into 
exploring the interrelations between trends in male and female labour supply. One obvious line of 
research would be to test the predictions of Chapter II, that inequality reduces average hours of 
work, with data from a different country. Another interesting area of research would also be to 
explore the complementarities (or substitutions) of labour supply within households with 
changing labour market opportunities.
In Chapter III I test the effects of receiving unexpected windfall gains on labour supply, relying 
on predictions from a life cycle model. Again my unit of observation is the individual, but I could 
as well explore the effects on the labour supply for households as a whole and potential changes 
and substitutions within a household. It would be very interesting to see the effects on other uses 
of time, such as leisure, childcare, and on consumption patterns. The variable measuring windfall 
gains in my data is a household level variable and is available in three discreet intervals, only 
indirectly indicating size of the gain. Ideally, however, one should find data where it is clear who 
the receiver of the windfall gain is and what the amount of the gain is.
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